


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HEGEL'S DOCTRINE OF FORMAL LOGIC

BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE FIRST
SECTION OF THE SUBJECTIVE LOGIC

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

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P R E F A C E

FORMAL logic is the subject-matter of the first section of Hegel's *Subjective Logik*. The *Subjective Logik* itself constitutes the second part, or the third book, of the *Wissenschaft der Logik*, written while Hegel was rector of the gymnasium at Nuremberg.

When a youthful student is told without further explanation that the philosophy of Hegel places the absolute truth in logical thought, he naturally proceeds to put two and two together in a mechanical sort of way. One pigeon-hole of his mental repository furnishes him with the information that the absolute truth is the ultimate ground and explanation of this universe of things. Under another mental heading he finds that logical thought consists for the most part in extracting from propositions and pairs of propositions all their legitimate implications and equivalents. The combination of these articles of information yields the truly astonishing result that Hegel sees the ultimate explanation of all reality in such thoughts as that it follows from all pigs being animals that some animals are pigs; and the student naturally concludes, if he is of a matter-of-fact and definite turn of mind, that Hegel's philosophy is an extravagance

of metaphysical levity, or if he, or she, is romantically inclined, that it is a dark and delightful mysticism.

* [Now, whatever else may be said against Hegelianism, most certainly it is neither frivolous nor mystical. But the first step towards the apprehension of this fact is that the student should gain some general notion of what Hegel did and did not mean by logical thought. And how can he do so better than by studying Hegel's logical thought as it appears in that domain of thought-forms with which the name of logic has been associated for over two thousand years ?

Surely every lover of philosophy must at times have felt misgivings about the ancient science of logic as it appears in its modern presentations. That science, indeed, despite the bustling competition of its latter-day rivals, has never quite lost the spell of its aristocratic glamour. It still bears its august title—the science of the *logos*, the divine word or reason. It can still point to its groundplan designed by the mighty *maestro di color che sanno*, to its acknowledged pre-eminence during centuries of a singularly beautiful, earnest, and thoughtful phase of the human spirit. No modern misrepresentation can altogether stifle its lofty claim to be the science of pure thought, of the ideal of thought; and the very ring of these terms places it for the lover of philosophy on a plane apart from the sciences that never rise above the mere fact. Yet when we come to contemplate its content, its actual achievement, what a disappointment! Helpless appeals to everyday thinking and popular parlance to determine the import of

reason: petty wranglings over the contradictory of *all endogens are all parallel-leaved plants*, or the connotativeness of *John Smith*: wearisome rules for converting and obverting alternately until one is mercifully brought to a stand by the *O cul-de-sac*: unworthy caricatures of the *logos* in dotted lines and blackened circles: detestable hexameters concocted as mnemonics for peddling distinctions that were better forgotten: tedious conundrums that are not to be compared as tests of ingenuity with the puzzle toys of an Oriental bazaar:—such matters would seem to be its main concern. Even were we entirely to reject his metaphysical foundations, we should at least be thankful to Hegel for the broad, dignified, and significant treatment that he has accorded to this sadly abused and trivialized science.—But a Preface is not the place to enlarge on this topic.

It has been my great good fortune to have freely at my disposal during the preparation of this work the wide knowledge and wise judgement of my friend Dr. James Creed Meredith. I am indeed deeply in his debt for his valuable assistance, ever ready to my call; but I can console myself by reflecting that the reader is still more indebted to me for the unstinted use I have made of it.

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INTRODUCTION

THE name of the Hegelian philosophy has to a great extent lost its intimidatory power ; and though it is still sometimes invoked by preachers and professors to overawe the simple-minded, the trick is wearing thread-bare. Seventy years ago a distinguished English logician¹ classed Hegel among the mystics ; few persons would make such a mistake nowadays, though even yet it is not sufficiently recognized that his philosophy, impressive and imposing as it is from its combination of breadth and profundity, is [an altogether definite, sober, and methodical attempt to solve the riddle of the universe.]

So much has changed. Yet in spite of this change, and in spite of the fact that there are common current notions of some of the dominant notes and general bearings and points of view of Hegelianism, the precise metaphysics on which the system rests are largely ignored or misunderstood by the average student of philosophy in this country. The misunderstandings of Hegel, indeed, have been many and curiously conflicting, and often in the face even of his explicit statements. He has been accused in popular phrase of denying the existence of an external world, and of reducing, like Berkeley, the totality of things to individual minds and their ideas ; although the material sphere is an indispensable member of his system, and although he notes the theory of Berkeley with something approaching contempt.² He has been condemned as a pantheist,

¹ See Mill's *Logic*, bk. V, chap. iii, sect. 4.

² See Hegel's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. iii, p. 440 (ed. 1844).

and therefore, according to the common confusion, as an atheist, although in the development of philosophic thought he explicitly assigns its place to pantheism, as an inferior though necessary standpoint of human reflection.¹ Materialism of the crudest, the materialism of Büchner and Moleschott, has derived itself from him, although his ground principle is that truth lies in thought alone. He has been widely quoted in support of the popular notion of a personal Deity, although he expressly identifies the mind of God, before its manifestation in nature and finite spirit, with the sphere of abstractions and shadows.² He has been ridiculed for undertaking to deduce all the particular facts of existence from pure reason, in spite of his repeated statement that it is the very essence of the world of nature and finite spirit to teem with nullities and contingencies, in other words, with what cannot be deduced.³ His system has been held to stand self-condemned, because he once suggested a rational explanation of why there should be seven planets ; as though a principle was disproved by a mistaken application of it, and as though he had not taken care to confess his sense of his own shortcomings in the carrying out of his general method.⁴

Such misunderstandings in the air are a serious impediment to the study of Hegel ; and it is the aim of the following pages to put before the reader, in quite a general and provisional way, some truer and more just conceptions of what Hegelianism in general means, and so help him to enter on the study of a great philosopher with a mind at least not disposed to misunderstand him.

¹ *Logik*, bk. I, p. 75 (ed. 1841).

² *Logik*, bk. I, p. 33 and p. 44.

³ See for example below, p. 156.

⁴ See for example *Logik*, bk. I, p. 39.

A. THE HEGELIAN CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY
IN GENERAL.

According to the vulgar notion, we, human beings, are in the immediate presence of, and immediately cognizant of, a multitude of facts or particular existences, and it is the function of science and philosophy to extend this cognition, either by bringing new facts within our ken, or by adding to our knowledge of what are already there. For example, by personal experience and tradition we are immediately acquainted with facts extending over a few thousand years of the world's history; it is the business of science and philosophy, according to this notion, to reveal to us some of the facts of the years that preceded those limits, and of those that are yet to come. Or, we have an immediate knowledge of certain facts lying within a circumscribed area of so many square miles; what science and philosophy have to do is to discover to us facts about further worlds and more distant spaces. Or again, we are familiar with the symptoms of some disease; that is to say, we know immediately certain more or less obvious conditions present to the body that suffers from it. It would be the business of science and philosophy to ascertain, by microscopical or other investigation, such additional deep-lying conditions as would be amenable to direct treatment and so open the way to a cure. Or again, we are immediately cognizant, in part at least, of this system of things which we call the universe; and in it we find in general certain objects produced by others, and in particular many systematic objects made by ourselves. It would be the part of science and philosophy to ascertain if this whole system that we call the universe is itself produced by some other object, preferably by an object resembling ourselves in our general character

as agents, though of immense power adequate to the creation of the cosmos. Or once more, we observe in the world around us objects of various degrees of density and rarity; it would be the function of science and philosophy to examine whether there be any truth or possibility in the tradition that tells us that those whom we call the dead really inhabit this world and atmosphere of ours, though the rarity of their new bodies conceals them, except under special and unknown conditions, from our gross perception.

In this notion the distinction between science and philosophy is variously conceived. Sometimes philosophy is supposed to be doing the same thing as science—looking for facts—but looking for them in more ancient times, at more remote distances, at profounder depths of analysis, and consequently with a greater doubt and uncertainty in its results. If I am investigating the facts of life in Greece three thousand years ago, it is a scientific research; but if I inquire into the facts of the solar system as it was a hundred million years ago, it is philosophical speculation. If I ask questions about the moon, it is scientific curiosity; but if I venture as far as the Milky Way, I am perilously near the brink of philosophic doubt. Sometimes philosophy is supposed to be concerned with the facts of human minds, while science restricts itself to what is material. A question of physical habits is held to be scientific, a question of mental habits to be philosophical. Here again doubt and uncertainty are regarded as the special portion of philosophy; for the vulgar imagination always discredits the mental, and does not see that if it is facts that are wanted the most idle fancy that brain ever held is as much a fact, that is to say, it just as much happened or took place, as the earthquake at Messina.

Nor is the notion of philosophy as a discovery and

exposition of facts a mere popular error confined to the man in the street. On the contrary, it has infected nearly all the philosophical thinking of England. It is carried to the extreme of its irrationality in Butler's *Analogy of Religion*, which actually sets out to defend certain features in a conception of the truth by finding parallels to them in the facts! Surely it is a simple reflection that, were the world and the things of this life all they should be, there would be no need for the conceptions of God and a future life to correct them.

There is a particular misconception of philosophy that has been made prevalent in this country by the one-sided study of the empirical and critical schools. According to this misconception, the mind or ego is a certain existent thing—though doubtless a thing of a peculiar nature—confronted by a congeries of other things called the world or the non-ego, of which the mind contains a picture or reproduction, which we call knowledge. On this view, the particular facts of the world, and consequently of the mind's reproduction of it—that the sun attracts the earth, that cold solidifies water, &c.—are matters of science, that is of observation and experiment, whereas the sole function of philosophy is to explain how such a reproduction of the world by the mind is possible, and how we can know it to be faithful. This question presents great difficulties; for as the knowledge or reproduction is conceived as the immediate contact of the world and the ego, the ego cannot get any nearer to the original, so as to measure the accuracy of its copy.

The fundamental supposition that underlies all these notions is that the immediate fact, the particular existence¹ in time and space, the original *datum* of sense,

¹ Philosophy is under the difficulty that it can only express itself in language and that nevertheless it is concerned with distinctions and conceptions that language does not recognize. Its only resource is

is the truth. The language of ordinary life accords in the main with this supposition. If I say that it is cold, and if the thermometer is standing at zero, I am said to be speaking the truth, and my statement is said to be true because the fact is true. And since, whatever disputes there may be as to what the truth is in itself, the truth is at any rate what is of supreme value to every one—just as Socrates tells us in the *Republic* that all men seek the good, however much they differ as to what the good is—the plain man who finds the truth in the fact finds in it also his supreme good and interest.

Now the notion of science as having for its function the discovery and exposition of facts is not true of any science that deserves the name. To take a familiar instance, the science of geometry is so far from being a statement of facts, that it is a direct contradiction of them. For it is of the very essence of the fact *not* to present us with absolute circles, or absolute straight lines, or absolute equality of magnitudes. So obvious, indeed, is the opposition between facts and the truth of geometry, that Hume, with whom science and philosophy were merely a matter of facts, regarded geometrical science as a fiction of the imagination. And what is true of geometry is true of every science to some degree. Even the so-called natural sciences involve classifications and distinctions that nature with its hybrids and monsters

to use words in restricted and conventional meanings ; and this is far from satisfactory, for it must happen that philosophy will sometimes have to employ those same words in their everyday sense, and so fall into ambiguity. The words *fact* and *existence* I have used generally in the sense of the *immediate datum* of consciousness, immediate *presence* to consciousness, something that *is there*, without any further reflection or reference. But in everyday language these words are often employed with an implication of reality or objectivity as opposed to mere contingent subjectivity, and it is sometimes impossible to avoid this use of them.

confuses and denies. If we want the pure fact, it is not in science that we must look for it. When we are informed by weekly papers of a certain class that 'Mr. Hall Caine when engaged on a story writes on an average 1,500 words a day', or that 'Donkey licences for the season have been issued by the Clacton Urban Council on condition that only persons under sixteen years are allowed to ride them', we have an approach to the absolute fact, but little trace of science or philosophy.

But however false this notion may be as applied to science, it is still more false when applied to philosophy. For while the different sciences only oppose the world of facts in particular directions and respects, philosophy opposes it absolutely. If the first step in religion, though by no means the whole of religion, is to renounce the world, so the first step in philosophy, though by no means the whole of philosophy, is idealism or the denial of the fact. Much of the violent popularity and violent unpopularity that have attached to idealism are due to the supposition that the denial of the fact means the denial of the fact's existence. People have supposed, for example—and loved or hated him for it, according to the bent of their minds—that Hegel gravely asserted that the external world, the 'manifold of space of time', was not there at all! This is precisely as absurd as if one were to imagine that when Buddha called upon men to deny themselves and their affections, he was asking them to disbelieve that they and their affections existed. The truth is that philosophy, like art and religion, is an appraiser of the value of things and thoughts; and having weighed the so-called world of facts and found it wanting, it denies it or turns from it to the contemplation of a new world that shall be for it adequate and true. In other words, it denies, not the existence of the fact, but the truth of existence, precisely

as religion does not deny that the passions are natural, but repudiates the authority of nature. It is not facts then, but this new supersensible world of absolute truth, only to be reached by turning away from the facts, that is the real object of philosophy.

This idea of truth as independent of, and even in general opposed to, the existent fact is not wholly unrecognized in the language of everyday life. We have seen that the term *true* is commonly applied primarily to the facts, and then to our ideas in so far as they agree with them; but it is not always so. When, for example, we say of a man that he is or is not a true statesman, of a painting or poem that it is or is not a true work of art, we are making the idea the standard of truth, and attributing truth to the existent fact only if, and in so far as, it agrees with the idea.

We may here note for the first time a point of capital importance, the neglect of which does much to embarrass the student of Hegel. Philosophy, as we have seen, repudiates the existent fact, and exposes the error of confusing the truth of a thing with its existence. But when we are contemplating the pure absolute truth that philosophy substitutes for the fact, we must beware of falling into an analogous error, and attributing existence to this absolute truth because it is true. For man, as a creature evolving out of a sensuous and animal condition, it is very difficult to think without images, that is to say, without having before his mind's eye the representation of a fact, or definite existence in space and time. Even when we are conscious that in the nature of things no image can rightly represent the thought on which we are engaged, the latter commonly evokes involuntarily some sort of image, however inadequate or even contradictory; and then there is the danger that we may confuse the image with the thought, and attribute

existence to what in the nature of things cannot exist. Now, when we think of the absolute truth—whether we conceive it with Parmenides as the one, or with Plato as the idea, or with Spinoza as the infinite substance, or with Leibnitz as the monad—a pretended image of the truth obtrudes itself on our consciousness, as though the truth was an existence. We must therefore steadily bear in mind that it was the untruth of existence that led us to the truth, and that to convert the latter into an existence would be to fall back on the position, whose inadequacy and falsehood was the starting-point of our reflection.

This does not of course mean that the truth does not manifest itself in the world, or that there is no such thing as a science of nature and of spirit, or that the orders of nature and spirit hold no relation to the absolute truth. On the contrary, we shall see later that the truth must manifest itself; to use the language of religion, God must create a world, and the man who loses his life for the truth shall surely find it again. But God and the world are distinct though they constitute an identity; and there is the same diversity in identity between the truth and its manifestation. The truth taken by itself, or, as we may call it, the *pure* truth, does not and cannot exist. In the language of Kant, it is not in time or space; and the young student should note that to exist through all time is not to be out of time, and that to exist everywhere or very far away is not to be out of space.

There is here a certain ambiguity of language which may be illustrated by reference to the common conception of a substance. This conception we reach by abstraction, that is to say, we strip off all the qualities or accidents $xyz \dots$ of an object O , and the substratum, S , that remains as the potential support of the accidents is called the substance. Of this latter we then attempt to form

an image, but immediately find ourselves baffled. For in stripping off $x y z . . .$ we have removed all the materials out of which an image could have been formed—the size of the thing, its shape, colour, weight, feel, sound, &c. We then proceed to call our failure ignorance, and to speak of the mysterious nature of substance.¹ But surely there is nothing mysterious about a thing not possessing accidents when it was specially defined as exclusive of them; nor is it ignorance on our part not to be able to find in a thing the qualities of which it is the express denial. On the other hand there is ignorance in the common abstraction which makes an absolute separation between the substance and its accidents.

We may then express ourselves in either of two ways. Since substance is distinct from its accidents, and yet one with them in the sense that they together constitute an indissoluble identity, we may on the one hand be thinking of the substance, S , as a factor *distinct from* the accidents $x y z . . .$ in the indivisible O , in which case we naturally say that S has no accidents; or again we may be thinking of S as the *inseparable* support of $x y z . . .$ in the totality O , and in that case we say that S has for its accidents $x y z . . .$ In the same way the absolute truth, as we shall see later, manifests itself in the cosmos of nature and of spirit—not the contingent medley of isolated facts whose negation is the beginning of philosophy; this cosmos is, if you will, the existence of the truth. To use once more the language of religion, the world is the existence of God. But when we consider the absolute truth or God prior to, or apart from, His manifestation, we should exclude the idea of existence; whereas we are prone to set on one side

¹ See for example Locke's *Essay*, bk. II, chap. xiii, sect. 17-19, and chap. xxiii, sect. 1-6.

His manifestation or existence in the world, and then attribute to Him a second existence in this abstraction, precisely as if we were to conceive substance in its abstraction from accidents, and then hunt about for another set of qualities—mysterious and deep below the surface—by which to determine it.

But admitting that philosophy, if there is such a thing as philosophy at all, is concerned not with facts, but with the absolute truth, and that the absolute truth is not to be imagined as existing, we are immediately confronted by several difficult questions. Must we suppose that the immediate fact is untrue, and how are we justified in asserting a sphere of absolute truth at all?—for though we do not attribute existence to such a sphere, we must be asserting it in some sense or other, or it would be nothing at all, nor could we rationally speak or argue about it. Again, what is the particular nature, the matter or content, of this absolute truth, of which we have so far stated only what it is *not*? Once more, if truth is not existence, what value attaches to truth, and what condemnation is implied in saying of an existent thing that it is not true? We shall proceed to consider the first of these questions, which, taken in the broadest possible way, may be called the question of the philosophical *ordo cognoscendi*.

B. THE HEGELIAN *ordo cognoscendi*.

We are familiar with the logical dilemma that attends the inference between the universal and the particular. If, on the one hand, we attempt to deduce the particular from the universal by the formal syllogism, we fall into a *petitio principii*. If we reason—

All men are mortal

Socrates is a man

Therefore Socrates is mortal

we are assuming the conclusion in the major premiss ; for unless we know that Socrates is mortal, we cannot be sure that he may not supply the contrary instance that will invalidate the universal assertion that all men are mortal. If, on the other hand, we attempt to pass by induction from the particular to the universal, e. g. Socrates is mortal, Plato is mortal, Julius Caesar is mortal, every individual man we know of is mortal, therefore all men are mortal—our conclusion is a hasty and insecure generalization that could only be made sound by exhausting experience, which is a manifest impossibility.¹

A kindred difficulty attends the question of the philosophical *ordo cognoscendi*. Every philosophy with the exception of scepticism—which is a philosophy consisting in the denial of philosophy—recognizes two distinct, though not necessarily separable, spheres of being—the world of facts, of finite, contingent, immediate, sensuous existence, and the infinite absolute truth, revealed not to the eye of sense but to the eye of reason—the one of Parmenides, the idea of Plato, the substance of Spinoza. Now the world of facts is immediate or given, and its existence is not a matter of inference. No doubt the ‘existence’ of the world in a certain sense of the term has been a subject of philosophical discussion ; but then the existence of the world has been taken to mean its self-dependence, and indifference to mind. But here we understand by the existence of a fact, its immediate and sensuous presence, and in this sense existence is not an inference but the original *datum*. But it is otherwise with the sphere of absolute truth. This is not immediately present to any sense external or internal, but is the assertion of our thinking ; it is not a *datum*, but a result.

¹ See below, p. 265 and p. 267.

Hence we are bound to ask how this assertion is justified and how this result is reached.

Philosophers have not always recognized the necessity of answering this question. They have often felt so profoundly the untruth and inadequacy of finite existence, and the truth and satisfying nature of the absolute, that they have without more ado made God—which is but another name for the absolute—the foundation of their system and of all their ratiocination, and from this foundation have deduced the finite facts. Spinoza is an example of this philosophical method; alluding to the converse order of inference he says,¹ ‘*cujus rei causam fuisse credo, quod ordinem philosophandi non tenerint. Nam naturam Divinam, quam ante omnia contemplari debebant, quia tam cognitione quam natura prior est, ordine cognitionis ultimam, et res quae sensuum objecta vocantur omnibus priores esse crediderunt.*’

Now it is quite true that the truth must be regarded as the foundation; we cannot conceive it as dependent on an untruth. But, to use Hegel’s phrase, it must have made itself the foundation; since it is not a *datum* but a result, we must establish the process by which it is reached, or rather that process must establish itself. The omission of this step, of the justification and determination of the absolute truth, is the defect of the so-called dogmatic schools of philosophy, and gives them the appearance of assuming and defining the truth according to their individual caprices; so that one metaphysician finds the ultimate reality in number, another in atoms and the void, another in the idea, another in substance, and the plain man concludes not unnaturally that the so-called absolute truth is merely a *Hirngespinnst*, the fancy and fiction of individual minds.

If then we cannot begin with God or the absolute truth,

¹ *Ethica*, bk. II, prop. x, schol. ii.

there is nothing for it but to begin with the facts ; and this is what empiricism seeks to do by its inductive method. Empiricism, as it appears for example in Locke, may be regarded as the philosophical expression of the confused and inconsistent notions of common sense. It accepts the immediate facts as true, and as the foundation of knowledge, and yet is not content with these alone, but endeavours to derive from them a more remote and non-sensuous reality, and talks glibly of matter, and the soul, of the uniformity of nature, and of the infinity of God. Hume pricked the bubble and showed that if we make experience or the facts our foundation and starting-point, it is also the limit of our attainment. No doubt, empiricism presents us with numerous arguments for advancing to a truth beyond experience ; but it is easy to see that the premisses of these arguments unconsciously involve principles that could never have been derived from experience, just as the inductive syllogism unconsciously implies the syllogism of analogy.¹

Kant who saw with perfect clearness the weakness of both these methods, the dogmatic and the empirical, substituted for them what he called his transcendental procedure. Here again the existent fact is the starting-point ; but the object now is to discover a deeper truth implied *in the fact, in so far as it is a fact*. Hume had shown that if we start with such propositions as ' it is cold to-day ', ' the sky is clear ', as the explicit and complete foundation of our knowledge, we must restrict ourselves to such fragmentary cognition, and can never reach the knowledge of substance, of matter or soul, of the uniformity of nature, of God. Kant, accepting this conclusion of Hume's, starts from these propositions of existent fact, but not as the foundation of our knowledge,

¹ See below, p. 268.

but as involving in themselves, *in so far as they are facts*, a truth that goes beyond the fact. For example, if I say that the sky is clear and am thereby asserting a fact, as something that implies more than mere perception, and is definitely opposed to fancy and illusion, there must attach to the proposition some further reality that makes it a fact and not merely a subjective representation. Common sense finds that further reality in its correspondence to an actual externality—the thing in itself, as it is called. But even common sense must admit that if there was such a thing-in-itself it would be impossible for us to get out of ourselves and our consciousness so as to ascertain the required correspondence. Nor can the reality lie in any element of my particular individuality; for I mean by a fact expressly what is not peculiar to me. Accordingly we must look for it in the proposition itself, and it can be nothing else than its fixity, or, in other words, the necessary connexion of its terms. But this means that a *fact* involves or exemplifies a *law*, and in this sense points to an underlying truth. The proposition ‘the sky is clear’, as the statement of a fact, implies the necessary connexion of ‘the sky’ and ‘clear’; not of course as though in general the two terms must go together, for the sky is often cloudy, but in the sense that in the present case the relation of the terms is conceived and stated as an instance of the necessary and indissoluble connexion between a substance and its accidents. Consequently the law or conception of substance and accidents may be regarded as a truth involved in the fact that the sky is clear.

But in the second place, this truth—for example, substance and accident—is non-sensuous, or non-existent, and for that reason Kant declares it to be imperfect and only a partial truth; which amounts to saying that in and for itself it is an untruth. To use his own

words, concepts without intuition are void.¹ Therefore we have to recall the matter or intuition with which we started—the clear sky—and combine it with the concept or law—substance and accident ; the resulting compound is the truth and the perfect truth.

Now with regard to this method we have to observe in the first place that though it starts from the fact, it does not start from it as an immediate *datum*, but from the fact expressly determined as such, and expressly opposed to dream, fancy, and illusion. No doubt the fact also contains a sensuous content ; in the above example there are ‘a sky’ and ‘clear’. The truth, however, of substance and accident is in no wise inferred from this content, but entirely from the quality of the copula ‘is’. But the quality of the ‘is’, the objectivity of the proposition, the knowledge that the fact is a fact, is not a *datum* but a result, and we are back again at the defect of the dogmatic method—we are not beginning at the beginning.

Again, we have just seen that the law and the immediate *datum*, the concept and intuition, are absolutely independent of one another, and are, nevertheless, regarded as co-factors of the perfect truth. Neither can give us knowledge without the other ; that is to say, neither is true in itself. They are like the circular note and the letter of advice which the traveller carries in different pockets for the sake of safety. Neither is of any use to him without the other, but if he can present both at the same time, he gets his money. To get the truth on the Kantian system we must present simultaneously an intuition and a concept, though neither involves the other ; and we are brought to the result that the truth is a juxtaposition of two untruths.

In speaking above of the Hegelian conception of philo-

¹ *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, p. 100 (ed. Kirchmann).

sophy in general, we have already indicated the general character of the Hegelian method. For we have said that the first step in philosophy is the denial of the mere fact. The mere fact, then, will be our starting-point, but the mere fact not as true, not as a fact expressly determined as such in contradistinction to fancy or illusion, but as the mere indeterminate immediacy of sensation—this thing here before me; and the advance from it must be made not by us, but by the fact itself in virtue of its inherent falsehood and self-refutation. The immediacy of sensation is the lowest phase of consciousness, and by its internal dialectic or self-contradiction it passes into a higher or truer phase, which in turn yields to one still higher and truer; so that consciousness is launched by the untruth of the fact on a process of self-evolution, the consummation of which will be the truth.

When we speak of philosophy starting from the denial and dialectic of the fact, and advancing to a truth that is not a fact at all, the student must not suppose that we are talking mysticism, nor must he imagine that what he calls the firm ground of fact is being withdrawn from under his feet. This dialectic of the mere fact as the *datum* of sense, and the advance from it to the supersensible, are recognized, however obscurely, and executed, however imperfectly, at all stages of thinking, even in that unreflecting consciousness which we call common sense. The ordinary man finds no difficulty in saying, for example, that he is looking at the mountains or the sea. Yet the original *datum* in his consciousness on such an occasion is merely a congeries of shapes and colours; and *not content with these*, he has posited the object in general, to which these shapes and colours belong. Further reflection will no doubt make him more careful in his use of words. He will now confess

that all he can properly be said to see are certain impressions of the kind called visual, while their cause, the real mountains, the real sea, remains an external invisible unknowable point of reference. But why *refer* his impressions at all? Every answer given to this question will be found to come back to the dialectic of the fact, and the necessity of an advance from it. 'Not imagining', says Locke,¹ 'how those simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some *substratum* wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result; which therefore we call substance.' Here we have completely, as far as its essential form is concerned, the dialectical movement from the fact. The qualities or ideas in themselves, *without any further reference*, are the original *datum*; but our thinking rejects them in this form, and reduces them to accidents or modes of a substance, which is not a *datum* or fact at all, but is posited by thought.

Nor can we escape this conclusion by saying that we merely find the original *datum* insufficient and *supplement* it. For the truth to which we are forced by the rejection of the fact—such a truth as the substance just mentioned—is by no means a new fact co-ordinated with the original facts that were our *data*. It is the positing of a new sphere of things on a different plane from what has gone before, and this positing means the complete shifting of our point of view, so that the *data* now appear with a complete subversion of their original character; in other words, the *data* are now presented expressly as *not* being *data*, or, if we prefer so to put it, the *data* are lost. To take the same example once more, a given quality, say, *black*, now appears *as a quality of a substance*; but it was originally an immediate indifferent *datum*, free from all ulterior reference, and therefore its

¹ *Essay*, bk. II, chap. xxiii, sect. i.

new appearance is the contradiction of its former character in the particular respect in which we are here regarding it. To any one, then, who takes his stand by what he calls common sense and declines to relinquish what he calls his facts, we have to answer in general that he has left the facts already, and that it only remains to determine how far he shall advance from them and at what truth he shall call a halt.

Of the self-evolution of thought, which Hegel calls the dialectical movement, we shall have occasion afterwards to speak in closer detail. For the present it suffices to remark that it is a method that proceeds from the untruth towards the truth, that proceeds by negation and opposition, and that proceeds by the immanent dialectic or self-refutation of its several successive steps. When in this method we repudiate some conception as untrue and pass to a higher, it is not that we condemn it in virtue of some principle that we know to be true. For what right should we have to assume such a principle in the operation of our method, when it is only by the method that any such principle can be established? On the contrary, each notion or step in the process that is rejected as untrue must have shown itself to be so; properly speaking, it is not that we pass from phase to phase; rather, phase passes into phase. No doubt we may say that it is reason or thought, in the most general sense of the term, that condemns the false notion and forces us to a higher, and in a word runs the whole dialectic. But then reason is not an indifferent self-sufficient Epicurean deity, that condescends once in a way to act as judge of certain notions brought before its notice. The presentation of the false notion or false phase of consciousness and its rejection and consequent dissipation are no mere performance of the reason, but are the very reason itself.

For the details of the particular steps by which the dialectical movement advances from the immediate fact of sensation to the truth, the student should consult Hegel's first great work, the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, his voyage of discovery, as he called it, in which his method was first propounded. To deduce step from step would be beyond the limits of our space, and the bare statement of the steps without giving their dialectic or deduction would be a superficial and barren enumeration. At the same time it is to be remembered that the whole nerve of the Hegelian philosophy lies in this method of dialectical deduction, and that in omitting it we are omitting the very essential of the system. For if any step in the process is false, the whole train and the conclusion fall to the ground. But this statement is ambiguous, and requires some explanation.

The scientific theory of evolution regards things not as indifferent and co-ordinated, but as standing in an ascending theory of development which we may symbolize generally by a_1, a_2, a_3, a_4 . Now if any one of the steps $a_1 - a_2, a_2 - a_3, a_3 - a_4$ is *really* false, that is to say, if, as a matter of fact, the thing which we call a_4 is not evolved at all from things precedent to it, then evolution obviously collapses as a fundamental principle. But there may well be a missing link in the sense that *we* have not yet been able, say, to discover a_3 , that is, to establish the connexion between a_2 and a_4 ; or we may easily make a mistaken connexion between two things in the evolutionary series. Such an incidental ignorance or error would not shake the overwhelming positive evidence in favour of the principle. In the same way, speaking objectively, we may say that if Hegelianism is to be true, a dialectical connexion must hold good between all the phases of consciousness and all the notions of our thinking. But Hegel knew that to dis-

cover this connexion and determine it unerringly in all its extent was a gigantic task and quite beyond the powers of one man, and he expressly deprecated any such claim on his own part.¹ Therefore when we say that the dialectical connexion or deduction is the essential of the Hegelian philosophy, we do not mean that Hegel's account of this connexion is to be regarded in every instance as infallible.

However, as we have already said, the aim of this Introduction is by no means to expound or defend Hegelianism, but merely to give the reader some general provisional notions that may prepare him to study it for himself. Accordingly we pass on to the question of the nature and contents of that absolute truth, to which the dialectical method leads as its consummation.

C. THE ABSOLUTE TRUTH.

Different systems of philosophy are primarily distinguished by the answer they give to the question, What is the absolute truth? And the variety of answers includes such divergent notions as the water of Thales, and the one of Parmenides. We shall see in the sequel² that this variety and divergency is not contingent or due to individual caprice, and is no justification to those who would repudiate the question altogether on the ground that there is no such thing as truth at all. But for the present we are only concerned with Hegel's answer. For him the absolute truth, determined by the dialectic springing from the untruth of the facts—or, to put it otherwise, the truth of consciousness in general, determined by the dialectic springing from the untruth of immediate sensation—is pure and free

¹ See, for example, *Logik*, bk. I, p. 39.

² See below, p. 99.

thought, or, to use his own phrase, the *Begriff* or concept. ✓

The terms *free*, *thought*, *concept*, are all of them so vague and ambiguous in the language of everyday life that this definition of the truth might easily convey a false impression, or, perhaps, convey no impression at all. To begin with, the term *thought* may be employed to signify the act of the individual thinker; or, on the other hand, it may signify what he thinks. If, for example, I am thinking 'to be or not to be,' we may call 'to be or not to be' the thought; or we may mean by the thought *my thinking* whether to be or not to be. If half a dozen persons concentrate on the turning of a table, we may say that the combined force of six thoughts is directed on a certain material effect; or we may say that all six persons are intent on the one thought. The first thing, then, we have to note about the *Begriff* or concept is that it is thought in abstraction from the particular thinker, not thought as a phenomenon, or as the mental operation of an individual mind. The character of thought as a particular phenomenon or psychical act has disappeared in the dialectical process by which the absolute truth has been posited. One may feel inclined to object that there *is* no such thing as abstract thought, that what we call abstract thought must *exist* in some individual mind; but this is only to repeat what has already been admitted, that the truth, as pure truth, is not a fact and cannot exist.

Again, the term *free* might suggest notions of caprice and indeterminism, which would be wholly out of place. A thing is *free* in Hegel's use of the word when it is not affected by any antithesis or opposite to itself. A stone is not free, because it is attracted by one opposite, the earth, and at the same time excluded by the impenetrability of the opposing objects that are contiguous

to it, shone upon and warmed by one opposite, the sun, weighed upon by another opposite, the air, and so forth. As an animal, man is not free, because he is affected in innumerable ways by his opposite, the nature that surrounds him. In his common or phenomenal thinking, too, man is not free, for his thought is affected or conditioned by the object about which he is thinking. If I think how still the sea is to-day, my thinking is what it is because of the state of the reality; I should have to think otherwise if the sea was stormy. Therefore though I call such a thought my thought because it is possessed by me, yet I possess it only as a *datum* or gift; to this extent it is not myself, it is my opposite. But all thinking is not conditioned in this way. In formal logic, as it is commonly understood, we have an example—a very barren example, it must be confessed—of a thinking that does not contain any *datum* or any object opposite to itself, and is therefore free. The concepts of subject and predicate and copula, of affirmation and negation, of proposition and syllogism with their modes and conditions, which concepts are here the object of our thought, are not an extraneous material on which we are directing the play of our intelligence, but are themselves the particulars of our thinking. In zoology thought is thinking animal life, in philology thought is thinking language, in geometry thought is thinking space; but in logic thought is thinking thought. Its object or apparent opposite is not really its opposite, but only itself; and this constitutes freedom.

In the transcendental logic of Kant we have an example of what at first sight seems to be free thought. The categories are not thoughts about a given object, but thoughts that constitute an object; and to that extent the object is themselves and not their opposite. But we have seen above that to obtain the object in its

complete truth Kant admits the need for a fact or *datum* as well as the concept; and in this concession the freedom of thought is sacrificed again.

The absolute truth, then, is abstract thought, independent of the particular mind—precisely as we conceive the equality of a triangle's three angles to two right angles as a truth independent of its existence as a mental operation in the consciousness of this or that mathematician, as a truth that would still be true if some catastrophe should sweep all mathematicians off the face of the earth. And the absolute truth is free thought, that admits no *datum* or foreign object. But all this only amounts to saying that the absolute truth is pure thought; not thought as presented in this or that phenomenal consciousness, not thought in its alloy with what is not thought, but thought as it is in itself. What, then, is thought in itself? And, in the first instance, what is the form of thought?

D. THOUGHT AND THE FORM OF THOUGHT.

What is thought? What is its essential characteristic, by which we distinguish it from what is not thought? In the plain man the question evokes the notion of an activity proceeding within the brain of an individual and having for its stuff or content the impressions or *data* presented by the world that surrounds him. However we have seen that the thought with which we are here concerned is not the mental act of the individual thinker. We have also seen that as pure thought it admits no *datum*; but we will waive this point for the present, and allow the term thought even when a datum is pre-supposed.¹ Thus when I say to myself that the colour

¹ Pure thought is an unfamiliar thing, and it is better to reach it by degrees. Accordingly we take as an example of thought something that would commonly be called a thought, but is nevertheless not a pure thought, or absolute truth.

symphony of the landscape before me is very beautiful, we will take this assertion in its abstraction from my subjectivity, and call it a thought; and our problem is to discover what is the essential feature of this thought as thought, in contradistinction, say, to the sand of the beach which we may take as an example of the material, of what is not thought.

Since we are all men in the street to begin with, whether we advance afterwards to be philosophers or not, it is probable that we all have the feeling, if only for a moment, that the thought is distinguished from matter as the transient from the permanent. I am thinking now of the beauty of the colour symphony, but presently my thought will stray to the political situation, or to some petty matter of business, while the sandy beach is there all the time. But, clearly, this is nothing more than the old confusion between abstract thought and its presentation in the mental act of an individual. The abstract thought or truth of the beauty of this colour symphony is by no means transient. On the contrary, it is in the heart of things the eternal, compared to which the sea sand is the creation of a day. Which is in real truth the permanent, the art of a Beethoven sonata, or the piano on which it is played?

The notion of thought as the transient being exploded, feeling may substitute for it the notion that a certain wilfulness and caprice, freedom in the sense of indeterminism, distinguishes thought from matter or the thing; that I may think what I like, but things are what they are. Now it is true that I may think what I like in the sense that in determining myself to any particular thought I am entirely free from *external* interference. No one can convince me against my will¹; no one can convert

¹ Of course I may be convinced against my *wish*; but that is another matter.

me except by making me think *of myself* what he thinks. But it does not follow that my thinking is lawless; on the contrary, it obeys a law of its own. If I think

All men are mortal

Socrates is a man

Therefore Socrates is mortal

my thought is free in the sense that the argument is not forced upon me from without, but springs from myself; but there is no caprice about it as though I might equally well think

No man is immortal

Socrates is a man

∴ Socrates is immortal.

I *may* think what I like; but also I *must* think what I like. No doubt, there is such a thing as erroneous thought; no doubt, also, there is a lower form of consciousness, called the imagination,¹ that is given over to caprice and indeterminism, and operates in dreams, reveries, random fancy. But in the first place mere errors of thought, and low forms of consciousness are not, properly speaking, thought at all; just as it would be absurd to say of one who dreamed profusely that he was a fertile thinker. And in any case such errors of thought and lower stages of consciousness have nothing to do with the abstract thought which is here our concern.

Another vulgar notion regards thought and the thing as respectively copy and original. When for military purposes a scout takes stock of the country that lies before him, his thought of it—if we connive at such a misuse of the word—may be granted to be a copy of the original article. But where is the original for the thought of the perfect circle or straight line, of the beautiful poem or symphony, of spotless virtue and

¹ Of course not the artistic imagination which has its own immutable laws of freedom.

infallible wisdom? When I think of the beauty of this colour symphony, let it be granted that the scheme of colours is presented by 'the thing'; but where is the original for the thought of its beauty?

Unreflecting common sense, then, has very crude notions of the distinction between thought and matter; but it is to its credit that at least it recognizes that there is a distinction, and so avoids a confusion into which immature reflection often falls. This confusion appears in two shapes. The first is the gross confusion of materialism which merely identifies thought with the operation of the brain, and ignores the formal difference between my thought of this beautiful colour symphony and, say, the sand of the shore set whirling by a hurricane. No doubt, thought stands, to use the common phrase, in necessary relation to matter; that is to say, logically as well as in the history of the world the thinking and psychical element is evolved out of matter. But a necessary relation, though it is an identity, is not the empty identity of $A = A$. Besides, we have to repeat once again that the thought whose nature we want to determine is the abstract thought of absolute truth, and as such is not the mental operation of psychology at all.

Equally false though less crude is the spiritualistic confusion between thought and matter. Whereas materialism asserts that mind is after all only matter, spiritualism, relying on the fact that we cannot know anything except as an object in our consciousness, declares that matter is after all really mind. Now matter is certainly not a collateral of thinking—this is the truth of Berkeley—but a step towards it that is over and done when the stage of thinking is reached. To talk of matter and mind as two collateral entities on the same plane is as absurd as if we were to co-ordinate space and the objects in space, and to say, for example,

of a box that was a foot long, a foot broad, and a foot deep that it contained so many papers *and* so many books *and* so many other articles *and* a cubic foot of space. In the sphere of thinking or mind matter as such has been subsumed and appears as the *object*. And we may grant further that absolute thought, the universal abstract thought of the absolute truth, in rendering its account of the totality of being, must render an account of matter, must explain what it really is, and why in the absolute reason of things it had to be, whence it logically came and whither it logically goeth. And in this sense we may speak of matter as a stage in thought. But granting the identity of thought and matter over and over again, the fact of their difference remains. By all means the pine-tree that I am now looking at is an object for me and contained in my consciousness ; and by all means the truth about the pine-tree—what matter really is, what is the essence or definition of living things, what in particular is the nature of the life that we call vegetable, what is the ultimate quality that determines the special class of vegetable life into which the pine-tree falls—all this consists of thoughts or determinations of reason. Still the reason of man is not a pine-tree, and matter is not the same as thought. So we return to our former question and ask what is the essential formal difference between the abstract thought of the beauty of this colour symphony and the material fact of the sand on the sea-shore.

The first reflection that strikes us is that the thought involves a certain unity that is not to be found in the thing. If we regard the colour symphony and its beauty as the two components of the thought—really a false and crude metaphor, for, as we shall see presently, thought is not a compound—and the nearer half and further half of the sand as the two components of the thing,

we see that we cannot separate the beauty of the colour symphony from the colour symphony itself without annihilating the thought, whereas we might cart away one part of the sand to a distance from the rest, and yet it would all remain the same sand still.

This, however, requires further explanation ; for one might object, in the first place, that in a thought there is a great deal that lies outside the identity, that here, for example, there is a good deal of independent import in the particular facts of the colour symphony that is untouched by the identity of the thought, and in the second place that though the sand may be separated from any particular connexion, it must be in connexion with some other thing, and is variously affected and determined by its particular connexions and relations. But in making these objections one is confusing the very distinction we are seeking to determine—the distinction between a thought and a thing. In the first place, the beauty of this colour symphony is not, as we have seen, a thought in the full and perfect sense of the term. It contains a *datum*, the particular existent scheme of colours, and is therefore not a pure thought, but the thought *of a thing*. And the sand, in its connexions and relations with other things and affected thereby, is not a thing, but the *thought of a thing*. Accordingly we must not consider the particular, independent import of the colour scheme as part of the thought ; this consists merely in the truth that the scheme *is* beautiful. And we must banish from the thing all that is attributed to it by the activity of a comparing, contrasting, abstracting intelligence, and take it as an inert, passive, indifferent multiplicity. And then we seem justified in our former assertion that unity is the essential nature of thought in contradistinction to the diversity, multiplicity, isolation, separability of the thing.

This notion of the nature of thought which finds its first and most consistent expression in the Eleatic philosophy leaves us with two separate and incompatible spheres of being, each subsistent in its own right—thought and the thing. Thought is absolute unity, and denies or ignores all diversity and multiplicity—*A* is *A* and nothing else. The things, on the other hand, are a multiplicity of entities, each existent in its own right, and distinct from, and independent of, every other. Thus the same relation of opposition and independence that holds between the several things holds also between thought and the thing. And, since the two spheres are incompatible, if one is true, the other must be false; if the unity of thought is true, then the multiplicity of things, the world of sense—plurality, change, motion—is an illusion; that is to say, an existent fact, but an untruth. We once thought that cloud and rain were two distinct, separate things; now we see that it was only our ignorance, and that they are really one. The diversity was after all only a form or semblance, behind which lay the truth of their unity.

True this conception undoubtedly is, in so far as it is a necessary step in the determination of what thought is; but its innate dialectic and self-contradiction reduces it to a mere step, something that must be taken, yet must be left behind, and is so far untrue. To secure perfect unity in thought, the absolute identity of *A* with *A*, we banish completely all diversity and opposition, all not-*A*. For the purposes of *A*, in the context of *A*, there is no not-*A*. *A* is not an adjunct to, or a complement of, or in relation to, or in the same world with not-*A*, any of which would mean that in some sense *A* was not-*A*; simply and absolutely *A* is not not-*A*. Therefore we have to conceive *A* and not-*A* as two mutually impenetrable and unrelated, or, in other words, absolutely

distinct and separate entities—which is exactly the conception we have accepted as the essential character of the thing in contrast to the thought. Conversely we conceive things as a multiplicity of absolutely distinct self-subsistent beings. But this absolute distinction means that there is no commerce between any of them and any other; that for the purposes of the one, in the same world with the one, there is no other; in fact, that the one simply and absolutely is itself, and *is not* the other, that *A* is *A* and *is not* not-*A*—which purports to be the essential nature of thought.

Once more, we conceive thought in general and the thing in general as absolutely opposed to one another, as an absolute unity in which there is no difference and an absolute difference in which there is no unity, in fact as two distinct *things*. Therefore for thought all is thought and there is nothing else, and for the thing all is thing and there is nothing else; in fact *A* is *A* and *A* is not not-*A*. But this means that thought and the thing stand in the relation of thought. From every point of view then, absolute unity turns out to be absolute difference, and absolute difference absolute unity.

When thought places itself in this sheer opposition to the multiplicity of things, it appears as merely analytical thought, and in this form it constitutes the object of formal logic, as that science is commonly understood. The multiplicity or diversity, that is, the matter or content that appears in the operation of the thought, is entirely an external *datum*, accepted by the thought and not a factor of itself. Thought accepts that men are mortal and accepts that Socrates is a man, and only insists that *if* mortal can be identified with man, and *if* man can be identified with Socrates, then Socrates must be mortal, since man is man, or *A* is *A*. On this view, thought becomes such a barren and futile affair that we are not

surprised at the contempt which common sense and the empirical sciences have always entertained for logic and pure thinking; and we are bound to confess that Parmenides made a poor bargain when he sacrificed the rich world of concrete realities for the abstract truth of the absolute one.

The notion, then, of thought as an absolutely self-related unity and of things as an absolutely self-related diversity has perished by its own dialectic or self-contradiction, and is superseded by the notion of a relation between thought and the thing. Finding that we must surrender our view of their absolute disconnectedness, we now conceive them as possessing severally an independent and separate being of their own, and yet at the same time as related to one another. Thought is now conceived as a *combining* unity, the thing as a *combined* multiplicity. Thought is necessarily related to the thing, the thing is necessarily related to thought, and the manifold things, through their common relation to a combining thought, are themselves necessarily related to one another. At this stage we have what Hegel calls the *first negation*, that is, the first denial or qualification of the complete isolation and independent immediacy of thought and the thing and of the several things.

This conception of thought as *synthetical* has been made popular by Kant. The main distinction or opposition on which it rests is the distinction between the intrinsic reality of a thing and its phenomenon or presentation; and this double aspect of being—thing-*per-se* and phenomenon, or *absolute existence* and *positivity*¹—appears

¹ Positive is here used to signify what is laid down, or asserted, as opposed to what is original or natural; as one, for example, opposes a positive law, right, or obligation to a natural one. But as so opposed it really signifies the particular form in which the original gives itself expression.

in thought in respect of the thing, in the thing in respect of thought, and in the manifold things in respect of one another. Thought or the ego has its own intrinsic reality or absolute existence, but *also* it presents itself as an apprehending and combining activity—it knows. And the thing has its absolute existence also as thing-per-se, but *at the same time* has a positive side, and presents itself as a multiplicity for the activity of thought to manipulate ; it becomes a phenomenon, or is known. The manifold things are a multiplicity of isolated entities and yet are necessarily related to one another as phenomena for the same ego. The consequence of this opposition between reality and appearance, absolute existence and positivity, is that knowledge becomes merely phenomenal and cannot reach the reality, the thing in itself. For the reality is expressly posited as that which is not presented or phenomenal, that is to say, not accessible to thought. In like manner, we can have no knowledge of the inner nature of the soul, though we are witnesses of its manifestation in the synthetical unity of thinking. Finally, of the various and manifold things we know nothing but their reciprocal relations ; and these relations are external, and leave untouched the absolute intrinsic reality of their several natures.

We have seen that the advance to the synthetical conception of thought was effected by the dialectic or self-contradiction of the supposed opposition between absolute identity and absolute difference. In the same manner the dialectic of the supposed opposition between the absolute existence of a thing and its positivity effects the advance from synthetical to absolute thought. For example, the fire that warms this room I conceive on the one hand as a self-subsistent activity, no mere product, but one of the effective realities, the absolute existences of the world ; on the other hand, I conceive

it at the same time as manifested in the raised temperature of the room. The apparent opposition, however, between these two sides is only a semblance. For what makes the fire an ultimate reality that cannot be ignored, or annihilated, or set aside, or reduced to something else, is that it limits or affects other things—here, for example, the room in respect of its temperature. According to the synthetical notion of thought, the nature of things may be symbolized under the image of two substances, *A* and *B*, each of which has its own absolute existence, or original effective reality, and each of which at the same time manifests itself as a positivity or an effect in the other. But the reality of *A*, as we have just seen, consists in its effect on *B*, and the reality of *B* in its effect on *A*. Therefore there is no such thing as the absolute existence of *A* *apart from* its positivity in *B*, or the absolute existence of *B* *apart from* its positivity in *A*. The collapse of this opposition is the genesis of absolute thought.

In absolute thought all opposition has been reconciled ; that is to say, it has been shown to be a distinction between factors that are absolutely one. At the synthetical stage, *A* was distinct from *B*, and *at the same time* related to, that is, one with, it. But this merely meant that everywhere we were to look for two separate sides or aspects in things, an aspect of difference and an aspect of identity. But in absolute thought the identity and difference are of the one aspect ; it is the absolute unity of absolute opposites ; its identity consists in its difference, and its difference in its identity. Here the powers of imagination and of language fail us ; and for that reason it is easy to miss the full significance of this conception. Imagination, whose medium is the mutual externality of space, can only represent the identity of opposites by a juxtaposition of things external to one

another. But this is in truth a complete misrepresentation; for juxtaposition is not true identity, nor externality true opposition. If we imagine the opposites as overlapping by a hair's breadth, we are forfeiting the opposition, and letting it lapse into the empty abstract identity of A is A ; and if, on the other hand, we allow the unity to expand a hair's breadth beyond the indivisible point, we are sacrificing the identity, and letting it fall asunder into externality.

Language, on the other hand, is able by its matter or import to explain the nature of this conception; but its form still belies the matter. If I say that A is absolutely B , the meaning of my assertion is the identity of A and B ; but the assertion is couched in a form in which the A and B are posited as separate, one as subject and the other as predicate. The proposition gives us the opposites A and B as the terms, and their identity in the copula; but it only gives *both* the identity *and* the opposition, not the true identity of opposites, which involves the unity of their opposition with their identity. In fact, the proposition brings us back to the synthetical aspect of thought; it supplies us with opposites, and a unifying copula. But in the A and B taken apart from the copula—and as constituents of language they are apart from it—there is no identity, and in the *is* taken apart from the terms there is no opposition; therefore instead of the identity of opposites we have in the proposition an identity without opposites, and opposites without identity. Again, if we say the 'identity of opposites', we are first positing 'identity' and then 'of opposites'. But what does 'identity' mean? If it excludes opposition, it is the merely analytical unity of A is A , which we have left behind us long ago. But if it includes opposition, why do we add 'of opposites'? And what do 'opposites' mean? If they exclude identity, they are the absolute difference

of the thing, a notion whose falsehood has been already demonstrated. But if they involve unity, why should we add 'the identity of' opposites?

By its dialectical evolution, then, thought has determined its formal nature to be the unity of opposites, absolute identity in absolute difference, where not only are the opposites absolutely identical as well as absolutely opposite, but their identity is absolutely opposed to, and absolutely identical with, their opposition. In this process of evolution the thing, which first appeared as completely external to thought, has gradually approached it, and finally passed into it, or, to speak more correctly, has become identical with it. In so far as we still distinguish thought and thing *inside their identity*,¹ thought is conceived as the *identity* of the opposites, the thing as the *opposites* that are contained in the identity.

The form of thought being established, our next problem is to ascertain its content or matter, to ascertain what are the opposites, whose absolute identity in their opposition constitutes the formal essence of thought. Granting that philosophy is not an account of facts, but the science of a truth posited by the inadequacy of the fact, and that this truth is thought, and that the form of thought, by which it is directly opposed to the immediacy and isolation of the fact, is the identity of opposites, we still require to know what it is that thought thinks in this form. Until this question is answered, and unless it is answered satisfactorily, the assertion that thought is the truth might seem a preposterous reduction of truth to a mere formality. What, then, is the content of thought, or—to put the question in a shape familiar to students of Kant—What are the categories of the Hegelian logic?

¹ We shall see afterwards the re-emergence of the thing or fact in general opposition to thought. See below, p. 79.

E. THE CONTENT OF THOUGHT.

A provisional account such as is here given of a system of philosophy involves the grave defect that one is obliged to treat separately what are really factors of an indissoluble identity ; in fact, to fall into that error of abstraction, which in all departments of human thought it is the main business of the Hegelian philosophy to remove. For example, we have asked, What is the truth according to Hegel? and again, What is thought according to Hegel? But it is clear that Hegel's conception of truth was determined by his conception of thought and vice versa. Again, having considered the Hegelian conception of the form of thought, we are now proceeding to inquire into its content, as though a fresh problem confronted us. And, indeed, to us in this provisional account it is a fresh problem, since we have only indicated the form in a quite general and abstract way. But if we had worked out the form into its details and successive determinations, we should have had the content before us. For we have seen that the truth or principle is pure thought, and therefore not to be confused with our everyday thinking, which is thinking *about something*. Pure thought must contain no *datum*, but must produce itself ; its matter must be its own spontaneous creation, and therefore the absolute distinction between matter and form disappears.

In the Kantian logic the form of thought is *a priori* synthesis, and its matter or content—in so far as we may on Kantian principles speak of the matter of thought at all—is presented in the twelve shapes that this *a priori* synthesis assumes ; these are the twelve categories that fall into the four classes of quantity, quality, relation, and modality. We have already seen how thought with Kant, although posited as one of the constituents

of truth, turns out in the end to be anything but true. And we have also seen that synthesis is an altogether inadequate representation of the formal nature of thought. We have further to see that—apart from the details of the categories, their number and order—Kant's account of the matter of thought is in general defective.

In the vulgar fiction of the day there is no more exasperating figure than the celebrated private detective who is introduced to us with impressive solemnity as the preternaturally acute unraveller of countless mysteries, and who nevertheless fails to display for our enjoyment any evidence of his extraordinary talents. He is by way of being a wonder worker; but we have to take his miracles for granted, for everything that he says or does in the story is down to the level of the most ordinary intelligence. There is the same unfulfilled pretence in the Kantian categories. We are assured that they are not mere facts or *data*, but the product of thought's spontaneous activity; and, further, not the mere contingent and transitory formations of imagination or fancy, but the universal and necessary creations of our reason. But thought does not produce them for us to see; we are only told that it does so. They do not show themselves to be necessary; we are only told that they are so. When we speak of a thought in contrast to a fact or *datum*, we imply something mediated or deduced as opposed to the immediate and isolated. But Kant simply *gives* us four classes of categories, with three in each class.¹ There is no reason why there should be just so many, or why they should be what they are; a man has his two lungs, his ten fingers, and his twelve categories, and that is the end of it. In this way thought is reduced to a mere particular or fact, an idiosyncrasy or

¹ Kant only makes matters worse by his so-called derivation of the categories from the forms of the judgement. See below, p. 163.

way of looking at things peculiar to man—to what Hegel would call *eine Art und Weise*,—and logic and even metaphysics are reduced to an empirical psychology.

To begin with, then, all the content of thought, all its categories and determinations,¹ must be deduced—not in the sense of a Kantian deduction whose aim is merely to establish the objectivity of thought in general, but in the sense that the meaning of each particular category, e. g. what reciprocity is and involves, must be the necessary outcome of the meaning of another category, e. g. the conception of a substance and its causality. Further, they must all lie on the one line of deduction; for if we were to suppose two collateral deductions leading to two collateral categories, in the co-existence of these two collaterals we should again be confronted by a *datum* or fact. Once more, this deduction cannot proceed from anything outside thought. Pure thought as a whole is indeed to be deduced, as we have already seen, from the dialectic and falsehood of sensuous and perceptive consciousness. But once the sphere of pure thought opens, those other spheres of falsehood are dissolved and absorbed, and thought has to make its own content for itself—else it would not be pure thought at all. Accordingly we have to conceive the content of thought, the categories, as steps in one self-contained series of deduction, in which one category leads to a second, the second to a third, the third to a fourth, and so on to the consummation of the truth.

But before we can form this conception, there are two questions that have to be answered. If the content of

¹ As we shall see later, there are three main classes of logical determinations—those of being, those of essence, and those of the concept. Hegel restricts the term category to the first of these classes, but one has the authority of Kant for using it with a wider application.

thought is such a self-contained series, what is the first category, and how do we get it? Again, what is the nature of the logical deduction by which category is derived from category? By what kind of process, for example, does the category of being lead to that of becoming, or the categories of quality in general to those of quantity?

It is a fundamental thesis of Hegelianism that dialectic has a positive, and not merely a negative, result. If a notion or category proves itself dialectical and self-refuting, the result of this dialectic is not bare nothing—the ‘infinite nothing’ as Hegel sometimes calls it—but the negation of that particular notion or category. And as that notion or category was a particular and therefore itself a negative, the result is the negation of the negative, and therefore a positive. Now we have seen that thought in general is mediated, or led up to, by the lower forms of consciousness. Their dialectic and self-dissolution leaves us with thought in general as a sphere in which the distinctions and determinations (such, e. g., as the independently existing subject, and independently existing object) that marked the lower and superseded stages of consciousness *are now effaced*; that is to say, leaves us with thought as the turning over of a new leaf on an unworthy past, affirmative of itself and positive in general, but so far not positing or affirming anything in particular—the new leaf as yet blank. But this thought that affirms without affirming anything in particular is the category of pure being. Being, then, or to-be in its absolute indeterminateness, is the primal category from which is derived, by the dialectical force that is the dynamic of truth, the whole content of the Hegelian logic.

At first sight this empty indefinite conception of being seems a very unpromising source from which to derive

the manifold content of thought—categories of quality and quantity, of substance and activity, and, as we shall afterwards see, of life, science, and reason. This consideration brings us to the second question mentioned above, namely, What is the exact nature of this logical process by which category leads to category, from its beginning in the thought of mere being to its conclusion in the absolute idea?

F. THE CONCEPTION OF EVOLUTION.

We are all familiar with Herbert Spencer's conception according to which an original incoherent and homogeneous matter—which in its undifferentiated homogeneity may be regarded as a material parallel to the concept of pure being—proceeds to differentiate itself, and evolves into a heterogeneity, that continues to grow in wealth of variety, intensity of difference, and closeness of interconnexion. Relatively simple and incoherent forms pass into forms more complex and individualized, a scanty diversity held in a loose unity develops into a richer diversity contained within a strict unity; for example, the relative simplicity and incoherence of inorganic matter into the relative complexity and individuality of organic nature. This process of evolution meets us on every hand, in the growth of the oak from the acorn, in the development of the consciousness of an individual or a race, in the history of ethics, of art, of religion, and of philosophy itself.

The conception of evolution is distinguished from the conception of mere change, first by the fact that it is a self-wrought alteration—the original homogeneity must have differentiated of itself, or, what is the same thing, through a force inherent in itself, since it was itself the totality of existence with nothing outside it; and

secondly, by the fact that it implies a discrimination of values. The more complex and coherent forms are said to be higher than the more simple and incoherent ; but as to the justification of this scale of values the scientific theory of evolution is completely silent. To the plain man it seems so obvious that, for example, a horse is a higher being than a sponge, or that a symphony of Beethoven's is something higher than the music of savages, that he does not feel the need of any explanation. If pressed for one, he would probably say that the horse approached more closely than the sponge to those higher qualities that distinguish man from lower creatures, and that the Beethoven symphony gives greater enjoyment than the music of savages to the more highly civilized man. If pressed thereupon to explain why man is to be considered higher than the beast, and the civilized man than the savage, he would probably make the vicious circle explicit by replying that man is higher than the beast because he contains in the highest degree those qualities that raise the horse above the sponge, and that the civilized man is higher than the savage because he can produce and appreciate such things as a symphony of Beethoven's. But even if he can afford to smile at such mere logical difficulties, his security might well be shaken by the fact that within certain limits these values which seem so obvious to him have been disputed, and disputed by no mean authorities. Rousseau with his cry of 'back to nature' and Tolstoi in his arraignment of modern poetry and art—to mention only two famous names—have had the hardihood to question values which the ordinary man regards as the bed-rock of his appreciations. And, in truth, the plain man's explanation is no explanation at all, but the reiteration of an assumption ; or, to put it otherwise, it

is an explanation, if you will, of the fact that men call certain things higher and lower, but no justification of it. If the conception of evolution is to be a true conception, we must get hold of an absolute scale of values, in which a thing will be higher or lower, not contingently in reference to some assumed standard, not *for us*, but *in and for itself*. How then is an absolute value to be established and justified?

The germ of the answer to this question, as of the answers to so many of the great questions of philosophy, is supplied by Kant. In his critical investigation of the ethical problem he demonstrates that the conception of morality implies the absolute value of the free and autonomous reason of man. But the peculiar limitations of his standpoint, on which we have already touched, rob his argument of most of its significance. To begin with, we must remember what it is that Kant's philosophy in general sets itself to establish. Hume, who was Kant's dialectical predecessor in the evolution of philosophic thought, had laboured to show that knowledge and morality were alike impossible, that what we had supposed to be knowledge, must be resolved into belief, and that what we had supposed to be morality, must be resolved into self-interest. Consequently the aim of Kant's argument, which is a direct answer to Hume, is to show that knowledge and morality with all their implications are *possible*. In the case of the ethical problem, with which alone we are here concerned, he shows, not that the conception of morality is a true one, but in the first place, that, whether true or false, it cannot be resolved into any modification or elaboration of self-seeking, since analysis reveals the presence in it of factors distinct in kind from the idea of individual interests; and, secondly, that these factors—the universal obligation, the absolute value, the autonomous reason—

are in themselves possible in the sense that they do not contradict the laws of nature. And, no doubt, it is a great achievement to have shown that if there is such a thing as morality or duty at all, if the word *ought* is to have any legitimate place in human speech, the crude theories of hedonism must be laid aside, and that the arguments by which hedonism thinks to crush the conception of pure morality are so many fallacies. Yet the truth of the moral conception and with it the truth of universal obligation, an absolute value, and the autonomous reason, remain matters of mere possibility. It is useless to say that morality is actual; its existence as a psychological conception is no doubt a given fact; but what is required is its metaphysical truth.

Further, the free reason of man, in which alone Kant finds an absolute value, is an abstract principle, to which all the natural springs of his actions, his likings and aversions, his malevolent and benevolent affections, are absolutely external. As such they stand out of all relation to the absolute value. It would be hard to imagine a clearer example of an evolution from lower to higher than the process by which the natural feeling of wanton hostility that the savage entertains towards a stranger has passed into the natural feeling of goodwill, which, when not disturbed by the clash of interests, the civilized man entertains towards humanity at large. Yet these two natural feelings are denied all moral character by Kant, and are therefore excluded from the sphere of absolute values. This being so, it goes without saying that Kant leaves us helpless when we come to the question of higher and lower as between different forms of life, or between organic and inorganic existence.¹

Once more—and this brings us to the root of the matter—although Kant's argument made a show of

¹ See Hegel's *Logik*, bk. III, p. 209.

rescuing us from the closed circle of contingent values, it ends by betraying us into the hands of our enemies again. For even if we grant that thought recognizes its own absolute value, we have still to ask what is thought. If thought is the truth and absolute ground, well and good ; but if thought is merely an idiosyncrasy, *eine Art und Weise*, a psychical fact, besides which there are other facts, and for which there are *data* that it does not make and therefore has no right to judge, then the absolute value turns out to be the same self-contradiction as Kant's truth—an absolute value that is only a value *for us*.

Probably the old difficulty, to which we have already alluded, will rise again before the young student, when he is told that in order to establish an absolute value we require an absolute thought that is not merely *our* thought. 'Surely,' he may urge, 'any value that I can recognize must in the last resort be a value *for me*, and any thought that I can recognize, whatever its pretensions to a subsequent extension, must in the last resort be *my* thought, thought within the consciousness of that particular individual that I call *me*. I may have grounds, sufficient or otherwise, for advancing to the belief in an external world, in an objective morality and art, in absolute values ; but the advance can never be truly more than *my* acceptance of an external world, absolute values, &c. ; since, all said and done, I can be sure of nothing except my ideas. It is true that Kant establishes a universal ego to explain objectivity. But what after all does this mean except that several individual egos agree in their thinking ? And as I cannot directly know any other ego than my own, this simply means that *I* think a universal ego, or contemplate the agreement of several individual egos. It may be said that the ego transcends itself, but the transcendency of the ego—is it not *my* individual self that is thinking it ?'

It is remarkable how many intelligent persons, who see quite plainly the absurd results that follow from such a solipsistic or panegoistic position, are yet content to accept as *metaphysically* true, that they can know nothing beyond the limits of their particular consciousness ; as though metaphysics was a kind of Scottish Sabbath, on which one must be very circumspect indeed, and deny oneself many pleasant little liberties of knowledge, that are quite innocent and even laudable on week-days. Let us, therefore, examine briefly this general position.

The panegoist insists that he is absolutely and ultimately sure of his own ideas and of nothing else. For example, to place myself in his attitude, I am sure of my idea of the willow in the garden below me, but not of the willow itself. But what is my idea of the willow ? Put in the simplest form, my idea of it is that it is a large leafy object standing in the garden a few yards away from me, and there whether I am looking at it or not. As I am supposed to be sure of my idea, it would seem that I am sure that in the garden a few yards from me there stands a large leafy object, called a willow, which is there whether I am looking at it or not ; for this is what my idea is. But here I am pulled up and advised that perhaps there is no willow there at all, and I am merely thinking that there is one. So it turns out that I am not yet sure of my idea after all. How then am I to make sure of it ? As I am supposed to be sure of nothing beyond my ideas, with what standard shall I compare any idea that may be disputed ? Evidently with some other idea, but with what one ? Now what the panegoist really means is that the first or immediate idea is the true one, and that the later or derived ideas are relatively uncertain ; and he thinks he has found the primordial idea in my consciousness of myself as having representations or inner states, from

which afterwards I infer the idea of an outward world and other objectivities by a train of merely probable reasoning. But this is simply a false account of the matter. In the case before us, the idea that the tree stands there, a leafy object in the garden, is anterior to the idea that I, a perceptive being, have a certain inner representation, from which I infer the tree itself. If the panegoist shifts his ground, and urges that the latter idea is the true one, we may ask him how he is going to prove it. He must prove it from the ideas themselves, for outside the ideas he is supposed to know nothing. If, therefore, he accepts the former idea as true, his general thesis falls to the ground. If he declares it to be false and attempts to proceed from its denial to the truth, then he is setting out on that very dialectical voyage, whose goal is the pure universal thought, that contemplates the object, not as it is for us, but as it is in and for itself, or in its absolute truth.

If then we can show that the conception of evolution is given in the absolute thought that is the matter of the Hegelian logic, then, and then only, may we say that the conception is justified. We have already seen that the content of that thought is a deductive series of categories or determinations proceeding from the concept of mere being to the absolute idea. What we are now required to show is that this series constitutes an evolutionary progress. The necessary implications of evolution are, as we have said, that the later form must issue out of the earlier, and that it must possess a higher value. The first of these requirements is obviously satisfied : for as the series is a series of pure thought, nothing in it can be determined by anything outside thought ; and since the series is itself the constitution of thought, there cannot at any point be any particular thought available to determine a category except the preceding thought that has

already been established. There only remains, therefore, the question of values.

It will not do to say that one category gives rise to another that is immediately seen to be higher, or that like Butler's 'conscience' plainly bears on itself the marks of its superior value; for this would be to remit the valuation from the jurisdiction of thought to the court of feeling and contingent subjectivity. Not only must the higher and lower values attach to categories of pure thought, but the attachment must itself be given by the thought. But this is precisely what is given in the Hegelian deduction of the categories, which issue out of one another by the same dialectical movement by which sensation and the other lower forms of consciousness developed into pure thought. To express the nature of this deduction accurately, we have to say that each category issues, not from the preceding category, but from the preceding category's falsity and oneness. Each category, in fact, is the correction of the preceding one, and its deduction is the positing of its truth or value as against the falsehood and unworthiness of its predecessor.

Absolute thought therefore presents us with a genuine evolutionary series, in which each member is not merely presumed to issue from the preceding one because it is found to succeed it, but is actually its product in point of content; and in which the relative values of the several members are posited in their very genesis. To trace the course of this evolution is the object of Hegel's *Logic*; to give any account of its details here is of course impossible, while the bare recital of the titles of the categories would be a mere repetition of Hegel's table of contents. But through the whole of this great progress of thought there repeats itself—like the three in a bar running through a piece of music—a certain rhythmical

triple movement, which may be called the method of pure thought, or the logical method.

G. THE LOGICAL METHOD.

The three steps in the triadic movement of the Hegelian logic, anticipations of which are, and on Hegelian principles must be, discernible in earlier philosophy,¹ are commonly given as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. These names are no doubt correct so far as they go, but they by no means suggest the full meaning of the movement that we are considering. We have constantly to bear in mind that we are here in the sphere of pure thought, where we must make no absolute distinction between an intellect on the one side and a *datum* on the other, or between a form and a content of thought. It is not a case of *our understanding* positing a category, and then from some consideration or other proceeding to posit its antithesis, and finally on further reflection summing the two opposites in a synthesis; in that case, we should be separating the categories as a given matter from an external understanding engaged in their contemplation. Here what posits and what is posited are one and the same. The necessity of the antithesis must reside in the thesis, and the necessity for the synthesis in the antithesis; and by the same necessity the antithesis must contain the thesis, for it is its result, and the synthesis both thesis and antithesis. How, then, does the thesis of itself necessarily lead to the antithesis, and the antithesis to the synthesis?

The first step in every triad of thought is a simple affirmation, a simple assertion of self, that has arisen from, or been mediated by, the denial and abolition of a negation or difference. Thought has emerged, as it

¹ Especially in the Neo-platonists, and in Fichte. Cp. also Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, p. 124.

were, triumphant from its conflict with one foe, and proclaims its challenge again—this is the thesis; and its challenge immediately evokes a new foe, the antithesis, which in turn a synthesis will be required to subdue. Such a challenge or thesis we have already found in the starting-point of logic,—the category of pure being. Thought—using the word for once in a quite general sense—has overcome the opposition between an independent subject and an independent object which is the characteristic of the lower forms of consciousness, and proceeds to act or affirm again. But at this point, or as yet, it has no content; all the preceding determinations have been put out of the way as false. No doubt they have mediated the new sphere that has just opened; as we might say, they leave their impress on the quality of the freshly turned page, which quality will be a permanent determinant in every character hereafter written upon it. Every subsequent category will be a category that is *not* the representation in an independently existing subject of an independently existing object. But all that is so far gained is the *new sphere in general* thus mediated; and the simple assertion of the general sphere, which is really the simple self-reassertion or thought after the collapse of the lower forms of consciousness, the thinking before anything in particular is thought, is the concept of being. At this stage there is no opposition or difference; the old content has passed away, and the new has not yet emerged. Being or thought's simple self-assertion has the whole field to itself—or, rather, it seems to have. Reserving the term *infinite* for a higher use, we may call this stage of the thesis the *indefinite*; the limitation has not been overcome: rather, no limitation has as yet been discerned.

Another example of the thesis is the one. Language may easily mislead us here, for the term *one* is applied

in explicit consciousness of the opposition between *one* and *many*, or, as we might say, after the difference between the one and the many has emerged. But if we take the one at the point of its emergence in the logical evolution, it is simply the position that is mediated by, or issues from, the denial of quality. Thought has cancelled the opposition of *somewhat* and *other*, and proceeds to posit or think again; and what it thinks is *that definite existence in general in which the qualitative distinction is effaced*; and this is the one.

Another example of the thesis, and one with which we are specially concerned in studying the third book of the *Logic*, is the concept of the universal. The universal, before the particular comes to view and therefore before the universal merits the name of universal, issues from the collapse of the opposition between substance and accident, cause and effect, activity and passivity, the absolute existence of a thing and its positivity or manifestation. A new sphere of thought has opened; and the first movement of thought in that sphere is simply the assertion of the sphere in general, or, what is the same thing, the assertion of its own survival after the disappearance of the sphere that has been superseded. This 'yes' or 'to-be' in general, translated into a sphere mediated by the inner dialectic of the above-mentioned distinctions, is the simple universal. The universal is therefore so far unopposed; the particular has not yet emerged, and earlier determinations such as substance and cause have been put out of the way. Substance, for example, is no more an opposite¹ to the universal than space is to body.

But the challenge of the thesis does not remain unanswered; as a challenge, indeed, it presupposes an

¹ I use the terms opposite and opposition, as they are used in formal logic, to cover both contradiction and contrariety.

answer. The thesis in asserting itself defines its character and its limitation ; even the indefinite has this much definite about it that it is the indefinite *as against* the definite. Thus we are brought to the second stage or antithesis, the stage of opposition, finitude, dualism, or, as Hegel calls it in view of what is to follow, *the first negation*. Over against being there appears not-being, against the universal the particular, against the positive in general the negative. But this opposition immediately collapses again. The antithesis is only the antithesis *of the thesis*, the *alterum* is an *alterum to an alterum*, the particular is a particular case *of the universal*. The conflict collapses, for thought has been fighting with its own shadow. Here we reach the synthesis, or, as Hegel calls it, *the second negation*, or the negation of the negation ; for the first negation is seen not to be a negation, or its negativity is denied. The result is a simple positive, yet complex in its mediation, like the perfect rest that arises from the equilibrium of opposite forces.

It is in the stage of synthesis that we first meet the true infinite, which is the unity of thesis and antithesis, of the indefinite and the finite. An example of such an infinite is the concept of the singular or individual, in which the universal and particular, that at first blush appear irreconcilable opposites, are merged in a perfect unity, or in which, to speak more in accordance with the logical order, the universal has restored itself out of the particular. The individual *as such* is absolutely indeterminate, has no special character, is not defined by this or that quality in contradistinction to something else. All this specializing or defining by contrast carries us no further than the particular. I may add term after term to a connotation as long as I please, but I am still short of the singular or individual. To get this I must restore

the self-reference of the universal. The individual is self-referred—as the logicians say, a proper name has no connotation ; at the same time, it is absolute distinction, difference for the mere sake of difference.

It is easy to miss the full significance of this triadic method. To begin with, the phrase *thesis—antithesis—synthesis* is itself misleading. Not only may it suggest, as we have seen, the act of an external understanding contemplating the categories from without, but it tends to conceal the evolutionary character of the movement. The term *synthesis* suggests the combination of self-subsistent elements ; whereas the third stage of the triad is the simple truth¹ that has arisen from the falsity of the two first stages, that is, from the fact that they are not self-subsistent. Further, every image or representation by which we attempt to familiarize ourselves with this movement forces us into an abstraction that contradicts the movement's essential nature. We picture thought as a traveller halting at stages in his journey which are the categories, and we imagine these stages or categories as separated by intervals from one another. That is to say, we not merely distinguish thought from its categories, and category from category,—and of course they must be distinguished from one another—but we separate them by the absolute externality of spatial difference. But in truth they are distinct, and at the same time in absolute identity. It is the same misconception that makes us wonder how the first two categories of the triad, which have been expressly denied and superseded, can be said to be gathered up into the truth of the synthesis. But, properly speaking, it is not that the former categories are false, but that it is false to stop at them ;

¹ Not of course the final and perfect truth—only the supreme concept of the absolute idea can be that—but the truth as against its predecessors, the truth of its own sphere or triad.

and it is not the categories that are abolished, but their independence and ultimacy; and the abolition of this independence and ultimacy *is* itself the true category, that is, the category that is true as against them. In fact what is really true is not any inferior category at all, but the dialectic by which category runs into category and what is false is any inferior category at all regarded as self-subsistent and ultimate. And even the supreme category that closes the evolution of thought, the absolute idea, is only true because it is itself the repetition of the whole *process*. Only we must remember that when we say that the real truth is the dialectic by which category runs into category we must not make another false abstraction between the dialectic and the categories themselves. The categories are the dialectic, and, as its factors, constitute the absolute truth. Taken out of the logical process and posited in self-dependent subsistence they are all false. The synthesis that proved to be the truth of its own triad has itself to appear as the thesis of the triad to follow, that is, as the false and abstract category that is to be absorbed in turn into a higher synthesis.

Not only does this nexus of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis—or, better, of the mere positive, the first negation, and the second negation or restored positive—bind together individual categories in their immediate sequence, but it forms the connexion between groups of categories. For example, it not only conjoins the several categories of quality with one another and the several categories of quantity with one another, but it constitutes on a higher scale the triad of quality, quantity, and measure. And when we advance to the first main division of the whole Hegelian logic into the logic of being, of essence, and of the *Begriff* or concept the nexus remains the same. But at the outset this division is merely provisional and anticipatory. It is not so with the other sciences.

When geometry, for example, undertakes to investigate spatial relations, the dimensions of space which the science assumes, enable it to divide itself, before it sets to work, into geometry of the plane and of the solid. Formal logic, as it is commonly treated, does not attempt to deduce or justify the term, the proposition, or the syllogism as forms of thought, but takes them as given ; consequently it can divide itself at the outset into logic of terms, of propositions, and of syllogisms. But since the Hegelian logic is the science of absolute thought, and recognizes no *datum* to start from, or, what is the same thing, recognizes nothing but itself and its own potentialities, a division of it is only possible when its work is done. Such a provisional division as Hegel prefixes to his own work only means, as he says himself, that one who has already gone over the ground may give some indication to the novice of what he may expect to meet in the course of his journey.

H. THE DIVISION OF LOGIC.

Kant distinguishes four groups of categories, those of quantity, of quality, of relation, and of modality. Modality is properly a distinction of judgement, and may be laid aside for the present ¹ ; on the other hand, what Kant calls concepts of comparison ² may be added to his enumeration. But he has a higher classification as well. The categories of quantity and quality are distinguished as *mathematical* from the categories of relation as *dynamical*. The mathematical categories determine an object, the dynamical determine the relation of one object to another ; or the mathematical are directed to objects of intuition, the dynamical to the real existence of those objects. Translated into Hegelian terms, the categories of

¹ See below, p. 224.

² See *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, p. 268.

quality and quantity¹ become *immediate* categories, while the categories of relation and comparison become *mediate*, or determinations of *reflection*.² The immediate categories go straight for the object and remain in it; the categories of reflection³ reach the object through something else, and pass back from it to that other. The *quantum*, for example, is an immediate category, because it includes or expresses no reference to anything outside it; the cause is a mediate category or determination of reflection because it contains a necessary reference to the effect. Consequently the mediate categories consist of pairs of correlates.

As this distinction is of capital importance, we must notice a possible objection to it. It might be contended that every category is necessarily relative or mediate, that every quantity carries with it a reference to other quantities, and that every quality owes its character to its distinction from other qualities and its relation to our perception.⁴ Now this is perfectly true, but it leaves the distinction between immediate and mediate categories unaffected. A *quantum* stands, no doubt, in relation to other *quanta*; but, to put the difference in a popular way, the order of connexion here is that the *quantum* is related to other *quanta* because it is a *quantum*, not that it is a *quantum* because it is related to other *quanta*; whereas the cause is a cause in virtue of its relation to the effect. To employ another popular contrast, the relation is *implicit* in the *quantum*, it is *explicit* in the cause. But of a distinction so important as this we

¹ In the Hegelian deduction the categories of quality precede those of quantity, quantity being reached by abstraction from qualitative difference.

² We shall see later that the immediate categories constitute the sphere of being, the mediate or reflective, the sphere of essence.

³ The metaphor is from the reflection of light.

⁴ See Locke's *Essay*, bk. II, chap. xxi, sect. 3.

require a more fundamental expression and explanation.

The whole evolutionary process of thought is of course a process of mediation or inference, and since the categories are the steps of the process, every category *as a step in this process*, or, to use a phrase of Hegel's, every category *initiates Begriff* or concept implies mediation. But in the immediate categories the mediation does not lie within the category itself, but in the dialectic that mediates between category and category. So far indeed from the mediation lying within the category, it is its very lack of mediation, the fact that it is a false halt, that necessitates the transition to another category. If, as we might put it, the category had contained the mediation within itself, if it had not halted but gone on to its opposite, it would have made the transition itself, and we should not have had to leave it in order to reach its complement. On the other hand, the mediate categories are those in which the transition is not left to us, that is to say, to the dialectical movement in general, but is expressly effected by the category itself. The category of *somewhat*, for example, by reason of its dialectic and onesidedness necessitates a transition *from it* to the category of *other*; but the transition to the *effect* is given *in and by the cause*.

If we object here that *somewhat* without an *other* is in truth as absurd as a cause without an effect, and that an isolated category of *somewhat* is a distinct falsity, we are simply playing Hegel's game for him. For the whole *momentum* of his system is that such categories as *somewhat* are false, and demand correction. We may further object that the business of logic is with the truth, and that it ought to put aside all such falsities. Precisely so, but the evolution of the Hegelian logic *is* the repudiation of them. Hegel says, certainly, that every

lower category is at the same time abolished and retained¹; but its retention includes the correction of its falsity. The *somewhat* is retained in a higher category in which it is in unity with the *other*; but its isolation from the *other*, which is the point we objected to, is not retained. Again, we may ask how logic can be defined as the science of pure truth, if it is composed of false categories. But what is true is logic as a whole, not its individual categories—except in so far as we may use the term category of the supreme concept, the absolute idea; and that *is* the whole of logic. If we should urge that logic might as well present us straight away with its final true result without wasting its time in showing that the false is false, we should simply be denying the conception of evolution, as if we were to require the unknowable force of Herbert Spencer to posit the civilized man in the first instance without working up to him through aeons of tedious differentiation. In fact, we should be impugning the whole conception of truth, and of the *ordo cognoscendi* which lies at the basis of Hegel's philosophy. The false must certainly be denied, but it cannot be ignored; in the pure absence of falsehood, how should truth be truth, how should truth establish itself as truth?

But the difficulty is not altogether removed. Even if the immediate categories are only false in themselves or in their isolation, and if the logic of their dialectic may be called the truth as being their repudiation, and even if a falsehood of some kind must be granted in order that there may be a truth, where is logic to get its falsehood, since it admits no *datum*? Is it then a science

¹ Hegel uses *aufgehoben* in this sense; like our phrase 'put aside' it involves the twofold meaning of (a) superseded, (b) put by to keep. I have generally translated it by 'merged', as where, in legal phraseology, a term of years is 'merged' in the fee simple. The term is gone, but only because the greater estate absorbs it.

that creates a falsehood?—The answer is that in the immediate categories there is no positive false content, but that the content which thought creates, though certainly not a *datum*, is treated as a *datum*; the matter of thought appears in a form that is not the form of thought, namely in the form of immediacy or isolation; there is no *datum*, but there is the form of a *datum*; thoughts are treated as if they were things. Finally, if it should be contended that this false form¹ renders the logic of the immediate categories unworthy of the claim to truth, we have to remember that in an evolutionary series the term *truth*, like the term *value*, has to be applied in a comparative sense, and that what is true in one reference may be called falsehood in another. Logic is the science of truth as against the lower forms of consciousness, but there is an evolution within logic as well, and its lower forms are false as against its higher. The ultimate and final truth of logic is only to be found in the supreme conception of the absolute idea.

The distinction, then, between the immediate and mediate categories is a fundamental one; and it will be seen at once that this distinction supplies us with the thesis and antithesis of the logical process as a whole. The immediate category in general is a mere positive that ignores any reference to an opposite; the mediate categories expressly present us with diversity and

¹ It is easy to see that one might express the same thing by speaking of the false *matter* implied in the immediate categories. Let us take as a statement of truth the *unbroken whole* that mere-self-identity-passes-into-difference-which-is-identical-with-the-self-identity; next, let us split it into '(a) there is a self-identity; it passes into (b) difference; but this difference is (c) identical with the self-identity'. Now I may either say that the second statement is giving the same content as the first in a new and inadequate form, or I may say that in the isolated terms of the second I have a content different from anything in the first.

opposition, as of substance and accident, cause and effect, matter and form. But to complete the logical triad there is required the synthesis, the second negation, the restoration of the positive through the negation and absorption of the opposition or negativity.

We have already seen that Kant's conception of thought stops short at an external synthesis of self-subsistent entities. In the *a priori* synthesis of the transcendental logic he suggests something higher than this, a pure thought, an identity in a diversity of its own, independent of a given content. But by insisting on the necessity of an intuition he again reduces the *a priori* synthesis to a mere form of combination that is meaningless unless given something to combine. It follows naturally that when we examine the categories of this incomplete thought we find none that is applicable to thought itself. The concept of the Kantian logic always remains the concept of *things*, and never rises to the *νόησις νοήσεως*, the thought of thought. In Kantian language we know the world, but we do not know ourselves. Accordingly the category of reciprocity, the richest and highest in his enumeration, is still a category only applicable to things. True, it is on the way to thought; it has passed beyond the mere isolation and immediacy, that is the direct contrary to thought, to a mediacy or relation in which that isolation is qualified or partly denied. But it still falls short of that absolute identity in opposition which is the essential nature of absolute thought. It has passed from the thesis to the antithesis or the first negation; but the synthesis or negation of the negation is still to seek.¹

The main division of the Hegelian logic is into the

¹ This sentence well illustrates the unsuitability of the terms *thesis*, *antithesis*, *synthesis*, as applied to the three members of the Hegelian triad. Synthesis in its natural meaning, and as Kant uses it, signifies

spheres of *Sein* or being, *Wesen* or essence, and *Begriff* or concept. The spheres of being and essence correspond in general to the mathematical and dynamical categories of Kant: for *Sein* connotes immediate or unreflected being, while *Wesen* or essence connotes a true being or ground that is conceived *in contradistinction* to an apparent or inessential being, as, for example, we conceive substance in contradistinction to accident, causality to effect, thing *per se* to phenomenon. *Sein*, therefore, is the stage of thesis, and *Wesen* the stage of antithesis, in the whole logical process. The stage of synthesis, or the restored positive, which is wanting in the Kantian logic, appears in the Hegelian sphere of the *Begriff*.

I. THE LOGIC OF THE CONCEPT.

Hegel uses the term *Begriff* or concept to denote that pure thought whose essential form we have found to be the identity of opposites. Now the sole object of logic is pure thought, or, as Hegel puts it, all logic lies in the element of the concept. But just as a man besides being conscious of other things can also be conscious of his own consciousness, so pure thought besides containing categories or predicates of things¹ can also think, or contain categories of, itself. Whereas, then, the sphere of being is the concept or pure thought of being, and the sphere of essence is the concept or pure thought of

merely that necessary or objective connexion which is only the second stage of the triad, or the first negation.

¹ From what has been so often repeated the reader will understand that this does not mean that pure thought contains a *datum*; but rather that pure thought has to evolve itself to the complete expression of its own nature, and therefore in its earlier stages treats its *own native* content as though it was a thing. And in general a thing means for Hegel the positing of a content of thought in the form of immediacy or isolation, which is precisely *not* the form of thought.

essence, the sphere of the *Begriff* is the concept of the concept, or the pure thought of pure thought.

In comparing the immediate categories of being with the mediate or reflective categories of essence, we naturally and rightly spoke of the mediate as true in contrast to the immediate. But mediation is only the antithesis or first negation ; and the mediate categories are in their turn false as against the higher categories of the *Begriff*, which contain not merely opposition, a reference to a correlate, but the identity of opposites. It is, therefore, only in the concept that logic can properly be said to have come to itself.

In the lower spheres of being and essence we find it necessary to distinguish between the categories in themselves and their dialectic, the truth lying in the dialectic, and the categories in themselves being false ; or, to put it in another way, the truth lying only in that category which is a synthesis of two opposites, and the other categories being false. Indeed it is a true paradox that in these spheres the logical process exhibits its truth by demonstrating the falsehood of its own categories. For example, the truth of the process from pure being to becoming lies in the denial of the categories of pure being and pure nothing. But when the sphere of the concept opens, all this is changed. Here we have to do with categories of pure thought, not merely in the sense that they are categories by which pure thought thinks, but in the sense that they are the categories by which pure thought thinks pure thought. Therefore the truth which in the earlier spheres resided in the dialectical movements here reside in the categories themselves ; or, what is the same thing, the dialectic is not merely implied in the categories, but expressly posited in them. Thus they correct themselves, as it were, or contain their own opposites and their identity with them ; that

is to say, they require no correction and have no opposites. The category of pure being is false because it implies its opposite not being, and the unity of itself and its opposite in becoming, and yet does not expressly posit either the opposition or the unity. The categories of cause and effect, though nearer to truth, are false to the extent that, though they imply their own absolute identity, they do not expressly posit it. Such categories, therefore, demand others to correct them. But the universal, for example, which is the first category of the concept, makes open confession of its identity with the particular and singular; it avoids correction by anticipating it, and escapes opposition by admitting it.

In fact, while identity in opposition is the essential character of logic as a whole, the concept is the sphere of the *posited* identity of opposites, whereas being was the sphere of posited simple identity—being is being, nothing is nothing—; and essence was the sphere of posited opposites—the cause is the antithesis to the effect, the substance to the accident. Or if we speak in general of being as the immediate, and essence as the mediate, we may call the concept the immediacy that has been restored out of mediation; that is to say, the identity that has arisen from the reconciliation of opposites. The opposite of a category is now nothing extraneous to it, but merely the reverse of the die; or the category is simply opposed to itself. The concept, therefore, is the synthesis or identity of being and essence; like being, it is identity, but like essence, it includes opposition.

The concept is the reconciliation of the antithesis presented by essence; more immediately, the antithesis of absolute existence and positivity is the proximate opposition, whose resolution introduces the sphere of the concept. The substantial conception of the universe,

which is the highest furnished by the categories of mediation, and which forms the basis of Spinoza's system, presents us with a fundamental antithesis, between an absolute and original reality which is the source of all power, and the positive¹ particular modes or facts, that are the accidentality or effect of that original and active reality. The original reality is conceived as the infinite in contradistinction to its finite or particular modes; and, as thus conceived *in contradistinction*, it differs essentially from the category of pure being, which, as such, is posited without any reference beyond itself. But the absolute substance is only conceived in contradistinction to its positivity or modes, and not also in identity with them; as Hegel says, it is not the determining ground of its positivity. Spinoza's modes are *alleged* to follow from his substance, but as a fact they are not deducible from it; therefore his principle turns out not to be a principle at all, and the absolute substance stands in merely external connexion with its positivity. To this extent, then, the substantial conception is a faulty one. But since logic is the science of truth, it only exhibits this fault in order to remedy it forthwith by advancing to a higher plane of thought on which the conceptions of absolute existence, of positivity, and of their contradistinction are maintained, but at the same time this contradistinction is conceived as an opposition between factors of an identity.

This higher plane of thought is the concept, and its essential note is accordingly the identity of absolute existence and positivity. Also it may be called the domain of freedom in contrast to the necessity that characterizes the sphere of reflection or mediation. When, for example, we conceive a certain cause as

¹ Positive in the sense of not-original, but posited or laid down.

merely related to a certain effect, each is determined or limited by the other, which in this case is something foreign to itself; to this extent it is not free but necessitated. But when we conceive the transcendental ego or pure thought as absolutely identical with its objects, not as synthesizing them, but rather as their actual unity, while they, on the other hand, are merely the factors of the identity, then the ego, though it is still distinct from the objects, is not limited by them, for they are only its other self; consequently it is free. Once more it is in the sphere of the concept that we discover the true infinity, whereas the infinite of reflection was but a make-believe. No doubt, the substance of Spinoza is by way of being the infinite; but since it is not actually the determining ground of its modes, it is not really infinite at all, for the finite *falls outside it*, and so far limits it. On the other hand, the transcendental ego or pure thought is not only the infinite as the universal self-identity that unscathed and unaffected pervades the multiplex content of its process of determination, but is itself the actual source from which this content is drawn. Thus it is the infinite that contains within itself both the infinite and the finite.

Such is the genesis of the concept; but as yet we are only in possession of its general note or character. This pure thought, in which absolute existence and positivity are identical, has still by its own self-development to evolve its own categories; and this evolution forms the subject-matter of the third book of Hegel's *Logic*. Thus it might appear at first sight that in tracing the evolution of the concept we were going over the same ground that had already been covered by the evolution of being, and again by the evolution of essence; for each sphere has in a certain sense to start from the beginning. When essence through its dialectic has

passed into the concept, essence and all its works are merged or superseded; and the concept, having no matter in hand to go on with, must start afresh to produce a content for itself. But it has its own character and form determined by the sphere it has superseded. Though it will progress from lower truths to higher truths, its lowest term will always be some identity of opposites; posited identity in opposition is its *element*, within which its development must proceed. Therefore when it begins with affirmation in general, it does not begin, like being, with the category of pure being, which is a simple affirmation without reference to any opposite; nor does it begin, like essence, with the category of positive which is an affirmation merely correlated to an opposite; but it begins with the universal, as an affirmation that expressly distinguishes itself from the negative or particular, and at the same time is expressly identified with it in the singular.

The concept, therefore, has to make its own content, and it is only in the consummation of its process of self-evolution that it comes to conceive itself in its absolute truth. To that extent its prior categories or determinations are imperfect and one-sided. Logic in general is the science of truth or the realm of pure thought; its element is in general the identity of opposites. But in the concept we reach a truth higher than what belongs to logic in general, for the concept is the pure thought of pure thought; here the identity of opposites is expressly posited in every determination. But even here, where every term is already such an identity, the evolution of thought is still at work gathering smaller identities into larger till it reaches the absolute synthesis. The course of this self-evolution by which pure thought comes to have an adequate and perfect conception of pure thought is determined as follows.

The concept is at first immediate, that is to say, it refers to no opposite, or takes no account of anything beyond itself. In this character it constitutes the object of formal logic. No doubt we speak of formal logic as concerned with the form of thought in contradistinction to its matter. But this is only an external distinction. Formal logic goes about its business without paying any regard to the matter of thought, in fact, as if there were no such thing as an object or a matter of thought at all ; in this way it has the semblance of freedom. Yet this is not true freedom, but merely an assumed security ; formal logic is only ignoring any opposite. So far, then, thought has not yet attained to an adequate conception of thought ; for the very nature of thought is freedom in the sense of the recognition and reconciliation of an opposite. But formal logic leads to its own correction and by the process of its self-determination passes over into the object. Objectivity, then, is the second stage of the concept.

But the perfect truth is not yet. In objectivity, as such, the concept, though present as its inmost soul, is buried in its content. To realize itself to the full the concept must as subject rise again into independent spontaneity, distinguish itself from the object as its opposite, and finally overcome the opposition and annex its object ; and thus achieve true freedom. This last stage of the concept, to which the evolution of objectivity leads, and in which the subject and object are distinct and at the same time identical, is called the idea.

Thus the whole course of logic divides itself into the three spheres of being, essence, and concept ; and the sphere of the concept or the subjective logic divides itself again into the triad of subjectivity or formal logic, objectivity, and the idea. As we said before, these

divisions are merely provisional. We have said that subjectivity passes into objectivity, and objectivity into the idea ; but it is the business of the third book of Hegel's *Logic* to show by a detailed deduction that this is so. Formal logic must be traced along the course of its self-evolution, and shown to pass of itself into objectivity ; and in the same way objectivity must be followed stage by stage till it turns into the idea. This much we may premise that the evolution of each of these three stages of the concept—subjectivity, objectivity, and the idea—proceeds through the same movement of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, or immediacy, mediation, and restored immediacy, that forms the basis for the division of logic as a whole, and of the logic of the concept. Formal logic divides itself into the logic of the concept as such, or the logic of terms, the logic of the judgement or the concept in the opposition of its factors of universal, particular, and singular, and the logic of the syllogism, or the concept with its factors distinguished as extremes, and at the same time identified in the middle term. Similarly objectivity divides itself into mechanism, chemism, and teleology ; and the idea or the unity-in-difference of subject and object divides itself into the idea of life, where subject and object are in immediate unity, the idea of cognition, where the subject opposes itself to the object as to something *given* it to know, and the absolute idea, which is the absolute identity in opposition, the adequate thought of thought as *the maker of its own content*. But the thought that makes its own content is the pure thought of which the whole logic is the detailed statement ; therefore logic has for its final category or determination the conception of itself. The highest form a man can think in is his reason, and the highest thing he can think of is his reason ; in the reason that thinks itself the supreme form

and the supreme content pass into one another, and this is the absolute idea.

J. THE CONCEPTION OF FORMAL LOGIC.

Formal logic is the science of the thought that as yet is confronted by no object and simply refers to itself. Thought here contemplates itself, and not itself as engaged upon this or that object, but itself in its simple immediacy or self-identity.

Hegel points out¹ that the disrepute into which this science has fallen is due in part to mere barbarism on the part of its detractors, but in part also to the errors of its expositors and defenders. That it has fallen into disrepute is only too obvious; of this there can be no greater proof than that its advocates are often reduced to the appeal *ad misericordiam* that the study of it fortifies the mind against fallacies of reasoning. Not that it does not do so; but it would certainly seem that the result might be attained by a less complicated and elaborate method. And surely this ancient science would be in a poor plight if its only asset was that it sometimes enabled stupid people to do in a slow and laborious way what intelligent people can do by their mother-wit.

But on behalf of logic we have in the first instance to remind its critics that at any rate its contents—concepts, judgements, syllogisms—*are there* or are facts just as much as physical objects are, and are also so much a higher class of facts, as reasoning man is a higher being than the rest of creation. If a botanist may legitimately spend a life in watching the growth of a few sorry plants, if other men of science are lauded for having devoted their existence to the study of radium, or shooting

¹ See below, p. 257.

stars, or bimetallism, or free trade, or wireless telegraphy, surely there is some inconsistency in sneering at a science that contemplates the human reason. That sneer is to this extent merely the expression of a materialistic and utilitarian barbarism that refuses to recognize any fact that it cannot see or feel or feed on, and does not perceive that this refusal, if consistently maintained, would be the denial of morality, art, religion, and even of what is commonly called science.

On the other hand, however, we have to confess with Hegel that logic has suffered severely at the hands of its expositors. The unpardonable sin in the logician is to treat reason as though it were an irrationality, to treat thought as though it were a mere thing. He may fall into this sin in more ways than one. He may give external classifications and arrangements of the content of logic, as though that content were a mere collection of isolated and indifferent forms. Or he may carry formalism so far as to reduce the concept to an empty mathematical term, an x or y ; as, for example, in the so-called quantification of the predicate. In this mathematical levelling down, logic is so denuded of its true significance that it becomes indeed a mere mental gymnastic, and, moreover, a gymnastic of such an exceptional and far-fetched character as to be of no practical value, and only enjoyable for the sake of the dexterity it exercises. Here is a logical exercise quoted in Mr. Keynes' *Formal Logic*¹:— 'Six children, A, B, C, D, E, F , are required to obey the following rules: (1) on Monday and Tuesday no four can go out together; (2) on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday no three can stay in together; (3) on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Saturday, if B and C are together, then A, B, E , and F must be together; (4) on Monday and Saturday B cannot go out

¹ p. 520.

unless either *D*, or *A*, *C*, and *E* stay at home. *A* and *B* are first to decide what they will do, and *C* makes his decision before *D*, *E*, and *F*. Find (α) when *C* must go out, (β) when he must stay in, and (γ) when he may do as he pleases.' The logician that frames exercises of this kind is doing his science a bad turn.

So much for what formal logic is *not*; what it *is*, since it constitutes the subject-matter of the ensuing text, need not be considered here.

K. THE VALUE OF THE TRUTH.

We have now briefly and provisionally considered the form and content of that truth, of which logic is the science. We had already seen that the essential step to the attainment of the truth is the denial of the immediate fact or *datum* of sense. And we had also seen that we must not undo our work by attributing to the absolute truth an existence in the sense of *being there*, as we speak of the existence of material or mental facts, of the existence of a comet or of a religious revival. But all this leaves us at first with a general sense of the unreality of the truth; we feel that if we are only to reach it by turning our back on the actual, and if when we do reach it, it is non-existent, we are only playing with words, or at most are only turning from a real world that dissatisfied our reason to a mere idea that it finds agreeable, as a disappointed man might console himself in opium dreams for the unkindness of fate. We know that the fact *is there*; we find that the idea or truth is not there. What then is the significance of its being true? What is the value of truth in general? And if the false fact is there, and its supposed antagonist, the truth, is not there at all, what is the harm of the fact being false? And what in general is the objection to falsehood?

That the truth is not wholly detachable from the fact, that it is necessarily led to by the fact, that the thinking man must come to think it instead of the fact, is a consideration of great importance, but is not a sufficient answer to these questions; it gives a foothold to the idea of truth, but not a value to the truth itself.

This question of the value of truth in general is not to be confused with the question of evolutionary values that we have already considered. Our conclusion on the question of evolutionary values was that we are justified in saying that one thing is absolutely higher than another because it is so for the pure thought that is the absolute truth. But how shall we justify our acceptance of the verdict of pure thought? If truth and fact, thought and the thing, contradict one another, how shall we choose between them? It really comes to this that we have to sing a palinode confessing that the fact has its rights, and that so long as it is merely lost in the truth, the work of philosophy is only half-done. The value of truth lies in its being a truth *of facts*; if the first step in philosophy is to lose the facts, the second is to find them again.

Before examining more closely this resuscitation of the fact, we may illustrate it by a similar paradox familiar to us in the domain of conduct. The lowest phase of human conduct is to be seen in those in whom reflection has never stirred and who perform the ordinary parts appertaining to their position in life as a matter of unconsidered routine, or merely with an *immediate* sense of their particular obligations. Such men often make useful citizens, but their virtue is, as Plato says, the virtue of bees and ants. In reflecting men there supervenes a higher phase, of which the essential note is the denial of the immediate and alleged duties of life as against some broad conception of its general aim, whether it be

a conception of absolute right or absolute beauty, or even of mere pleasure or licence. According to the constitution of the individual man and the nature of this conception in him, the denial of the immediate may be little more than momentary or it may be life-long, it may appear in mild or intense, practical or theoretical, comparatively virtuous or vicious forms. We find it in men so different as Oscar Wilde, Nietzsche, and Tolstoi, in habits of life so diverse as Coleridge's indulgence in opium and the hermit existence of the Yogi. Yet, whatever shape this denial may take, it is a higher thing than the unthinking affirmation that precedes it, just as even a bad man is a higher being than the innocent child. But for all that it is only the second stage, and the third must be a retraction of the denial. The highest virtue, the virtue of a Socrates or Alfred or Goethe, is no abstraction or denial, but an affirmation once more; but this time no immediate affirmation of routine, but one that sees beyond the immediacies to the principle behind them, and then re-affirms them in the light of the principle.

Philosophy therefore has to re-create the facts that it has denied, or thought has to realize itself. In so doing it becomes the absolute totality, the thought that distinguishes itself from the fact and yet makes the fact possible, the truth that opposes itself to the false and yet explains it. Thus it possesses the only absolute value possible to it, namely, that it is absolutely free or the absolute *whole*.

L. THE REALIZATION OF THOUGHT.

Thought must realize itself, or the absolute truth must create a world of facts. But, in the first instance, thought, as Hegel views it, is already a progressive self-realization. Throughout the whole of the logical process

from the category of pure being to the absolute idea thought is depositing successive layers of reality. For what in general is reality or the fact but the particular and individual content as against the universal form? To the natural demand then for reality as against thought we have in the first instance to reply that the presence of the demand must not lead us to confuse Hegel's absolute truth with the empty and abstract absolute, say, of Spinoza; thought with Hegel is already in itself replete with reality.

And at first sight it is not easy to see the possibility of any other realization. To get any realization of thought beyond what we have already found *within thought* we must make a new move beyond the absolute idea, in which the logical process terminates; but how is such a move possible? And yet it is necessary if we are in truth to get at the fact itself; for the realization of thought within thought gives us not the fact, but only the thought of the fact. This last point demands some consideration.

Roughly speaking, the fact or thing may be contrasted with thought as the immediate and isolated with the mediate.¹ When we distinguish, for example, the sun as a fact or reality from the thought or knowledge or conception of the sun, we mean ultimately by the fact something that is where it is at the present moment, existent on its own account quite apart from its place in a system and its connexion with, and similarity or dissimilarity to, other things. Now logic is constantly presenting to us categories of the immediate; pure being and the one, to go no further, belong to this class, pure

¹ In this rough parlance the term *mediate* is used to cover that identity of opposites, which is the essence of true thought and in which the difference is so completely dissolved in the unity that it may be called an immediacy restored out of mediation.

being not containing, and the one excluding, all reference to anything outside. But then pure being and the one, as they occur in thought, are only steps in the dialectical process which is itself always mediation. Therefore, though the one is immediate, the thought of the one is not so; the thought of the immediate is not itself immediate, any more than the thought of plurality is itself a plurality. Thus the realization of thought within the logical process stops short of the absolute fact.

In order to get the fact, what we require is, not any positive content beyond thought—for such there cannot be—but to rid ourselves of the mediation, which is the form of thought in general. The fact demands not an advance but a relaxation. Thought holds taut all its plurality, its content, its categories in the tense clasp of its identity. When it slackens its hold and allows its content—and there can be no other—to fall asunder into the absolute dissociation and externality of space and time,¹ the resultant is the fact.

As this question of the outward realization of thought or the creation of the world is alike important and difficult we will consider it again apart from metaphor and from the technical language of Hegel. Idealism starts with the assertion that the ultimate truth is thought, that there is nothing else that is really true. To this realistic common sense answers in the first instance that most certainly the fact or thing as it is called *is there*, or is a *datum*. Idealism replies by granting that the fact is a *datum*, but at the same time showing that a *datum* is something that involves its own dialectic and self-destruction, and lapses into thought as its truth. To this realism answers, secondly, that reduction of the *datum*

¹ This does not mean of course that space and time are there waiting to receive the sundered thought, but that this disintegration of thought is what time and space essentially are.

to truth only means the refutation of the form of the *datum* as *datum*, and that there still remains the thing no longer considered as a *datum*, but conceived in its general opposition to thought. And this reply of realism is perfectly sound, and when idealism declines, as it sometimes does, to meet it, it becomes in itself the complementary absurdity to vulgar realism, one being a philosophy of thought without things, and the other of things without thoughts. Idealism is justified in denying any value or truth to the mere contingent medley of sensuous impressions, but it would become ridiculous if it denied the scientific system of nature and of spirit. And here is something, realism urges, that contains thought, if you will, but surely is something more than thought. To this Hegel's answer is that on the contrary the fact is something *less* than thought, that the fact contains no meaning or significance, nothing positive, that is not thought, and only differs from thought through its *lack* of thought's coherence and compulsive unity.

To say then that thought or the absolute idea creates the world is the same as saying that things or facts contain no positive content or value that is not to be found in thought, that when you grant facts, you grant nothing *more* than is already present in thought. Even the new form or want of form that they possess—immediacy—is itself a factor of thought; it is simply the characteristic of *Seyn* or being. To use Hegel's phrase, the world of nature simply means that the idea posits itself in the form of one of its own factors—being or immediacy. Space, for example, is simply a pure being that, unlike the category of pure being, does not disappear into its opposite, but maintains itself in persistent isolation. The compulsion by which dialectic drives category into category is relaxed, and they are allowed to subsist

on their own account. This is what Schelling meant by speaking of nature as petrified intelligence. ✓

But the difficulty is not yet completely solved. So far it only appears that thought can realize itself into the fact, or, in the language of religion, that God can create a world. But why does He do it? This further question is essentially the same as the problem of the existence of evil, and the general problem suggested by the conception of evolution, namely, how to explain the existence of the lower in general, seeing that in every case it only exists to be lost in the higher. It is an essential principle of Hegelianism, to which we have often referred, that philosophy being the science of reason must be itself rational, and must never therefore put us off with mere assertions, but must always give us explanations or deductions. It will not do merely to say that God of His free will creates the world. Yet when we ask why He does so, why the absolute idea passes into nature, we seem to have come on an insuperable barrier to our thinking. In the process by which lower forms of consciousness passed into thought, and lower categories of thought passed into higher, the driving force was the dialectic or self-refutation and inadequacy of the inferior. But what inadequacy or self-refutation are we to find in the absolute idea? To put it once more in the language of religion, how can God as Absolute Perfection suffer any lack, or as Absolute Freedom how can He be under any compulsion?

Then again it is not sufficient to say that thought itself is a process of evolution and as such implies the origination of higher from lower. For this is only the presence of the lower within thought, or the idea of evil in the mind of God. But our present difficulty is to understand why God allows a self-subsistence to evil, not why thought thinks the fact, but why it makes

the fact, why it disguises itself in the garb of the world.

Plainly we are here faced by a transition of a wholly different kind from those that we have met in the course of the logical evolution. The new sphere that opens in nature cannot be deduced merely from the preceding sphere of thought, in which case it would be a new logical sphere and not a world of things, but must be derived from some one-sidedness in the nature of thought *as a whole*. And in thought as a whole there is one-sidedness; for though logical thought contains the material of all positive content and meaning of the universe—qualities and quantities, matter and form, causes and effects, life and knowledge, imagination and reason—it contains them all in the form of mediate identity or subjectivity. No doubt, this is the true form, and the process of logic exhibits the necessary transition from the immediate categories to the mediate. But this very process is itself one of mediation; and therefore what logic has demonstrated is only the truth of mediation as against immediacy *inside a closed circle of mediation*. Consequently mediation in general has not established itself as the absolute truth till it has issued as the necessary outcome of an *absolute* immediacy. This absolute immediacy which is necessary if the truth is to be the truth, or if God is to vindicate Himself as God, is the fact or, in the first instance, the world of nature.

God *can* create the world, for there is nothing whatever in that world of which the essence is not *expressly* contained in God. And, though He is of course under no compulsion but acts of His absolute free-will, yet He creates it *for a reason*, namely, in order to manifest Himself as God. In philosophical parlance, the falsehood, which is the essential character of the thing *as against* thought, has no positive content, but is mere nullity. At the

same time it plays a necessary part in the economy of truth as such ; for it is only by the subjugation of the false that the truth becomes truth.

M. THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE.

Philosophy as a whole divides itself into three parts : logic or the philosophy of pure truth ; the philosophy of nature, or truth in its externalization ; and the philosophy of spirit or mind. We must not conceive this perpetual recurrence of the triadic division as a pedantic formalism or artificial symmetry on the part of Hegel. There are indeed cases in philosophy where we are justified in suspecting such pedantry and artifice. When Kant, for example, expressly isolates the forms of thought from reality, and conceives these forms again as mere contingent and undeduced *facts of thinking*, we may well feel suspicious when we meet them constantly figuring as the basis of real classifications. But with Hegel the triadic grouping is the essential movement of thought, and thought is the essence of reality, and, therefore, if this grouping did not recur everywhere, in fact, if we did not find Hegel going over the same ground, and saying the same kind of thing about every subject that he takes up—be it nature, or art, or politics, or religion—his philosophy would stand self-condemned.

The subject-matter of the philosophy of nature is the idea disguised in the form of immediacy, or of an external world that proceeds from God. When we say that the idea 'disguises itself' as a world, or that it 'creates' a world, or that the world 'proceeds' from it, we are using phrases of a kind that we cannot well avoid, but which are nevertheless objectionable and misleading in a double degree. They evidently introduce fanciful and irrelevant metaphors ; but, what is worse, even if

we abstract from these, there still remains the suggestion of an act in time. The same false suggestion is implicit even in the language that we apply to the logical process ; we have to say that category 'leads to' category, that conception 'follows' conception, &c. But in logic we are dealing only with thought, and most persons have reflected enough to recognize that in thought such terms as 'follow', 'derive', 'lead to', &c., have no temporal or spatial signification ; that when we say that it 'follows' from *All A is B* that *Some B is A* we do not mean that the second proposition is younger than the first. But when we come to the relation of the world to the idea or truth, the suggestion of time is more misleading. For here we are concerned in part with the spatial and temporal world. We contemplate the series of physical existence in which *A* produces *B*, and *B* proceeds from *A* ; and then we go on to assert that the whole of the physical series proceeds from God or the absolute idea. It is easy then to confuse the latter production and procession with the production and procession by which the members of the physical series are connected with one another, and to imagine that if we could only retrace the temporal course of the world we should reach some point of time at which the world began, and before which there was nothing but the idea or God.

This confusion of thought is really a recrudescence of the old misconception of the absolute truth of which we have already spoken so frequently. The physical facts of to-day proceed from the events that went before them, and these from their predecessors, and these again from their predecessors, and so on for ever ; the history of the universe stretches back into an infinite past just as it extends onward to an infinite future. Into this stream of physical change the idea, which is not an existence or event, enters not at all. It is not a

member—the first member—of the successive existences of the world, nor is it a kind of contemporaneous cause of things, a permanent substratum for change, whether existing all through the duration of an eternal world-history, or whether containing that world-history as a finite section cut out of its own eternity. In order to rid ourselves of these false notions, we have only to remember that the world has been found to be a mode of the idea, and not the idea a mode of the world ; and, therefore, whereas we are naturally prone to accept the physical universe as the primary reality, in terms of which everything else—the truth included—must be expressed, on the contrary the relationship of the world to the idea is to be expressed in terms of the idea, and not of the world.

When we speak of the transition from logic to the philosophy of nature as a return to the fact, there is another misconception to be avoided. It is a return to facts, if you will, but by no means to the *same* facts ; indeed, so important is the distinction that it would be far better to avoid the word *return* and the repetition of the word *fact*, and speak of the transition as the advance to physical science, were it not that we desire to make it clear that if idealism begins with the bare denial of things, it certainly does not end there. But the facts of physical nature to which logic advances are not the mere medley of sense that constituted the primary fact ; they are, as we have seen, *the idea* in the form of immediacy. A primary fact, for example, is the starry heavens as a multitude of twinkling lights out there above me ; a scientific fact of physical nature—the idea in its immediacy—is the astronomical system of the celestial bodies. No two representations could be more diverse than these two representations of the stars : yet our popular thinking identifies them in

a confused notion that they are two different ways of looking at the same thing. But this thing of which the two representations are supposed to be different views is itself a pure abstraction and nonentity.

The origin of nature from the idea determines the content and character of natural philosophy. The inner significance of nature is that in its immediacy, which is its essential note as against thought, it is to serve as the mere lump that the idea is gradually to leaven, the *vile corpus* on which the idea is to demonstrate its truth. Therefore the philosophy of nature will like logic be a science of evolution, and its forms, which begin with the absolute immediacy and externality of pure space, will present a continuous ascent to greater richness of differentiation and closer mediation—in fact to a more definite and coherent heterogeneity.

That here we have the essence of the modern scientific theory of evolution is apparent. But it should be noted that Hegel knew nothing of evolution as an historical event in the physical world; the empirical evidence to establish this fact had yet to be gathered. He had no notion that as a matter of historical fact a lower form of nature passes into a higher; indeed, conscious that his language in speaking of natural forms ‘passing into’ others might be taken to signify such an historical alteration, he expressly disclaimed any view of the kind.¹ He was only speaking of a rational or logical evolution, in virtue of which the higher natural form contains in its essence or logical determination the essence of the lower along with a correction of its deficiency.

Accordingly nature is a system of ascending forms, in which the mediation and identity of thought is endeavouring to restore itself out of the immediacy of an existent world of space and time. But within the

¹ See *Naturphilosophie*, p. 23 (ed. 1842).

limits of what we mean in general by nature, that is to say, the physical universe, this process is not completed. The oak, for example, with its coherence of parts, differentiation of functions, and general unity of aim, as compared, say, with the indifference and incoherence of clay, is on the way to the absolute identity of the idea, but no more. As in the logical evolution *Seyn* had to pass into *Wesen*, and *Wesen* into *Begriff*, so nature must develop into a higher sphere which will still be a sphere of existence or fact, and at the same time will possess the identity of mediation which is the essence of the idea. This new sphere is spirit or mind, and the philosophy of spirit completes the triad of knowledge.

N. THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT.

There is no word in our language that expresses quite clearly the subject-matter of this science. *Consciousness* is only a suitable term when the thinker contrasts himself with an external object: and does not properly connote, for example, philosophical thinking, where thought is free. *Soul*, as the mere principle of life, is a term applicable within the sphere of nature, as when we speak of the 'vegetable soul'. *Mind* rather implies the cognitive character, which is only one phase in the development of the subject. Terms like *thought* and *subject* not only seem out of keeping with feeling and the lower states of consciousness, but have the fatal defect that they would lead to a confusion between the philosophy of spirit and logic; it is better therefore to reserve them for the abstract universal logical thought which constitutes the mind of God before the creation of finite existence, physical or psychical. On the whole perhaps the term *spirit*, in spite of its

peculiar religious and mystical associations, is the best to denote the concrete individual psychical being, that is the logical result of nature.

In spirit the idea is to return to itself. The phrase *return to itself* is exactly the most appropriate; for nature is not some *other* thing alien to the idea, but the idea alienated or estranged from itself—as one who has lost his personal identity. But the philosophy of spirit, like the philosophy of nature, must present us with a developing series of forms determined by logical evolution; for the return of the idea to itself is no more consummated in the first or lowest form of spirit, than the personal identity of a man who has lost it is re-established in the first vague glimmer of memory that breaks the darkness of his past.

It is not to our purpose here, any more than in the case of logic or natural philosophy, to give the details of the development that yields the varied content of the science before us. But it is worth noting that in that progress we must naturally come upon those lower forms of consciousness—sensation, perception, &c.—whose untruth we had found at an earlier stage to be the starting-point of logical thought. But this time we are approaching them from the idea; then we took them in their immediacy, at their own valuation. Then they were an accepted illusion; now they are the knowledge and explanation of what an illusion is. Then it was the case of a man groping and blundering on his journey in the dark; now it is the same man going over the ground in the light, and marking where and why he went astray. In fact, what we have now is not sensation and perception—in them there is indeed no truth—but the philosophy of sensation and perception, in which philosophy we see the logical pedigree of these psychical forms, and at the same time their necessary displacement by higher ones

—what they have of truth, and what of imperfection or falsehood.

As we have seen above, the concept or *Begriff* appears first in the form of subjectivity, then as mere objectivity, and finally as the idea, in which the subjective and objective are synthesized or identified. Similarly spirit is first presented in the form of subjective spirit; as such it is the subject-matter of anthropology and psychology. Secondly, it appears as the objective spirit, as spirit embodied in human society and human institutions; as such, it is treated by the political, social, and legal sciences. Finally, these subjective and objective aspects are united in the absolute spirit, which is the sphere of what we may *in general* call religion; here the spirit that is in man is one with the spirit that is without him, or the spirit has itself for its object.

This sphere of the absolute spirit, which in general we have called religion, divides itself more particularly into the domains of art, religion proper, and philosophy. All these three are presentations and contemplations of the absolute spirit; but art presents and contemplates it in immediacy and sense, religion in the form of representation and thinking in general, philosophy in the form of reason or pure thought. Therefore the greatest of these three is philosophy, because it is the presentation of the supreme content in the supreme form.

O. THE RELATION OF HEGELIANISM TO CHRISTIANITY.

We have just spoken of religion and philosophy as being both presentations of the absolute spirit, and this naturally suggests the question of the relation between Hegelianism and Christianity. It is well known that immediately after Hegel's death, his disciples split into two parties, called the Right and the Left, which differed mainly in the view they adopted on this question, his

disciples of the Right claiming him as a champion of orthodox Christianity, those of the Left employing his philosophy to subvert the popular religion of the day. The difficulty of the question lies perhaps less in ascertaining what were Hegel's philosophic views, than in determining the precise content to which the name of Christianity should be applied.

According to Hegel, religion is essentially akin to philosophy, contemplating, as it does, an identical object with it, and only differing from it in the manner in which that object is presented. The object of religion, as of philosophy, is not the world of facts and historical events, but the absolute truth that lies behind that world, and also, of course, manifests itself in it. But, whereas philosophy presents that object in what is the only true and adequate form, namely, in the form of reason, religion presents it in the inadequate form of immediate image and representation. That is to say religion embodies the unseen realities of God in forms that are really applicable only to the world of finite existence, and pictures them as a mere antithesis to *this* world, and therefore as an *other* world. In consequence of this faulty form religion as such, though conversant with the truth, can never be itself absolutely true ; or the only true religion is philosophy—which is not a religion at all.

Yet there is a very real sense in which we can speak of the truth of a religion. Granting that all religions are formally inadequate, we can still ask concerning any particular religion how far it presents us with the true essential content. And speaking in this sense Hegel asserts that the one true religion is Christianity. In the Christian doctrines that the world is not self-dependent, but the creation of a personal God who is the source of all power and all wisdom, that this His creation

has fallen away from Him, but after preparation by priest and prophet is brought back to Him in the fullness of time by the incarnation of His Son, who is no mere 'good man', no mere servant or imitator or angel of God, but is God Himself, and that by this incarnation man is enabled to find redemption from sin and everlasting happiness—in these doctrines Hegel sees the highest possible religious expression of the philosophical truths that the world proceeds from the absolute idea, and contains nothing positive but what it receives from the idea, that nevertheless the idea is self-estranged in the world, that this self-estrangement is gradually overcome by a process of evolution culminating in the absolute return of the idea to itself in the absolute spirit of man, and that in this absolute spirit lies perfect freedom and so perfect felicity.

In this identification of Christianity and Hegelianism in respect of their content, the two points on which the champion of orthodoxy would probably fasten are the personality of God and the immortality of the soul. No doubt, to say that the truth must be conceived not as substance but as subject,¹ that the infinite and absolute in which every finite thing is merged is thought, and that this thought is no mere congeries of concepts, like the ideas of Plato, and no mere catalogue of categories such as Kant gives us, but an absolute exclusive self-identity making and overcoming all its oppositions, is the same as saying that God is a person. For such absolute and exclusive self-identity in difference is precisely the true meaning of personality. I am a person in so far as the things of the universe round me are *my* objects, and stand in relation to one another through their identical relation to *me*. Consequently in proportion as the unity of my world of

¹ See Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 14.

objects deepens and widens, my personality grows in intensity. But this takes us very far from the common notion, which confuses personality with the particularity or idiosyncrasy that is essentially the imperfection of personality.¹ My fragmentary acquaintance with things, my limited interests, my partial and fickle affections, my unreasoning caprices and narrow prejudices, the water-tight compartments in my thinking, are exactly my failure to assert the identity of myself in the multiplicity of my objective world; they express the fact, not that *I* am *I*, but that *I* am a particular kind of *I*, and to the extent in which I have them, my personality is maimed or ineffectual. We must be careful therefore when we speak of the personality of God, that we do not—perhaps unconsciously—associate with the phrase some notion of individuality in the trivial sense of personal traits or peculiarities. But further, and this is the essential point, the personality of God as God cannot on Hegel's view be regarded as an existent fact; or God is not a person that exists beside other persons. Undoubtedly he is not merely this or that finite person, nor yet the totality of all finite persons; yet it is only in these that he *exists* as person. In his attitude on this question Hegel is to be compared in general with Aristotle. And just as Aristotle's conception of the universal as not the particulars, and yet not outside the particulars, was degraded on the one side into a grotesque realism, and on the other into nominalism, Hegel's conception of God has been distorted by some in the direction of mysticism, and by others in the direction of materialism and atheism. In fact the universal concept in general, which is the essence

¹ This would be the same as the logical confusion between the particular and singular.

of philosophical thinking, is an insuperable stumbling-block to the average human intellect, which either perverts it into a particular, or explains it away into a name.

Again, when Hegel finds the eternal foundation of things in the idea, and conceives this idea as re-established in the human spirit, this may with some propriety be called a doctrine of the immortality of the soul. But here again we are very far from the common notion of immortality that is the last ditch of popular orthodoxy. The inadequacy of Hegel's conception to popular requirements is often expressed by saying that his conception leaves no room for *personal* immortality; and this throws us back on the question of what personality really means. The incorruptible ground of things in the Hegelian philosophy—whether we call it truth, or God, or thought, or the idea, or the absolute spirit—is essentially a subject or a person, though by no means a finite or existent person. But if we mean by personal immortality the immortality of those accidental finitudes and imperfections, those stunted developments of reason, those particular entanglements in material conditions and lower states of consciousness that constitute the content which we often misname ourselves, then there is indeed no room for personal immortality in Hegel's philosophy. And, as Hegel declines to see personality in those contingent and nugatory idiosyncrasies that make a person a particular *kind of* person, so he equally rejects the notion of immortality as a mere unlimited prolongation of existence. Existence is essentially finitude, and therefore essentially mortal; but the spirit or idea is no member of the world of finite and mortal things at all. All such things are in it or for it; it is as indifferent to

the transience of the finite as is the harmony of the diapason to the mutability and decay of the strings that sound it. For, be it observed, Hegel's conception permits no vague notion of the *everlasting existence* of a purified, universalized, dematerialized, self. Such a notion is a mere monstrosity of the vulgar imagination, not an identity of opposites, but a confusion of contradictories; death is appointed not to this or that class of existence, but to existence in general.

To the inevitable objection of the plain man that all this is mere trickery of words, and that in reality he is being cheated of the immortality that religion had promised him and on which he had set his heart, we might with Hegel reply, in the first instance, that surely the objector does not believe in the immortality of his earthly body; and that it would be unreasonable and indeed grotesque to suppose the everlasting continuance of that side of his mentality which is determined by his physical character; say, for example, his susceptibility to east winds, his aversion to cats, his preference of wine to beer, or of a pipe to a cigar. If the objector answers that, to put aside these trivialities, at any rate his reasonable thinking, his religious aspirations, his aesthetic raptures are not things to be lightly swept away, we might reply that reason is indeed never to be swept away, but is the last word of being, and that good and beauty are indeed the manifestation of the eternal idea winning out in the world of immediate existence. And if once more he objects that in all this there is not one word about *his* reason, and *his* religious and aesthetic feelings, we can only decline to recognize as final the entanglement of reason and the idea in such particular contingencies as an aversion to cats, a susceptibility to east winds, &c. And, last of all, there is no escape

from this entanglement, except the escape from existence.

The question of the relation between Hegelianism and Christianity is of more than merely speculative interest. Hegel professed himself a sincere Lutheran to the end; was he dishonest, or was he quibbling? It is common knowledge that in the different orthodox churches there are to-day not only members but officers whose religious conceptions partake of that character, commonly misnamed impersonal and pantheistic, which distinguishes Hegelianism from popular Christianity. Are these men impudent and fraudulent intruders in the places that they hold? Beyond a doubt they are deliberately giving a false impression of their beliefs to many of their hearers; and this is in itself such a repellent thing, that to the simple honest man the question requires no further discussion. But the simple honest view, however attractive it may be, never exhausts any question. And we might point out as a simple practical consideration on the other side, that no educated and intelligent man would expect a Christian teacher either to share or to disclaim the naïve beliefs of the more ignorant of his flock.

There are one or two further reflections that might make us pause before we frame a dilemma between self-deceiving sophistry and sordid dishonesty for Hegel and for those of his followers, who understanding him aright, have yet read his philosophy *in*, not *into*, the language of Christianity. To begin with, in the comparison before us the standard should not be merely the practical one. In a practical valuation, the religion that promised after death an indefinite prolongation in another place of the life we enjoy here would differ *toto caelo* from the philosophy that substitutes for this immortality the eternity

of reason. But then the practical standard is the standard neither of philosophy *nor of religion*. Again, the language of Christianity is not merely a form in which it is possible—and desirable as a popular recommendation—to throw the significance of Hegelianism; it is the inevitable expression for it. Nay, further, the popular Christian dogma is the only possible substitute for the Hegelian doctrine in the mind unable to cope with abstract thought. That is to say, if Hegel had been called upon to give the nearest possible impression of his convictions to a plain man incapable of philosophic ideas, he must inevitably have fallen back on Christian creeds. The impression would not have been a true one; but it would have been infinitely nearer to the truth than if he had merely said, ‘I do not believe in your God, and I do not believe in your Son of God, and I do not believe in your immortal soul.’ By calling himself a Christian he conveyed, no doubt, a false impression; if he had called himself an unbeliever, he would have conveyed an impression of materialism, empiricism, and atheism, that would have been infinitely more false according to his standard of valuation, which is the standard of philosophy and religion, not of practice.

But these considerations are rather in the nature of an apology addressed to those who have not reached the philosophic standpoint. At that standpoint the whole aspect of the case is changed. For Hegel true philosophy and Christianity *were* essentially one. For him it was no matter of chance that there was this religion which might be read as an intuitive representation of the truth of abstract thought. The human spirit is not a contingent group of independent faculties; it is the same spirit that worships in religion and that reasons in philosophy. It is not that Christianity happens to serve as an expression of philosophic truth; but such an ex-

pression is what Christianity in its essential and actual nature *is*.

Lastly, to avoid a possible misconception, we might remark that the Hegelian conception of religion stands at the opposite pole to the shallow liberalism that reduces religion to morality, 'morality touched by emotion.' Religion is not a matter of obedience to laws, or prudence for ourselves, or benevolence to others, but of the worship of that same God whom philosophy contemplates as the absolute truth.

P. THE SYNTHETICAL CHARACTER OF HEGELIANISM.

It is one of Hegel's highest merits that he was the first to establish a true conception of the evolution of philosophic thought. In the history of philosophy, as in every kind of history, allowance must be made for the contingent and accidental; but in the main, human advance in the study of reason must be itself rational. Every philosophical system, then, as indeed every considered reflection of thoughtful men, must express some standpoint or element of truth, however imperfect or one-sided that standpoint or element may be; and the proper attitude towards it is not merely to accept, or merely to reject it, but to accept it and then proceed to complete it.¹ Only to the superficial view that looks merely to net results can this completion pass for a bare repudiation. It is a common development of political views for a man to begin in his youth with an instinctive and unreflecting conservatism, pass on reflection to radicalism, and on further reflection adopt a conservative attitude again. A party whip might for practical purposes identify the first and last stages: but in real truth the riper conservatism is nearer to radicalism than

¹ See below, p. 121.

it is to the unthinking conservatism of youth, and indeed contains radicalism within it, to use Hegel's phrase, as an absorbed constituent.

We shall find accordingly that there is no philosophical system, whose essential principle is not recognized and incorporated in the Hegelian philosophy ; and that, not in the trivial sense as though Hegelianism was a shallow eclecticism, a prize selection of philosophical specimens, but in the sense that Hegelianism is the complete organism or synthesis, of which those other systems were the lower evolutionary phases. Just as its logical principle is the identity of opposites, it is itself an identity of opposites, where the opposites are conflicting schools of philosophy.

The fundamental opposition that runs through the whole content and through the whole history of philosophic thought is, as we might expect, the opposition between the thesis and antithesis or position and negation of the Hegelian triad ; or to use more familiar terms, the opposition between the one and the many, or the universal and the particular. In Western philosophy we find its earliest presentation in the philosophies of Parmenides and Heraclitus. It supplies the difference of method and the apparent difference of general tendency between Plato and Aristotle. It appears in the contrast between Spinoza and Locke, and in the general contrast between German metaphysics and English empiricism. Nor is it merely a philosophical opposition ; as every other kind of thinking is applied logic, there is no sphere of human life that escapes the contrast. It is at the bottom of the distinction between the socialist and the individualist, the imperialist and the Little Englander, the philosopher in general and the man of affairs, the devotee and the worker, the artist and the man of science, idealistic art and realistic, experimental research and

mere observation. In most cases, no doubt, the facts of practical life necessitate a compromise between these conflicting aspects of truth. The socialist has to leave some initiative to the individual, and the individualist cannot do without some kind of a state. The most grubbing of routine workers, the ant or bee of Plato's simile, has some faint sense of a general purpose in his labour; and a Tolstoi or a Yogi must eat and drink, if it be only roots and water. But a practical compromise, while it may sometimes serve as a working equivalent to a philosophical synthesis, is from the speculative point of view its furthest opposite. Socialism or individualism is the imperfect or one-sided logical; compromise is the merely illogical; philosophical synthesis is the true two-sided logical, the identity of opposites.

No doubt, every system, whether it takes its stand by the one or the many, the universal or the particular, is bound to recognize both opposites as *there*, that is to say, to recognize their existence. But it places one of them by itself in the position of an ultimate, necessary, self-sufficient reality, while it regards the other as a mere concomitant fact, a mere accidental state of things. The true reality, says Spinoza, is one necessary, eternal, infinite, absolutely affirmative, substance, *and then as a matter of fact* this substance negates or determines itself into the manifold modifications that constitute the world. The truth, says Parmenides, is the absolutely affirmative unity of being; *and then as a matter of fact* we find a world of belief in which not-being and plurality play their part. In the last resort, says Hume, what exist are the variety of successive impressions and ideas; *and then as a matter of fact* custom produces associations and connexions between them. The true objection, therefore, to these one-sided systems is not that they ignore one of the

conflicting opposites, but that they are destroying the significance of that very opposite which they have taken as their principle; that, for example, if they make negation a mere accidental fact, the absolute self-subsistent affirmation that is left as the sole truth is a meaningless void, that possesses just as much and as little significance as an absolute negation. The two conflicting contraries must be philosophically synthesized, that is to say, not merely both recognized, but both included in the original and absolute unity of the ultimate principle. Now, the whole of Hegel's system, his dialectic, his general conception of thought, his principle of the identity of opposites, is the detailed enunciation of the philosophical synthesis of the one and the many.

To trace in detail the comprehensiveness and what we may call the sympathy of Hegelianism would be a long business, and a few indications must here suffice. To begin with, Hegel's philosophy is the direct outcome and completion of the systems of Plato and Aristotle. Plato's great discovery was that the truth of things is thought. But his conception of thought was immature, not with the modern confusion that degrades thought to the mere contingent activity of an individual subject, but because he saw in thought only the universal *in general*, without any content or character of its own, or any relation to the particular.¹ To this undefined thought of Plato Aristotle gave determinate content and a necessary relation to the particulars of existence.

¹ Two qualifications are necessary here: (1) Plato's idea, e.g. the idea of a bed, or a horse, has a content derived from experience; but *as thought, as opposed to experience*, it has no character save self-identity, immutability, universality. (2) The above criticism is only true of Plato in general. In some of his dialogues, as for example, the *Sophist*, there are indications of a speculative advance.

In fact, while Plato left us at the first factor of thought, the universal, Aristotle gave us its transition to the second factor, the particular. But the interconnexion of the particulars, the immanent dialectic of their interdependence, the identity in their opposition, which constitute the singular or third factor of thought is yet to seek, and to supply it is the aim of the Hegelian logic. Further, the Aristotelian evolution from the *πρώτη ὕλη* to the *νόησις νοήσεως* suggests such a process as Hegel has carried out in his *Logic*. It is, however, no more than a suggestion: for the inner necessity and the values, which are the essentials of the process, are only postulated by Aristotle. And it is not merely that Aristotle omitted to supply the required deductions or that he sometimes gave erroneous deductions—this might be said of Hegel—but that he did not recognize the absolute necessity of a deduction at all, and to this extent was degrading philosophy to a statement of facts.

Again, Hegel is one with the intellectualists—with Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz—in their recognition of the ultimate authority of reason; he is one with the empiricists in their insistence on the priority of the fact. Or again, his ultimate principle is thought or the subject, and, as we shall presently see, the three factors of the pure subject are the universal, particular, and singular. But these factors taken in their abstraction constitute respectively the principles of Spinoza, Locke, and Leibniz. Again, while Hegel is pre-eminently the philosopher of gnosticism, he goes the whole length of the sceptics—or rather he goes further than them—in banishing *from the world of existence* all such 'metaphysical' entities as the simple substance of the soul, or the unknowable power of God.

This aspect of him, which is particularly interesting,

may be illustrated by comparing him with Kant. The contrast between them is commonly expressed by saying that Hegel attempted to re-establish the rational knowledge that had been so rudely shaken by the scepticism of Kant's *Critique of the Pure Reason*. And in strict propriety of language, this statement is perfectly accurate. Yet, using words with their everyday implications and associations, we might express ourselves in quite a contrary sense, and say that Hegel replaced Kant's *problematical* scepticism by his own *dogmatical* scepticism, Kant's 'I don't know if there is', by his own 'I know that there is not'. Kant speaks of the ego or spiritual substance, for example, as something that we can never know, and whose existence must always remain for us problematical; for though we have an idea of it, we cannot say if there exists any object corresponding to the idea. But on the other hand, we can never say that its existence is impossible. Our imagination may, without doing anything demonstrably absurd, cogitate the soul as an existent object for some apprehension different from ours. Hegel, on the contrary, regards the spirit or ego as perfectly knowable, but finds its being in its thinking, its absolute existence in its positivity; in fact, it is that transcendental ego or identity that Kant dismisses as mere evidence that there is a soul, not evidence of what it is. The demand or desire for any further determination of the soul or of God as existent facts, is for Hegel an irrelevant perversity of the imagination, an attempt to degrade thought into a thing, or to apply to something categories that are only valid in a lower sphere. But as the plain man sees things, this means that we have regained our knowledge of God and the soul by knowing them to be nothing at all.

Again, what is Positivism but the elaboration of the

truth that there is no absolute apart from the positive, and the consequent inference that there is no absolute, inevitably drawn by a mind that confuses imagination with conception? And what is the Positivist worship of humanity but the sentimental and undiscerning emphasis of the truth that the absolute subject or person does not *exist* as such save in the existent persons of the world of space and time?

Once more, let us pass to the theory of evolution presented by Herbert Spencer. If we turn a deaf ear to his amateurish metaphysics, and his crude remarks about the unknowable, and transfigured realism, and confine our attention to his great scientific conception, we seem to be listening to a devoted student of Hegel applying his master's philosophical theory to the *historical sequence* of the world of nature and of mind. We have already seen that Spencer gives us no insight into the real significance or real necessity of evolution, but we are speaking of him now not as a philosopher but as a man of science. That all the changes of the world may be summed into a process in which an original indefinite and incoherent homogeneity passes into a definite and coherent heterogeneity, and in so doing traverses the three stages of the instability of the homogeneous, the multiplication of effects and segregation, and the equilibration of forces—could there be a closer scientific analogue of Hegel's principle that the ultimate and absolute truth is an evolution in which the original indeterminate category of pure being differentiates itself step by step into categories of greater complexity and richer concretion, and in so doing passes through the three stages of simple affirmative self-identity or thesis, opposition or antithesis, and the restored affirmation of synthesis or the identity of opposites?

We may add just a word about the general *ethos* or

moral character of Hegelianism. Matthew Arnold's *ipse dixit* that the greatness of a philosopher lies solely in the greatness of his character as a man is nearly, but not quite, as ridiculous as if a blind man were to announce that the greatness of a painter lay solely in the quality of his voice. Not quite as ridiculous, for we might expect some connexion between a philosopher's character and his philosophy, and every philosophical system is naturally associated with a certain attitude towards life, and a certain tendency of conduct, although in the world of existence, which is a world of false abstractions and divisions, these connexions and associations may be wanting. If then we are to assign to each great philosopher the virtue or frame of mind properly and naturally associated with his doctrine—to Locke worldly but not unkindly sagacity, to Spinoza lofty resignation, to Schopenhauer cold and proud aloofness, to Hume cynical good humour, to Kant sublime and profound but narrow conscientiousness—the special virtue that we should assign to Hegel is optimistic and sympathetic tolerance, not the tolerance of contempt or indifference, but the unoffended tolerance of world-wide interest, insight, and appreciation. This comprehensive attitude is not perhaps so striking a quality as some others; yet it really implies all that is valuable in the lesser or one-sided virtues—resignation, magnanimity, sagacity, conscientiousness—as, in another domain of human activity, the smaller virtues and insights of smaller men are contained and absorbed in the infinite tolerance of Shakespeare.

Q. CONCLUSION.

'But after all,' the student may ask, 'does Hegel really throw any light on the mystery of the universe? does he really explain things?' But the very first thing

that needs explanation is the term *explain*. In everyday parlance we say we explain a thing when we find it a place in a familiar and therefore accepted context. A mysterious sound in a room, for example, is said to be explained when it is found to issue by a familiar process from a familiar object. The instinctive desire for this primitive form of explanation never quits us, but like the imaginative propensity, of whose danger we have already spoken so often, dogs our steps even into the sphere of deepest speculation. We crave to bring the whole universe of things into the familiar context of human feelings, motives, hopes and fears. We want to think of it as created by a Being like ourselves for this or that desirable end, and of ourselves as objects of affectionate but discriminating interest to a parental Creator. On such a view we feel that the world is explained. In an explanation of this kind the familiar and accepted context is regarded as an impregnable and unquestioned foundation, as the truth to which a given phenomenon is to be reduced. When we cannot reduce the phenomenon to this context, we are said to be in ignorance or error.

But this rudimentary form of explanation will not do at all. What are the credentials of this familiar context that it is to be held inviolable and sacrosanct? It is itself just as much a *datum* as the new phenomenon whose submission to it we demand, the only difference being that it was given us long ago, and has been given us repeatedly till it has hardened into a habit. And, as a matter of fact, it is no bedrock as we thought it, but a quicksand. Contrast the accepted context of the man of science with that of the savage, who has sufficiently explained thunder to himself as the noise of the warfare of the gods. And even if we should suppose that all fully developed and civilized men should agree in an accepted context, what speculative value would the con-

text derive from such an agreement? If a thing is not true because one man believes it, it is not *speculatively* true because a billion of men believe it.

Yet the true meaning of explanation, as of every word employed in philosophic language, will be, not a contradiction, but a development of its popular use; and the lines of the development will be these. We proceed to reflect on what is meant by reducing a phenomenon to the accepted context. Clearly it does not mean merely to add it to another set of phenomena already accepted. I should not explain the mysterious sound by saying that, besides all the other facts that I knew of in the room, there is now this additional one. Rather, the new phenomenon must, as we say, be consistent with the facts already known; that is to say, it must fall in with a *theory* of the pre-existing facts. This reflection gives us a new view of the accepted context, which in turn leads to a new view of how that accepted context is to be determined. Determined it must be, for a genuine explanation is impossible as long as the truth or foundation is a variable context, differing with individual men, and with their positions in the world of space and time. Yet it cannot be determined, as we have just seen, by an appeal to a mere agreement of individuals; nor can it be determined by an appeal to facts, for it is a question not of facts, but of a theory or view of facts. Why should new facts be consistent with old? Why not have several theories, one for one group of facts, and another for another group? Or why have any theory at all? Accordingly, as the appeal to human agreement or to facts is here out of place, the context or truth must be determined through an inner dialectic, that is through the replacement of any particular context in consequence of its inherent falsehood by its own correction. This view of the determination of the accepted

context leads in turn to a new view of the relation between truth and falsehood, for they are not mere opposites, in which case one might with reason question the superiority of truth. Truth is what the falsehood has to become; falsehood itself bears witness to the truth. If one should object that in speaking of the self-correction of falsehood, we are smuggling in the truth, and substituting for the mere falsehood the falsehood as contemplated by the truth or by reason, the repentant falsehood—that the falsehood left to itself, the falsehood as such, has no strugglings of dialectic within it—the answer is that the truth is everywhere, and is present even in what we call the false; and that the absolute falsehood that contains no dialectic is simply nothing, an abstraction as empty as would be a truth that contained no recognition and correction of error.

If, with this developed notion of explanation, we return to the question with which this section commenced, we shall say in the first place that Hegel's philosophy is above all an explanation, for from start to finish it is a reduction of things to *the* familiar context, *the rationality that is our inmost self*. But if we seek an answer to the craving of our instinctive nature for a reduction of the universe and its history to a familiar scene and its homely incidents—the craving that, unsatisfied, makes us feel as if our life was a nightmare, and we were walking in a maze of almost grotesque perplexities—we have to say in the second place that Hegel's answer is one of absolute disappointment—not the scepticism of Kant, but the absolute negative of gnosticism. For Hegel the world of existence contains nothing that the man of science, as we call him, would not admit; there are no mysterious metaphysical entities lurking in corners like the popular *soul*, or withdrawn into infinite remoteness, like the popular *God*.

Inorganic matter, vegetable life, the lower animals, man—there is the catalogue complete. There exists nothing else, and those who will not or cannot see beyond the existent *as existent*, are left with this negative result. But what about the significance of things, and their value? What about truth, and right, and beauty? Any one who is concerned with these will find, I believe, their truest vindication and explanation in the philosophy of Hegel.

HEGEL'S SUBJECTIVE LOGIC

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PREFACE

THIS portion of the logic, which contains *the doctrine of the concept* and constitutes the third part of the whole, is also issued under the particular title *System of Subjective Logic*. This is for the convenience of such friends of the science as are accustomed to take greater interest in the matters here treated—those included in the scope of logic commonly so called—than in the further logical topics treated in the first two parts of this work.—As regards those former parts, I was able to lay claim to the indulgence of reasonable critics on the ground that there were scarcely any previous works to afford me a basis, material, and a thread of method. In the case of the present part I may claim their indulgence rather on the opposite ground. One finds for the logic of the concept a perfectly complete, solidified, one might say ossified, material at one's disposal, and the problem is to reduce this material to fluidity—to rekindle in such dead matter the flame of the living concept. Now, the building of a new city in a waste land has no doubt its difficulties; but when the task is to remodel the plan of an ancient city, solidly built, and maintained in continuous possession and occupation, the very abundance of the material is a greater source of obstacles of another kind. Among other things one must resolve to make no use whatever of much of what has heretofore been held in high esteem.

But above all the grandeur of the subject-matter may be adduced as apology for the imperfect execution. For

what more sublime object can our knowledge contemplate than *truth* itself?—Yet the doubt whether it be not this very object that requires an apology may cross our minds, when we recall the sense in which *Pilate* put the question *what is truth*—in the words of the poet :—

mit der Miene des Hofmanns,
Die kurzsichtig, doch lächelnd des Ernstes Sache verdammet.

The meaning of *Pilate's* question—which meaning may be regarded as an element in polite manners—refers to the belief that the aim of attaining truth is something confessedly abandoned and long since set aside, and that the unattainableness of truth is a thing recognized even among professional philosophers and logicians.—But if the question that *religion* raises as to the worth of things, judgements, and actions—a question which in its purport has a like meaning—is vindicating its claims with renewed vigour in our days, then philosophy must surely hope that it will no longer be thought so remarkable if she too, starting in her own immediate sphere, asserts once more her true aim, and after having lapsed into the manner and method of other sciences, and into their relinquishment of the claim to truth, strives to raise herself to that aim once more. In respect of this attempt apology is properly speaking impermissible ; as an apology in respect of its execution, I may mention that my official duties and other personal circumstances allowed me but stray hours of labour at a science that demands and deserves undistracted and undivided exertion.

Nürnberg, July 21, 1816.

THE CONCEPT IN GENERAL

To state off hand *what is the nature of the concept* is as little possible as to establish immediately the concept of any other object. It might perhaps appear that, in order to state the concept of an object, the logical element was presupposed, and that therefore this element could not in turn have something else for its presupposition nor be deduced; just as in geometry logical propositions, as applied to magnitude and employed in that science, are premised in the forms of *axioms*, or determinate cognitions that *have not been and cannot be deduced*. Now, although the concept is to be regarded, not as a mere subjective presupposition, but as the *absolute foundation*, yet it can only be so in so far as it has *made* itself the foundation. The abstract immediacy is no doubt in a sense *primordial*; yet, in so far as it is abstract, it is on the contrary mediated; and therefore, if it is to be grasped in its truth, its foundation must first be sought. Hence this foundation, though doubtless an immediacy, must have made itself immediate through the merging of mediation.

From this aspect we should begin by regarding the *concept* in general as the *third member* in a triad whose other members are *being* and *essence*, or, in other words, *immediacy* and *reflection*. Being and essence are so far the factors of its *becoming*, but it is their *foundation* and *truth*, in that it is the identity in which they are submerged and contained. They are in it since it is their *result*—but they no longer appear as *being* and *essence*.

That character they possess only in so far as they have not yet retreated into this their unity.

Objective logic, therefore, which treats of *being* and *essence*, constitutes properly the *genetic exposition of the concept*. More precisely, *substance* is already *real essence*, that is, *essence* that has united with *being* and advanced into actuality. The concept, therefore, has substance for its immediate presupposition; substance is the *implicitness* of that of which the concept is the *manifestation*. Thus the progressive *dialectical movement* of *substance* through causality and reciprocity is the immediate *genesis of the concept*, which presents the *process* by which it has *come into being*. But the significance of this process, as of every process of *becoming*, is that it is the reflection of the transient into its *ground*, and that the apparent *opposite* into which the former has passed really constitutes its *truth*. Accordingly the concept is the *truth* of substance; and whereas substance has *necessity* for its special type of relationship, *freedom* shows itself as the *truth* of necessity and as *the special relationship of the concept*.

The progressive determination of substance through the necessity of its own nature is the *positing* of the *self-existent*; the *concept* then is the absolute unity of *being* and *reflection* whereby the *absolute existence* is necessarily identical with *reflection* or *positivity*, and the *positive* with the *absolute existence*.—This abstract result is elucidated by the detailed statement of its concrete genesis; that statement contains the nature of the concept, whose treatment it must have preceded. The chief factors therefore of this exposition (which has been presented in detail in the second book of the objective logic) can only be gathered up briefly here.

Substance is the *absolute*, the intrinsic and self-existent actuality—*intrinsic*, as the simple identity of possibility and actuality, as absolute essence containing

all actuality and possibility within itself; *self-existent*, as this identity in its character of absolute *power* or purely self-related *negativity*.—The movement of substantiality posited by these factors consists in the following steps.

1. Substance, as absolute power or self-related *negativity*, differentiates itself into a relationship wherein what were primarily only simple factors appear as *substances* and as original *presuppositions*. Their definite relationship is that of a *passive* substance—the originality of the simple *intrinsicity*, which, powerless to posit itself, is merely original positivity—and of an *active* substance, the *self-related* negativity, which, as such, has posited itself as an opposite and relates to *this* opposite. This opposite is simply the passive substance which in the originality of its power it has *presupposed* for itself as condition.—This presupposition is to be understood in the sense that the movement of substance itself appears in the first instance under the form of one factor of its conception, *intrinsicity*; or that the character of one of the related *substances* is also the character of this *relationship* itself.

2. The other factor is *self-existence*, which means that the power as *self-related* negativity posits *itself*, whereby it again sinks its *presupposition*.—The active substance is the *cause*; it *operates*; this means that it now *posits*, as it before *presupposed*, that to the power there is now added the *manifestation* of power, and to the posited the *manifestation* of positivity. What was *original* in the presupposition comes in causality to have its intrinsic nature *in its relation to an opposite*; the cause produces an effect, and, that too, in another substance; it is now power *in relation to an opposite* and thus *appears* as a cause, yet is a cause only through this *appearance*.—The effect enters the passive substance, whereby it now also appears as *positivity*, yet is passive substance only as so appearing.

3. But there is still more present here than merely

this *appearance*. (a) The cause operates on the passive substance; it *alters* its character; but this character is positivity and there is nothing else in it to be altered; the other character, then, which it receives is causality; the passive substance accordingly becomes cause, power, and activity. (b) The effect is posited in it by the cause, but what is posited by the cause is the cause itself that remains self-identical in its operation; it is this that posits itself in the place of the passive substance.—Similarly in regard to the active substance (a) operation is the translation of the cause into the effect, into its *opposite*, into positivity, and (b) in the effect cause shows itself as what it is, the effect is identical with the cause and not its opposite; accordingly the cause in operating shows its essential nature to be positivity.—Thus from both points of view, that of their *identity*, and that of their negation and *opposition*, each substance becomes the *counterpart* of itself; yet while each becomes this counterpart, none the less does the opposite one, and accordingly each of them, remain *identical with itself*.—But these two relations, their identity and their mutual negation, are one and the same; substance is self-identical only in its counterpart, and this constitutes the absolute identity of the substances posited as two. The active substance, by means of its operation, that is, in positing itself as the opposite of itself—which at the same time is the merging of its *presupposed antithesis*, the passive substance—is manifested as cause or original substantiality. Conversely, by the influence of operation, positivity is manifested *as* positivity, the negative *as* negative, and consequently the passive substance as *self-related* negativity; and the cause in this its opposite simply and solely closes with itself. Hence by virtue of this positing the *presupposed* or *intrinsic* originality becomes *self-existent*; but this absolute existence necessarily involves

that this positing is no less a *merging* of the presupposition, or that the absolute substance has only returned to itself *out of* and *in its positivity*, and is thereby absolute. This reciprocity is accordingly the appearance that again merges itself; the revelation that the *semblance* of causality, wherein the cause appears *as* cause, *is a semblance*. This infinite self-reflection, in which the absolute existence necessarily involves its identity with positivity, is the *consummation of substance*. But this consummation is no longer *substance* itself, but is something higher; it is the *concept* or the *subject*. The transition of the substantial relationship is effected by its own immanent necessity, and is nothing more than the manifestation of itself, that the concept is its truth, and that freedom is the truth of necessity.

It has been observed above in the second book of the *Objective Logic* (p. 187 note) that the philosophy which places itself at the standpoint of *substance* and abides by it is the *system of Spinoza*. In the same place I have pointed out the *defects* of that system in respect of both form and matter. But the *refutation* of it is another thing. As regards the refutation of a philosophical system, the general remark has been made elsewhere that we must rid it of the mistaken notion, that the system is to be exposed as out and out false and that the *true* system on the other hand is *merely contrary* to the false. The logical bearings of the system of Spinoza as it here makes its appearance yield us directly the true view of the system, and of the question whether it is true or false. The relationship of substantiality sprang from the nature of *essence*; this relationship, then, and its exposition enlarged to a totality in a system, is a *necessary standpoint* at which the absolute places itself. Such a standpoint, therefore, is not to be regarded as an opinion, as an individual's subjective

and arbitrary notion or way of thinking, as an aberration of speculation; nay rather, speculation in the line of its advance finds itself necessarily brought to this standpoint, and to this extent the system is perfectly true.—But *it is not the highest standpoint*. Yet the system cannot be regarded on that account as *false*, as demanding and admitting *refutation*; the only thing that is to be considered *false* about it is its being taken for the highest standpoint. The *true* system cannot therefore merely stand *in contradiction* to it; for, in that case, this contradictory would itself be something one-sided. On the contrary, it must, as the higher, contain the inferior within itself.

Further, the refutation must not come from without; that is to say, it must not proceed from assumptions lying outside the system in question, which the system fails to satisfy. It need but decline to recognize these assumptions; the *defect* is a defect for him only, who starts from the demands and requirements founded on these assumptions. Thus it has been said that, for any one who does not presuppose as an established fact the freedom and self-dependence of the self-conscious subject, no refutation of Spinozism is possible. Besides, a standpoint so high and so intrinsically *rich* as that of the substantial relationship is so far from ignoring the assumptions in question, that it even involves them. One of the attributes of Spinoza's substance is *thinking*. On the contrary, it understands how to resolve and absorb the particular forms under which those assumptions militate against it, so that they appear *in the system*, but in the modifications suitable to it. The nerve, therefore, of the external refutation rests merely on maintaining obstinately in their one-sidedness the antitheses of these assumptions; e.g. in maintaining the absolute self-subsistence of the thinking

individual as against the form of thinking posited in the absolute substance as identical with extension. The true refutation must penetrate the stronghold of the opponent, and invade the sphere of his power; to attack him abroad and to carry one's point, where he is absent, does not further matters at all. Thus, the refutation of Spinozism can only consist in acknowledging, in the first place, its standpoint as necessary and essential, and then, in the second place, raising that standpoint to a higher one *by a movement from within itself*. The relationship of substantiality, when regarded simply in *its own absolute nature*, carries itself on to its opposite, the *concept*. Therefore, the exposition of substance (contained in the last book) which leads to the *concept*, is the true and only refutation of Spinozism. It is the *unveiling* of substance, and this is the *genesis of the concept*, the principal factors of which have been co-ordinated above.—The *unity* of substance is its relationship of *necessity*; but in this form it is only *inner necessity*; in *positing itself* through the factor of absolute negativity, it becomes *manifested* or *posited identity*, and thereby *freedom*, which is the identity of the concept. This concept, the totality which results from reciprocity, is the *unity of the two substances* of the reciprocal relation; but this unity is such that they are now in the domain of freedom, in that they no longer possess their identity as something blind, or in other words *internal*, but have essentially the character of *manifestation* or factors of reflection, whereby each is no less immediately united with its opposite or its positivity, and each contains its positivity *within itself*, and consequently in its opposite is simply and solely posited as identical with itself.

In the *concept*, therefore, the realm of *freedom* has become revealed. The concept is what is free, because the *intrinsic and self-existent* identity, which constitutes the

necessity of substance, appears withal as merged or as *positivity*, and this positivity, as self-related, is nothing but that identity. The mutual opacity of the substances that stand in the causal relationship has disappeared, the originality of their self-dependence having passed into positivity, and has thereby become self-transparent *clarity*; the *original* thing is original, in that it is solely *the cause of itself*, and this is *substance emancipated into the concept*.

This enables us at once to determine more precisely the character of the concept. Since the absolute existence is here immediately identical with positivity, the concept in its simple reference to itself is absolute *determinateness*; which, however, as related only to itself, is immediately simple identity as well. But this self-reference of determinateness, as its *closing* with itself, is no less *the negation of determinateness*, and the concept in this aspect of self-identity is the *universal*. But this identity has equally the character of negativity; it is self-related negation or determinateness, and as such the concept is the *singular*. Each of these modes is the totality, each contains within itself the determination of the other, and for that reason these totalities are absolutely *one* and only one, just as this unity is the diremption of itself into the free semblance of this duality—a duality which appears in the opposition of *universal* and *singular* as a complete opposition, and yet is so entirely a *semblance*, that in conceiving and expressing either of them the other also is immediately conceived and expressed.

In the statement just given is to be seen *the concept of the concept*. Possibly it may appear to deviate from what is usually understood by the term, and we might be expected to show how other explanations and representations involve what we have here found to be the concept.

On the one hand, however, we cannot be concerned here with a confirmation founded on the *authority* of the common understanding; in the science of the concept, its import and character can only be ascertained by means of the *immanent deduction*, which is involved in its genesis, and which already lies behind us. On the other hand, it must no doubt be possible to discern in what is elsewhere given as the concept the implicit presence of the concept here deduced. But it is not so easy to discover what others have said of the nature of the concept. For, as a rule, they do not concern themselves with this question at all, and presuppose that every one as a matter of course understands the meaning of the term. Latterly one had additional cause for thinking oneself absolved from troubling about the concept; for just as it was the fashion for a long time to libel the imagination, and then the memory, in every possible way, so it became the habit in philosophy some time ago—and the habit to some extent still obtains—to heap every slander on the concept and bring into contempt what is the supreme thing in thought, while regarding the *inconceivable* and the *inability to conceive* as the pinnacle of science and morality.

I restrict myself here to one remark, which may serve for the comprehension of the conceptions here developed, and may help one to find one's bearings in them. When the concept has blossomed into a *real existence*, that itself is free, it is none other than the *ego* or pure self-consciousness. I *possess* concepts no doubt, that is, determinate concepts; but the *ego* is the pure concept itself, which, as concept, has come into *existence*. When we refer, therefore, to the fundamental characteristics which constitute the nature of the *ego*, we may presuppose that we are referring to something familiar, i. e. a commonplace of our everyday thinking. But the

ego is *first* this pure self-related unity, and it is so, not immediately, but in virtue of abstracting from all determinateness and content, and retreating into the freedom of limitless self-identity. As such, it is *universality*; unity that is unity with itself only through this *negative* attitude, which appears as abstraction, and that consequently contains all determination dissolved in itself. *Secondly*, as self-related negativity, the *ego* is no less immediately *singularity* or *absolute determinateness*, that confronts an opposite and excludes it; in other words, *individual personality*. Such absolute *universality*, which is immediately absolute *singularization* as well, and an absolute existence, which is absolutely positivity and is only *absolute existence* through its union with *positivity*, constitutes the nature of the *ego* as well as of the *concept*. Of the one, as of the other, no conception can be formed, except both the given factors are grasped alike in their abstraction, and alike in their perfect unity.

When one speaks in the ordinary fashion of an *understanding possessed by the ego*, one understands thereby a *faculty* or *property*, that stands in the same relation to the *ego*, as the property of a thing stands to the *thing* itself—which thing is an indeterminate substratum, that is not the true ground and determinant of its property. According to this representation I *possess* concepts and conception, as I also possess a coat, complexion, and other external properties.—This external relationship in which the understanding as the faculty of conception, and the concepts themselves stand to the *ego*, has been superseded by Kant. It is one of the deepest and truest instances of insight to be found in the *Critique of Reason*, that the *unity*, which constitutes the *essence* of the *concept*, is recognized as the *original synthetical unity of apperception*, as the unity of the *I think* or of self-consciousness.—This proposition con-

stitutes the so-called *transcendental* deduction of the categories; but it has always been regarded as one of the most difficult portions of the Kantian philosophy—doubtless, for no other reason than that it demands that we should leave the mere *representation* of the relationship in which *the ego and the understanding* or the *concepts* stand to a thing and its properties and accidents, and advance to the *thought*. An *object*, says Kant, (*Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 137, 2nd edition) is that, in the *concept* of which the *manifold* of a given intuition is *united*. But all unifying of representations demands *unity of consciousness* in the synthesis of them. Consequently, it is this *unity of consciousness* which alone constitutes the reference of representations to an object, and thereby their *objective validity*, and on which rests even the *possibility of the understanding*. Kant distinguishes between this unity and the *subjective unity* of consciousness, the unity of representation whereby I may be conscious of a manifold as *simultaneous* or *successive*, which depends on empirical conditions. On the other hand, the principles of the *objective* determination of representations are only, he tells us, to be derived from the maxim of the *transcendental unity of apperception*. Through the categories, which are these objective predicates, the manifold of given representations is so determined as to be brought into the *unity of consciousness*.—According to this exposition, the unity of the concept is that whereby something is not a mere *mode of feeling*, an *intuition*, or even a mere *representation*, but is an *object*; and this objective unity is the unity of the ego with itself.—In point of fact, the *conception* of an object consists in nothing else than that the ego makes it *its own*, pervades it, and brings it into *its own proper form*, that is, into the *universality* that is immediately *determinateness*, or the determinateness that is imme-

diately universality. The object in intuition, or even in representation, is still something *extraneous* and *external*. By means of conception, the *absolute existence* which it possesses in intuition and representation is converted into a *positivity*; the ego pervades it *with its thought*. But the object, as it is in thought, is for the first time the object *in its own absolute nature*; as it is in intuition or representation, it is a *phenomenon*. Thought merges the *immediacy* with which the object in the first instance confronts us, and so converts it into a *positivity*; but this its *positivity* is its *absolute existence* or its *objectivity*. Consequently, the object possesses this objectivity in the *concept*, and the concept is the *unity of self-consciousness* into which it has been received; its objectivity or the concept, therefore, is itself nothing but the nature of self-consciousness, and has no other factors or characteristics than the ego itself.

Thus we are justified by a leading principle of the Kantian philosophy in referring to the nature of the ego in order to learn what the *concept* is. But, conversely, it is necessary for this purpose to have grasped the *concept* of the ego, as that concept has been presented above. If we stop short at the mere *representation* of the ego, as it floats before our ordinary consciousness, then the ego is merely the simple *thing*, also called *soul*, in which the concept *inheres* as a possession or property. This representation, which does not take the trouble to conceive either concept or ego, cannot serve to facilitate or familiarize the conception of the concept.

The Kantian exposition above cited contains two other points which concern the concept and necessitate some further observations. In the first place, the *stage of understanding* is taken to presuppose the *stages of feeling and intuition*; and it is an essential proposition of Kantian transcendental philosophy, that *without in-*

tuition concepts are void, and that they are valid only as *relations* of the *manifold* given by intuition. In the second place, the concept has been declared to be the *objective* element of cognition, and, as such, the truth. But from another aspect it is regarded as something *merely subjective*, from which the *reality* (by which, since it is opposed to subjectivity, we must understand objectivity) cannot be *extracted*; and in general, the concept and the logical element are declared to be something *merely formal* which, since it abstracts from the content, does not contain the truth.

In the first place, then, as regards *the relation of the understanding or concept to the stages presupposed by it*, the determination of the *form* of those stages depends upon what science is under treatment. In the science before us, which is pure *logic*, those stages are *being* and *essence*. In *psychology* it is *feeling*, *intuition*, and then *representation* in general, that are precedent to the understanding. In the *phenomenology of spirit* as the doctrine of consciousness, we advanced to understanding through the stages of *sensuous consciousness*, and then *perception*. Kant presupposes only feeling and intuition. How *incomplete*, to begin with, this scale of stages is, he himself betrays by the fact that he adds, in the form of an *appendix* to the transcendental logic or doctrine of the understanding, a *treatise on the concepts of reflection*—a sphere which lies between *intuition* and *understanding* or *being* and *concept*. As for the facts themselves, the first thing to be remarked is that these forms of *intuition*, *representation*, and the like, belong to the *self-conscious spirit*, which, as such, is not treated in the science of logic. The pure modes of being, essence, and concept constitute, no doubt, the ground plan, and the inner simple frame-work of the forms of the spirit; the spirit as *intuiting*, and equally as *sensuous consciousness*, is in

the character of immediate being; and, similarly, the spirit as *representative*, and also as *perceptive* consciousness, has risen from being to the stage of essence or reflection. But these concrete shapes as little concern the science of logic as do the concrete forms assumed by the logical modes in nature, which would be (1) *space and time*, (2) space and time giving themselves content as *inorganic nature*, and (3) *organic nature*. Similarly, the concept is to be regarded here also, not as the act of the self-conscious understanding, not as the *subjective understanding*, but the concept in its own absolute character, which constitutes a *stage of nature* as well as of *spirit*. Life, or organic nature, is the stage of nature at which the concept emerges; but here it is still the blind concept which does not comprehend itself, that is to say, does not think; the concept that comprehends itself and thinks pertains to the spirit alone. But the logical form of the concept is independent alike of its former unthinking, and its latter mental, shape. The necessary premonition on this question has been given in the *introduction*, for this is a point not to be established inside the limits of *logic* but one that must be cleared up *before* that science is entered.

Leaving, then, the question of the shapes assumed by the forms that precede the concept, we come *in the second place* to the *relationship in which the concept is thought to these forms*. The view taken of this relationship, both in the ordinary representation of psychology and in the Kantian transcendental philosophy, is that the empirical *material*, the manifold of intuition and representation, first *exists on its own account*, and that then the understanding *approaches* it, brings *unity* into it, and by means of *abstraction* raises it to the form of *universality*. In this way the understanding is a *form* void by itself that, in the first place, only obtains reality through the *given*

content, and in the second place, *abstracts* from that content, that is to say, *lets it drop* as something real—only useless for the concept. In both these operations the concept is not the independent element, not the essence and truth of the prior material. On the contrary the latter is in its own absolute self the reality, which cannot be extracted from the concept.

Now, it must certainly be conceded that *the concept, as such*, is not yet complete, but must rise to the *idea*, which alone is the unity of concept and reality; and the advance to this point must be shown in the sequel to *flow of itself* from the very nature of the concept. For the reality which the concept gives to itself must not be adopted as something external, but must, in accordance with the demands of science, be deduced from the concept itself. But it is assuredly not the material given by intuition and representation that can be vindicated as the *real* in opposition to the concept. People are in the habit of saying '*it is only a conception*', contrasting the concept, not merely with the idea, but with sensuous, palpable existence in time and space, as something more excellent than the concept. And then, because so much material of this kind is omitted from the *abstract*, the abstract is held to be a poorer thing than the concrete. The signification of abstraction on this view is that from the concrete, merely *for our subjective behoof, this or that mark* is detached, without any derogation from the *worth* and *value* of the several other *properties* and *qualities* that are left behind; and that these remain the *reality*, and are always perfectly valid, only over on the opposite side; so that it is merely an *incapacity* on the part of the understanding that it is unable to take up such treasures, but contents itself perforce with the starved abstraction. Now, to regard the given material of intuition and the

manifold of representation as the real in contrast to thought and concept is a view, the complete abandonment of which is not only a condition of philosophizing, but is already presupposed by religion—for how is a need of religion and the sense of religion possible, if the fleeting and superficial phenomena of the sensuous and individual are still taken for the truth? But philosophy gives us a *rational* insight into the true state of the case with regard to the reality of sensuous being; and it assumes the stages of feeling, intuition, sensuous consciousness, and so forth, as presuppositions of the understanding, inasmuch as they are conditions of it in its genesis, but only in the sense that the concept, in proceeding *from their dialectic and nullity*, issues as their *ground*, not in the sense that it is conditioned by their *reality*. Abstract thinking, therefore, is not to be regarded as the mere laying aside of a sensuous material that suffers thereby no detriment in its reality; it is rather the merging and reduction of that material, as mere *phenomenon*, to the *essential*, which manifests itself only as the *concept*. Of course, if what is to be adopted into the concept out of the concrete phenomenon is only to serve as a *mark* or *sign*, it certainly may be any mere random sensuous individual determination of the object, chosen from among the others on account of any random external interest, and of a like sort and nature to the rest.

A capital misunderstanding which prevails on this point is that the *natural* principle or *beginning*, which is the starting-point in *natural* evolution or in the *history* of the developing individual, is supposed to be the *truth* and *first in the order of conception*. In the order of nature, intuition and being are no doubt primordial, or the condition for the concept; but they are not on that account the absolutely unconditioned; on the contrary, their reality is merged in the concept, and with it the

semblance they possessed of being the conditioning reality. When it is a question, not of *truth*, but merely of *history*, as in representative and phenomenal thinking, one certainly need not go beyond narrating that we begin with feelings and intuitions, and that the understanding from their manifold extracts a universality or abstraction, and naturally requires for this purpose the said foundation of feelings and intuitions, which in the process of abstraction remains for our representation in the same complete reality with which it first presented itself. But it is the purport of philosophy, not to be a narrative of occurrences, but to be a cognition of what in these occurrences is *true*, and, further, to proceed from the truth to the conception of what in the narrative appears as a mere occurrence.

If the superficial notion of what the concept is leaves all multiplicity *outside the concept*, and attributes to the latter merely the form of abstract universality, or empty reflective identity, we may at once appeal to the fact that, quite apart from our view, the definition or statement of a concept not only contains the genus, which itself is, properly speaking, something more than purely abstract universality, but expressly demands also the *specific determinateness*. If one would but reflect with attention on the meaning of this fact, one would see that *differentiation* is to be regarded as an equally essential factor of the concept. *Kant* has introduced this consideration by the highly important thought that there are *synthetical judgements a priori*. This original synthesis of apperception is one of the most profound principles for speculative development; it contains the first step to the true apprehension of the nature of the concept, and is completely opposed to that empty identity or abstract universality which is not a synthesis within itself.—This beginning, however, finds a poor

response in the further execution. The very expression *synthesis* easily leads back to the notion of an *external* unity and a *mere combination* of elements *that in their own essential nature are separate*. Consequently, the Kantian philosophy has stopped short at the psychological reflex of the concept, and has fallen back again on the assertion of the permanent subjection of the concept to a manifold intuition as its condition. It has declared experience and the cognition of the understanding to be a *phenomenal* world, not because the categories themselves are only finite, but on the ground of a psychological idealism, because they are *merely* modes that have their origin in self-consciousness. It is of a piece with this, that the concept again, apart from the manifold of intuition, is supposed to be *empty* and *void*, despite the fact that it is a *synthesis a priori*—in being which it must surely contain determinateness and opposition within itself. In that its determinateness is the determinateness of the concept, and consequently *absolute determinateness* or *singularity*, the concept is the ground and source of all finite determinateness and multiplicity.

The formal position which the concept holds as understanding is made complete in the Kantian exposition of what *reason* is. In reason, as the highest stage of thinking, we should expect the concept to lose the conditioned character in which it still appears at the stage of understanding, and to attain to perfect truth. But this expectation is disappointed. By the fact that Kant determines the bearing of reason on the categories as merely *dialectical*, and indeed apprehends the result of this dialectic as merely, and nothing more than, the *infinite nothing*, the infinite unity of reason loses once more the synthesis, and with it the rudiment, above referred to, of a speculative, truly infinite concept; and

it becomes what we are all familiar with, the wholly formal *merely regulative unity of the systematic employment of the understanding*. It is declared an abuse to regard logic, which is merely a *canon of judgement*, as an *organon* for the production of *objective* insight. The concepts of reason, in which we could not but feel the presence of a higher power and deeper meaning, no longer possess a *constitutive* character as did the categories; they are *mere* ideas; we are, indeed, *at perfect liberty* to employ them; but by these intelligible entities, in which all *truth* should have completely closed, we must not mean anything more than *hypotheses*, to ascribe truth to which in their own absolute right, were the height of caprice and foolhardiness, since they—*cannot occur in any experience*.—Should one ever have thought that philosophy would deny truth to intelligible entities, because they lack the temporal and spatial material of sensibility?

Immediately connected herewith is the question of the point of view from which the concept and the significance of logic in general is to be regarded—a question on which the Kantian philosophy adopts the same standpoint as the man in the street. That is to say, in what relation do the *concept* and the *science of the concept* stand to *truth itself*? We have already quoted from the Kantian deduction of the categories to show that according to it the *object*, as that in which the manifold of intuition is *united*, owes this unity solely to the *unity of self-consciousness*. Accordingly, the *objectivity of thought* is here definitely enunciated—an identity of concept and thing, which is *truth*. In like manner, too, it is commonly admitted, that when thinking appropriates a given object, the latter thereby suffers an alteration, and is converted from something sensuous into something thought; yet, that, far from this alteration affecting its essentiality, it is only in its concept that it is in its

truth, while, in the immediacy in which it is given, it is only *phenomenon* and *contingency*; that the cognition of the object which conceives it is the cognition of it as it is *in its absolute nature*, and that the concept is its very objectivity. But, on the other hand, it is no less asserted, that *we cannot after all cognize things as they are in their absolute nature*, and that *truth is inaccessible to the cognizing reason*; that the above mentioned truth, which consists in the unity of concept and object, is after all only a phenomenon, and this time again on the ground that the content is solely the multiplicity of intuition. On this point we have already remarked, that in the concept, on the very contrary, this multiplicity, in so far as it belongs to intuition in opposition to the concept, is merged, and that by means of the concept the object is reduced to its non-contingent essentiality; the latter enters into the sphere of phenomena, and it is just for this reason that phenomena are not merely unessential, but are the manifestation of essence. But the wholly emancipated manifestation of essence is the concept—These propositions, of which we here remind the reader, are not dogmatic assertions, for they are results that have issued from the whole immanent evolution of *essence*. The present standpoint, to which this evolution had led, is, that the form of the *absolute* which is higher than being and essence is the *concept*. From this point of view, then, the concept has *subdued* being and essence, which with different starting-points include also feeling, intuition, and representation, and which appeared as its precedent conditions; it has proved itself to be *their unconditioned ground*; and now there remains for us *the second question*, to the consideration of which this third book of the *Logic* is devoted, that is to say, the exposition of how the concept builds up within and from itself the reality, which has disap-

peared in it. Hence it has been freely admitted, that the cognition which stops short at the concept, purely as such, is still incomplete, and has only as yet arrived at *abstract truth*. But its incompleteness lies, not in the lack of that presumptive reality which is supposed to be given in feeling and intuition; but in the failure of the concept as yet to give itself *its own* self-produced reality. The absoluteness of the concept—an absoluteness which has been established in contradistinction to, and in respect of, the matter of experience, and, more precisely, of its categories and modes of reflection—consists, in this, that such matter, as it appears *outside* and *before* the concept, does not possess *truth*, but only finds it in its ideality or identity with the concept. The *derivation* of the real from it, if one will call it derivation, consists, in the first instance, essentially in this, that the concept in its formal abstraction shows itself as imperfect and, by reason of the dialectic grounded in itself, passes on to reality, and that it produces this reality from itself, instead of falling back on a ready-made reality that it has found as its counterpart, and taking refuge in what has proved to be the unessential element of phenomena, because it has looked around for something more excellent and failed to find it.—It will always stand out as a marvel how the Kantian philosophy recognized the connexion between thinking and sensuous existence, beyond which it never got, as a purely relative and merely phenomenal connexion; and perfectly well recognized and expressed a higher unity of both in the *idea* in general, and, for example, in the idea of an intuitive understanding, and yet stopped short at this relative connexion, and was satisfied with the assertion that the concept is, and remains, absolutely separate from reality—thus asserting as *truth*, what it enunciated as finite cognition, and proclaiming for an unjustified extrava-

gance, and a mere figment of thought, that which it recognized as *truth*, and of which it established the accurate conception.

Since it is here in the first instance *logic*, and not science in general, with whose relation to truth we are concerned, it must be further conceded, that logic, as the *formal science*, cannot, and should not, contain that reality which is the content of the further branches of philosophy, namely, *of the sciences of nature and of spirit*. These concrete sciences do certainly advance to a more real form of the idea than logic offers; but it is not by reverting to the reality abandoned by the consciousness that has risen from phenomena to the level of science, nor by returning to the use of forms, such as the categories and modes of reflection, whose finiteness and untruth has demonstrated itself in logic. On the contrary, logic exhibits the rise of the *idea* to the stage from which forth it becomes the creator of nature, and passes over to the form of a *concrete immediacy*, whose concept, however, breaks this mould to pieces again, in order to come to itself as *concrete spirit*. As contrasted with these concrete sciences (which, however, have and hold the logical element or concept as their immanent pattern, as they had it also for their archetype) logic itself is undoubtedly the *formal science*; but it is the science of the *absolute form*, which is a totality within itself, and contains in itself *the pure idea of truth*. This absolute form has its content or reality in itself; the concept, not being trivial empty identity, possesses in its factor of negativity or absolute specification the opposite modifications; the content in general is nothing else than such modifications of the absolute form—the content posited by the form itself, and therefore also adequate to it.—This form is consequently of quite another nature than that commonly attributed to the

logical form. It is *in its own right* already the truth, in that the content is adequate to its form, or the reality to its concept; and it is the *pure truth*, since its modifications do not yet possess the form of an absolute opposition, or absolute immediacy.—When Kant, in his discussion of logic (*Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 83), comes to treat the old and famous question *What is truth?* he first of all *presents* to the reader, as a triviality, the explanation of the term as the agreement of cognition with its object—a definition which is of great, indeed of the highest, value. If we remember this definition in connexion with the fundamental assertion of transcendental idealism that *the cognition of reason* is incapable of grasping *things in themselves*, that *reality* lies *absolutely* outside the *concept*, we see directly that a *reason* such as this that is *unable to put itself in agreement* with the object—the things in themselves: *things in themselves* that are not in agreement with the concept of reason: the concept that is not in agreement with reality: a reality that is not in agreement with the concept—are all *untrue representations*. If Kant had weighed the idea of an *intuitive understanding* by the above definition of truth, he would have treated that idea, which expresses the required agreement, not as a figment of thought, but rather as the truth.

What one wants to know, Kant proceeds to say, is a *universal and sure criterion of the truth of every single cognition*. This would be such a criterion as would be valid of all cognitions *without distinction of their objects*. But, since in such a criterion *abstraction is made from all content* of the cognition (*relation to its object*), and *truth concerns precisely this content*, it would be quite *impossible* and *preposterous* to ask for a mark of the *truth of this content* of cognitions.—In this passage the common notion of the formal function of logic is very definitely expressed.

and the adduced ratiocination has an air of great lucidity. But, first of all, it is to be remarked that it is the common way of such formal ratiocination to forget in its discourse the fact which is its fundamental premiss, and of which it is speaking. It would be preposterous, we are told, to ask for a criterion of the *truth of the content* of cognition;—but, according to the definition, it is not the *content* that constitutes the truth, but its agreement with the concept. A content, as it is here spoken of, *apart from the concept*, is something irrational, and therefore unessential; of the truth of such a thing we certainly cannot ask for a criterion—but it is for the very opposite reason. For its irrationality not merely debars it from exhibiting the required agreement, but marks it as a piece of idle fancy.—If we put aside the mention of the content, which occasions the confusion here,—a confusion, however, into which formalism always falls, and which makes it say the opposite of what it intends to assert, whenever it embarks on an explanation—, and confine ourselves to the abstract view, that the logical element is merely formal, and rather abstracts from all content, then we have a one-sided cognition which must not contain any object—an empty indeterminate form, which consequently is just as far from being an *agreement*, for agreement essentially implies *two* factors—and therefore just as far from being true.—In the *a priori synthesis* of the concept Kant possessed a higher principle in which one might have cognized duality in unity, and so what is required for truth; but the material of sensibility, the manifold of intuition, was too strong for him; and he never succeeded in getting away from it to the consideration of the concept and the categories *in their absolute nature*, and so arriving at a speculative train of philosophic thought.

Logic being the science of the absolute form, this formal element, *in order to be a truth*, must possess in itself a *content* adequate to its form; and all the more, since the formal element of logic must be the pure form, and, therefore, the truth of logic must be the *pure truth* itself. This formal element, therefore, must be regarded as much richer in native modifications and content, as well as of infinitely greater potency in its effects on the concrete, than is commonly supposed. The laws of logic proper (discounting the heterogeneous element of applied logic and irrelevant psychological and anthropological matter) are commonly restricted, apart from the law of contradiction, to a few barren propositions concerning the conversion of judgements, and the forms of the syllogism. And the forms that occur even here, as well as their further modifications, are only adopted, as it were, on historical grounds, and are not subjected to criticism, as to whether they are in their own absolute nature a truth. Thus, for example, the form of the affirmative judgement is accepted as a thing perfectly correct in itself, in the case of which it is a question solely of the content, whether such a judgement be true. Whether this form *in its own absolute nature* is a form of truth, whether the proposition that it enunciates, *the singular is a universal*, is not in itself dialectical, is a question that one never thinks of investigating. It is assumed straight away, that this judgement is capable on its own account of containing truth, and that the above proposition, which every affirmative judgement enunciates, is a true one; although it is immediately evident, that it lacks what the definition of truth demands, namely, the agreement of the concept and its object. If we take the predicate, which is here the universal, for the concept, and the subject, which is the singular, for the object, then the one does not agree with the other. If, however,

the *abstract universal* which is the predicate, fails to constitute a concept, since a concept certainly implies something more ; and if, likewise, a subject of this kind is not yet much more than a grammatical one, then how should the judgement possibly contain truth, seeing that either its concept and object do not agree, or it lacks concept and object alike ?—Therefore, what is really *impossible* and *preposterous* is the attempt to comprehend the truth in such forms as the positive judgement, or the judgement in general. Just as the Kantian philosophy did not consider the categories in their own absolute nature, but, merely on the wrong ground that they were subjective forms of self-consciousness, declared them to be finite modifications, incapable of containing the truth, still less has that philosophy subjected to criticism the forms of the concept, which are the content of ordinary logic. On the contrary, it has assumed a portion of them, namely, the functions of judgement, in order to determine the categories, and has accepted them as valid presuppositions. Even if we should see nothing in the forms of logic but formal functions of thinking, yet even so they would be worthy of investigation as to how far they in themselves answer to the *truth*. A logic that does not render this service can at most claim the value of a descriptive natural history of the phenomena of thinking, as they occur. It is an infinite merit of *Aristotle*, and one that must fill us with the highest admiration for the powers of that genius, that he first undertook this description. But a further step is necessary, namely, to ascertain, in the first place, the systematic connexion of these forms, and in the second place, their value.

DIVISION OF THE SCIENCE.

The concept shows itself, at the first glance, as the unity of *being* and *essence*. Essence is the *first negation*

of being, which being has thereby been reduced to a *semblance*; the concept is the *second negation*, or the negation of this negation; consequently it is reinstated being—but reinstated as the infinite mediation and negativity, that being contains within itself.—Accordingly, *being* and *essence* no longer possess in the concept the character in which they appear as *being* and *essence*; nor are they merely in such a unity that the one *shows* in the other. The concept, therefore, does not differentiate itself into these modes. It is the truth of the substantial relationship, in which being and essence attain their complete self-dependence and reciprocal determination. The truth of substantiality proved to be the *substantial identity*, which is no less *positivity*, and only as such is identity. Positivity is *existence* and *differentiation*; therefore, in the concept the absolute has attained an adequate and true existence, for here the positive is itself the absolute. This positivity constitutes the inherent opposition of the concept; its *opposite modes*, since they are immediately the absolute existence, are themselves the *complete concept*; *universal in their determinateness, and identical with their negation*.

This then is the very concept of the concept. But *as yet* it is *only* its concept,—or this concept is itself *only* the concept. Since it is the absolute existence that is also positivity or the absolute substance that reveals the *necessity* of different substances as *identity*, this identity must self-posit what it is. The steps in the movement of the substantial relationship whereby the concept *has come to be*, and the reality thereby presented, still lie within the transition to the concept; such reality is not yet the concept's *own* self-evolved specification; it fell within the sphere of necessity, whereas the concept's own specification can only be its *free* act, an existence in which it appears as identical

with itself, and whose factors are concepts and *posited* by itself.

At first, therefore, the concept is only *potentially* the truth; since it is *only* an *internal*, it is equally *only* an *external*. It is *at first* in general an *immediacy*, and in this shape its factors have the form of *immediate fixed determinations*. It appears as the *determinate concept*, as the sphere of mere understanding.—Since this form of immediacy is an existence not yet adequate to its nature, the concept being the *free* element that relates to itself alone, it is an *external* form in which the concept cannot have the value of an absolute existence, but only of something *positive* or *subjective*.—The phase of the *immediate* concept constitutes the point of view for which the concept is a subjective thinking, a reflection external to the *fact*. This stage, therefore, constitutes *subjectivity* or the *formal concept*. The externality of this concept appears in the *fixed being* of its *modes*, whereby each stands forth by itself as something isolated and qualitative that is only externally related to its opposite. But the *identity* of the concept, which is precisely the *internal* or *subjective* essence of these modes, sets them in dialectical movement, by means of which their isolation, and with it the separation of the concept from fact, are merged, and there issues as their truth the *totality* which is the *objective concept*.

In the second place, the concept in its *objectivity* is the *absolute fact itself*. Through its necessary progressive determination the *formal* concept converts itself into the fact, and thereby loses its attitude of subjectivity and externality to the fact. Or, conversely, objectivity is the *real concept* that has *come forth from its internality* and passed over into existence.—In this identity with the fact it has therefore an existence that is *its own* and *free*. But this is still an *immediate*, not yet a *negative* freedom.

Being one with the fact, the concept is *submerged* in the fact; its different modes are objective real existences, in which it is itself again the *internal*. As the soul of objective existence, it must *give itself* the form of *subjectivity*, which it possessed *immediately* as the *formal* concept. Thus *in the form* of freedom, which in objectivity it did not yet possess, it confronts that objectivity; and in so doing makes its identity therewith, which, as *objective* concept, it possesses *in absolute fact*, into an identity *posited* as well.

In this consummation, wherein the concept in its objectivity possesses at the same time the form of freedom, the concept has become *adequate*, and is the *idea*. *Reason*, which is the sphere of the idea, is the *truth revealed* to itself, in which the concept possesses the realization absolutely adequate to it, and is free, inasmuch as it cognizes this its objective world in its own subjectivity, and its own subjectivity in its objective world.

FIRST SECTION

SUBJECTIVITY

THE concept is in the first instance the *formal* concept, the concept in its *beginning*, or the concept as *immediate*. In its immediate unity its opposition or positivity is *at first* itself simple and only a *semblance*, so that the factors of the opposition are immediately the totality of the concept, and are simply *the concept as such*.

But, *secondly*, since it is absolute negativity, it sunders itself, and posits itself as the *negative*, or as the *opposite* of itself; and, further, since it is only as yet the *immediate* concept, this positing or differentiating has a character in which the factors come to be *indifferent to one another*, and each for itself; in this *partition* its unity is as yet only *external relation*. In this shape, as the *relation* of its factors posited as *self-dependent* and *indifferent*, the concept is the *judgement*.

Thirdly, though the judgement involves the unity of the concept that has disappeared into its self-dependent factors, yet this unity is not *posited*. It comes to be so by means of the dialectical progression of the judgement—which hereby has become the *syllogism*—to the completely posited concept; for in the syllogism are posited, not only the factors of the concept as *self-dependent* extremes, but also their *mediating unity*.

But whereas this very *unity*, as the uniting *middle*, and the *factors as self-dependent extremes*, stand, in the first instance, in *immediate* opposition to one another, this contradictory relationship that occurs in the *formal syllogism* merges itself, and the *completion* of the concept passes into the unity of the *totality*, the *subjectivity* of the concept into its *objectivity*.

FIRST CHAPTER

THE CONCEPT.

THE term *understanding* is commonly employed to express the faculty of concepts in general; when thus taken, it is distinguished from the *faculty of judgement*, and the faculty of syllogisms or the formal *reason*. In a special sense, however, it is contrasted with *reason*; but when thus taken, it signifies not the faculty of conception in general, but the faculty of *determinate* concepts, in which case the notion prevails that the concept is *nothing but a determinate* entity. When the understanding is distinguished in this signification from the formal judgement and the formal reason, it is to be regarded as the faculty of the *singular*, determinate concept. For the judgement and the syllogism or reason are themselves, as formal, only *a species of the understanding*, inasmuch as they come under the form of abstract determinateness of conception. With us, however, the concept does not, in general, signify a mere abstract determinateness; the understanding, therefore, is to be distinguished from the reason solely by the former being merely the faculty of the concept in general.

This general concept, which we have now to consider, contains the three factors of *universality*, *particularity*, and *singularity*. The opposition and the modifications which the concept gives itself in its differentiation constitute the side that above was called *positivity*. As this is identical in the concept with the absolute existence, each of these three factors is equally the *whole* concept, and a *determinate concept*, and a *mode* of the concept.

First, the concept is *the pure concept*, or the mode of *universality*. But the pure or universal concept is also merely one *determinate* or *particular* concept that ranges itself alongside the others. Since the concept is the totality, and consequently in its universality, or pure identical self-relation, is essentially determination and differentiation, it possesses in itself the standard whereby this form of its self-identity, while pervading and comprehending all factors, no less immediately determines itself as *the universal only* in contrast to the diversity of the factors.

Secondly, the concept appears thereby as this *particular* or *determinate* concept, which is posited as opposed to others.

Thirdly, *singularity* is the concept that reflects itself out of opposition into absolute negativity. This is at the same time the factor, in which the concept has passed out of its identity into its *antagonism*, and becomes the judgement.

A. THE UNIVERSAL CONCEPT.

The pure concept is the absolutely infinite, unconditioned, and free. Here, where we are beginning the discussion that has the concept for its *content*, we must look back once more to the genesis of the concept. *Essence* has *originated* from *being*, and the concept from essence, and therefore also from being. This process, however, has the significance of *self-repulsion*, so that *what has come to be* is on the contrary the *unconditioned* and *original*. *Being* in its transition into essence has become a *manifestation* or *positivity*, and *becoming*, or transition into an *opposite*, has become an *act of positing*; and, conversely, the *positing* or reflection of essence has merged itself and reappeared as a being that is *not posited*, but *original*. The concept is an interpenetration of these factors, in which the only qualitative

and original being is what posits and returns into self, and in which this pure self-reflection is absolutely *differentiation* or *determinateness*, which for that reason is no less infinite self-related *determinateness*.

Thus the concept is, in the first instance, the *absolute self-identity* that only is self-identity through being the negation of negation, or the infinite unity of negativity with itself. This *pure relation* of the concept to itself, that is such by positing itself through negativity, is the *universality* of the concept.

As *universality* is the most *simple* of terms, it seems not to be capable of any explanation; for an explanation must launch into particulars and differences, and must apply predicates to its object, but this is to alter, rather than explain, the simple. Yet it is the very nature of the universal to be a simplicity that through absolute negativity contains *within itself* the highest degree of difference and determinateness. *Being* is an *immediate* simplicity; hence it is only a *supposed* somewhat, and we cannot say of it what it is; it is therefore immediately one with its opposite, *not-being*. Its concept is just this, that it is a simplicity that immediately disappears in its contrary; in other words, its concept is *becoming*. The *universal*, on the contrary, is the *simplicity* that at the same time has the *richest native content*; for it is the concept.

The universal, then, is *in the first place*, simple relation to itself; it is solely *within itself*. But, *secondly*, this identity is within itself absolute *mediation*; not, however, something *mediated*. With the universal that is mediated, namely, the *abstract* universal which is opposed to the particular and singular we are not concerned till we come to the determinate concept.—Yet even the *abstract* involves at least that, in order to obtain it, it is requisite to *drop* other qualities of the concrete. These qualities,

as limitations, are in general *negations*; similarly, too, the *dropping* of them is a *negating*. So even in the case of the abstract we find the negation of negation. But this double negation is represented as though it were *external* to the abstract, as though, in the first place, the other omitted properties of the concrete were distinct from the retained one, which constitutes the content of the abstract, and, as though, secondly, this operation of retaining the one and dropping the remainder were a process external to the property itself. The universal has not yet specialized itself into such *externality* to the process of abstraction; it is still in itself the above absolute mediation, which is none other than the negation of negation, or absolute negativity.

From this original unity it follows, in the first place, that the first negative or *determination* is not a limit for the universal. On the contrary, the universal *maintains itself* in this determination and is positively identical with itself. The categories of being, in so far as they are concepts, were essentially such identities of thought-modes, maintaining themselves in their limit or their opposition; but this identity was only *implicitly* the concept; it was not yet manifested. Therefore the qualitative mode as such was lost in its opposite; and had for its truth a mode *distinct* from itself. The universal, on the contrary, even when it posits itself in a modification, *remains* therein what it is. It is the *soul* of the concrete which it inhabits, unimpeded and self-identical in the multiplicity and diversity of that concrete. It is not dragged into the stream of *things that come and go*, but *maintains* itself in undisturbed *continuity* throughout, and possesses the force of unalterable, eternal, self-preservation.

But, again, the concept does not merely *show* in its opposite, as does the mode of reflection. This latter is a *correlate*, and therefore is not merely self-referred but has

outward bearings. It manifests itself in its opposite; but this manifestation is as yet only *semblance*, and the showing of each in the other, or their reciprocal determination, when taken along with their self-dependence, has the form of an external operation.—The *universal*, on the contrary, is posited as the *essence* and *appropriate positive nature* of its own mode. For the mode, which constitutes its negative, appears in the concept simply and solely as a *positivity*; in other words, it essentially involves, at the same time, the negation of the negative, and is itself the same self-identity of the negative, which is the universal. Thus the universal is also the *substance* of its modifications; but with this difference, that what for the substance, as such, was a *contingency*, is the concept's own *self-mediation*, its own *immanent reflection*. But this mediation, which in the first instance elevates contingency to *necessity*, is relation *made manifest*; the concept is not the abyss of formless substance, nor is it necessity, as an *internal* identity of things or conditions distinct from, and limiting, one another; on the contrary, it is absolute negativity, and, as such, the designer and creator; and since the modification is not a limit, but is quite as much a merged limit or mere positivity, semblance has here become the self-presentation of the *identical*.

Thus the universal is *free* power; it is itself, and annexes its opposite; yet, not as *doing violence*, but as remaining at rest and *at home* therein. As it has been called free power, so might it also be called *free love* and *limitless felicity*, for it essentially bears itself towards *another* just as towards *itself*, and in that other it has returned to itself.

We have just referred to *determinateness*, although the concept, merely as the universal and *self-identical*, has not yet progressed to that point. Yet we cannot

speak of the universal apart from determinateness, which, to be more precise, means particularity and singularity; for the universal by its own very nature contains determinateness in its absolute negativity; therefore, when in dealing with the universal we speak of determinateness, the latter is not a foreign importation. As negativity in general, or according to the *first immediate* negation, the universal involves determinateness in general as *particularity*; in its *second* aspect, as negation of the negation, the universal is *absolute determinateness*, or *singularity* and *concretion*.—Thus the universal is the totality of the concept; it is a concrete; far from being a void, it possesses by virtue of its concept a *content*—not a content in which it merely maintains itself, but one which is its own and immanent. We may, of course, abstract from the content; but by so doing we obtain, not the universal of the concept, but the *abstract* universal, which is an isolated imperfect factor of the concept, and possesses no truth.

More precisely, the universal exhibits itself as this totality in the following manner. In so far as it possesses determinateness within itself, this determinateness is not only the *first* negation, but also the reflection of that negation into itself. With that first negation taken by itself, the universal is a *particular*, and as such we shall consider it presently; but in this determinateness it is still essentially a universal; this aspect we have here still to consider.—The fact is that this determinateness, as it appears in the concept, is the complete reflection, or *double manifestation*; first, the manifestation *outwards*, or reflection into an opposite; then, the manifestation *inwards*, or reflection into itself. The former external manifestation constitutes a difference from an *opposite*; from this point of view, the universal possesses a *particularity* that has its resolution in a

higher universal. Now, in being merely a relative universal it does not lose its character of universal; it maintains itself in its determinateness, not merely as though in its combination with that determinateness it remained indifferent to it—in that case it would only be *compounded* with it—but in the sense that it is what has just been called *manifestation inwards*. Determinateness, when it appears as the determinate *concept*, is *reflected* out of externality *into itself*; it is the native immanent *character*, which is an essential by virtue of the fact that, being taken up into the universality and pervaded by it, it also pervades the universality, being of like compass, and identical, with it; it is the character which belongs to the *genus*, as determinateness inseparable from universality. To this extent it is not a *limit* pointing outwards, but is *positive*; for through the universality it stands in free relation to itself. Thus even the determinate concept remains in itself the infinitely free concept.

But in regard to the other aspect, in which the genus is limited by its determinate character, it has been observed that as the lower genus it finds its resolution in a higher universal. This latter can again be apprehended as genus, but as a more abstract one; yet it still appertains only to that side of the determinate concept which looks outwards. The higher universal, in the true sense of the term, is that in which this outward-pointing aspect is withdrawn inwards, the second negation, in which determinateness appears simply *as* what is posited or *as* manifestation. Life, the ego, the spirit, the absolute concept, are not universals in the mere sense of higher genera, but are *concretes*, even as their determinations are not species or lower genera; on the contrary, they are absolutely self-contained in their reality, and receive their import from themselves. In

so far as life, the ego, the finite spirit, are—as of course they are—also merely determinate concepts, their absolute resolution lies in that universal which is to be apprehended as the truly absolute concept, as the idea of the infinite spirit, whose *positivity* is the infinite transparent reality wherein it intuites its *creation* and in that creation intuites itself.

The true infinite universal, which in itself is immediately both particularity and singularity, we have next to examine in its aspect of *particularity*. It *determines* itself freely; its delimitation is not a transition, for transition occurs only in the sphere of being; it is absolute self-related negativity, and as such *creative power*. Accordingly, it is self-differentiation; and this is *determination* because the differentiation is one with the universality. Thus its action is to posit the opposed particulars themselves as universal and self-related. In this way they become *fixed* and isolated in their opposition. The isolated *subsistence* of the finite, which at an earlier stage took the form of its self-existence, its character as *thing*, its substance, is in its truth universality; with this form the infinite concept clothes the factors of its opposition—a form, which itself is one of those factors. Herein consists the *constructive* operation of the concept, which is only to be comprehended in this its very core.

B. THE PARTICULAR CONCEPT.

Determinateness, as such, appertains to being and to the qualitative; as determinateness of the concept, it is *particularity*. It is not a *boundary*, as though it stood facing an *opposite* that lay *beyond its reach*; on the contrary, as we have just seen, it is a native immanent factor of the universal; in particularity therefore the

universal is not in presence of an opposite, but is absolutely resident in itself.

The particular includes universality, and this constitutes its substance; the genus is *unaltered* in its species; the species are distinguished not from the universal, but *as against one another*. The particular possesses one and the same universality as the *other* particulars with which it is connected. At the same time, by reason of their identity with the universal, the diversity of these particulars is *as such* universal; it is *totality*.—Accordingly, the particular not merely *contains* the universal, but presents it also *through the medium of its determinateness*; in this way the universal constitutes a *sphere*, which the particular must exhaust. In so far as the determinateness of the particular is regarded as mere *diversity*, this totality appears as *completeness*. In this respect the species are complete in so far as there are no more *to be found*. There is no inner standard or *principle* to apply to them, since *diversity* is just the incoherent opposition in which universality, which in itself is absolute unity, appears as a mere external reflection, and an undefined contingent completeness. But diversity passes into *contradiction*, into an *immanent relation* of the diverse. Particularity, however, is universality, and therefore by its own absolute nature it is this immanent relation, and does not become so by transition; it is totality in itself and *simple* determinateness, and essentially a *principle*. It possesses no *other* determinateness than that posited by the universal itself, and resulting from that universal in the following manner.

The particular is the universal itself but it is its factor of difference, or its relation to an *opposite*, its *manifestation outwards*; but there is no opposite at hand, to which the particular might be opposed, except the universal itself.—The universal determines *itself*; thus

it is itself the particular; the determinateness is *its* opposition; it is only opposed to itself. Its species are therefore only (a) the universal itself and (b) the particular. The universal, as concept, is itself and its contrary; and this contrary again is itself as its posited determinateness; it annexes this contrary, and is at home in it. Thus it is the totality and principle of its diversity, which is wholly determined by it, and by it alone.

Therefore the only true logical division consists in this, that the concept ranges itself on one side, as *immediate* indeterminate universality; this very indeterminateness constitutes its determinateness, or, in other words, makes it a *particular*. Each of the two is the particular and therefore *co-ordinated* with the other. Each of the two, is also, as particular, the *determinate as against* the universal. From this point of view we call it *subordinate* to it. But even this universal, *as against* which the particular is determined, is, for that reason, itself *only one* of the opposites. If, therefore, we speak of *two opposites*, we must balance this by saying, not merely that the two of them constitute the particular *together*, as though they were merely *alike* for external reflection in being particulars, but that their *reciprocal* determinateness is, at the same time, essentially only *one* determinateness—negativity, which in general is *simple*.

Opposition reveals itself here as it is in its concept, and therefore in its truth. All previous opposition has this unity in conception. Where it occurs as immediate opposition in the sphere of being, it appears as the *limit* of an *opposite*; in the sphere of reflection it is a correlative opposite, posited as essentially referring to an opposite; at this point, consequently, the unity of the concept begins to be *posited*; but, in the first instance, this unity is only *manifestation* in an opposite.—The

only true meaning of the transition and resolution of these categories is their attaining their concept and their truth. Being, existence, something, the whole and the parts, etc., substance and accidents, cause and effect, are in themselves modes of thought ; they are apprehended as determinate *concepts*, in so far as each is cognized in unity with its opposite or contradictory.—For example, the whole and the parts, cause and effect, and the like, are not as yet a diversity of reciprocally determined *particulars*, because, though they certainly constitute *intrinsically* one concept, their *unity* has not yet attained the form of *universality*, and, likewise, the *opposition* that exists in these connexions does not yet possess the form of being *one* determinateness. Cause and effect, for example, are not two opposed concepts, but only *one determinate* concept, and causality, like every other concept, is a *simple* one.

In respect of completeness, we have seen that the determinateness of particularity is *complete* in the opposition of *universal* and *particular*, and that these alone constitute the particular species. In *nature*, of course, we find more than two species in a genus, just as these several species cannot bear to one another the relation above indicated. This is the impotence of nature, that it cannot preserve and exhibit the strictness of the concept, and runs wild into this irrational blind multiplicity. Nature may *astonish* us by the multiplicity of her genera and species, and the endless diversity of her formations, for astonishment is *unreasoning*, and its object the irrational. Nature, since it is the self-externality of the concept, has free licence to ramble about in this diversity ; just as mind also, though it possesses the concept in the shape of concept, lets itself loose upon representation, and runs riot in its infinite multiplicity. The complex genera or species of

nature are to be esteemed no higher than the arbitrary fancies of the mind in its representations. Both, indeed, display on all hands traces and suggestions of the concept; but they do not present a true copy of it, since they are the side of its free self-externality. The concept is absolute power for this very reason, that it can freely release its opposition into the form of self-dependent diversity, external necessity, contingency, caprice, opinion; all of which, however, must not be taken for anything more than the abstract aspect of *nullity*.

We have already seen that the determinateness of the particular is *simple* as *principle*; but it is likewise simple as factor of the totality, as determinateness in contrast to the *opposite* determinateness. In determining or differentiating itself the concept is negatively directed against its unity, and gives itself the form of one of its ideal factors, namely, *being*; as determinate concept it possesses an *existence* in general. This being, however, has no longer the sense of mere *immediacy*, but of universality, or immediacy that is self-identical through absolute mediation and equally contains within itself the other factor, essence or reflection. This universality with which the determinate is clothed is *abstract* universality. The particular has universality in it as its essence; but in so far as the determinateness of the opposition is *posited*, and thereby possesses being, universality is the *form* in the particular, and the determinateness as such is the *content*. Universality becomes the form in so far as opposition becomes the essential element; just as, on the contrary, in the pure universal the opposition appears only as absolute negativity, and *not as* opposition *posited* as such.

Now determinateness is certainly the *abstract* in opposition to the *opposite* determinateness; but this opposite

is nothing but universality itself, and accordingly this latter is also the *abstract*; and the determinateness of the concept, or particularity, is again nothing but determinate universality. In it the concept is *outside itself*; since *it is the concept* that is here outside itself, the abstract universal contains all the factors of the concept; it is (a) universality (b) determinateness (c) the *simple* unity of the two; but this unity is *immediate*, and therefore particularity does not appear as the totality. *Intrinsically* it is also this *totality* and *mediation*; it is essentially *exclusive* relation to an *opposite*, or the *merging of negation*, namely, of the *opposite* determinateness—an *opposite*, however, which is only a phantom of fancy, for it vanishes immediately and shows itself the same as its assumed *opposite*. What makes, therefore, this universality abstract is that the mediation is only a *condition*, or, in other words, is not *posited in the universality* itself. Since it is not *posited*, the unity of the abstract has the form of immediacy, and the content the form of indifference to its universality; for the content does not appear as the totality which is the universality of absolute negativity. Hence, though the abstract universal is indeed the *concept*, yet its form is *not the form of conception*; it is the concept not posited as such.

When people talk of the *determinate concept* it is merely such an *abstract universal* that is usually meant. Even by *concept* in general one commonly understands this concept, *which is no concept*, and the *understanding* denotes the faculty of such concepts. To this understanding appertains *demonstration*, in so far as it *proceeds by concepts*, that is to say, merely by *modes of thought*. Such procedure by concepts, therefore, does not rise above finiteness and necessity; its highest point is the negative infinite, the abstraction of the highest essence,

which itself is the determinateness of *indeterminateness*. The absolute substance, likewise, though it is not this empty abstraction, but rather in point of content the totality, is nevertheless abstract for this reason, that it lacks the absolute form, and its inmost truth is not constituted by the concept; although it is indeed the identity of universality and particularity, or of thinking and externality, yet this identity is not the *determinateness* of the concept; on the contrary, there lies *outside* it an understanding—and, just because it is outside it, a contingent understanding—in and for which it exists in divers attributes and modes.

We should add that the abstraction is not *empty* in the sense in which it is commonly said to be so; it is the *determinate* concept; it has some determinateness or other for its content; even the highest essence, the pure abstraction, possesses, as has been observed, the determinateness of indeterminateness; but indeterminateness is a determinateness, since it purports to stand *opposed* to the determinate. But in the expression of what it is, what it purports to be is merged; it is enunciated as one with determinateness, and in this way the concept and its truth are restored out of the abstraction.—Yet every determinate concept is certainly *empty*, in so far as it does not contain the totality, but only a one-sided determinateness. Even when it has otherwise concrete content, as, for example, man, government, animal, and the like, yet it remains an empty concept, in so far as its determinateness is not the *principle* of its differentiation; the principle contains the beginning and the essence of its evolution and realization; but any other determinateness of the concept whatsoever is unfruitful. When, therefore, the concept is scolded in general for its emptiness, one is ignoring the absolute determinateness of it mentioned

above, which is the differential element in the concept and the only true content in its sphere.

Connected with the above is the circumstance that has led to the latter day disrepute of the concept and its depreciation as against the reason; namely, the *rigidity* which it communicates to determinate particulars, and so to finitudes. This fixity consists in the form of abstract universality which we have just considered; through it they become *unalterable*. For both qualitative determinateness and the modes of reflection are essentially *bounded*, and possess through their limit a relation to their *opposite*, and consequently the *necessity* of transition and decay. But the universality which they possess in the understanding gives them the form of self-reflection, whereby they are rescued from the relation to an opposite, and become *imperishable*. Now, granting that with the pure concept this eternity is part of its nature, it only follows that its abstract determinations would be eternal essences in respect of *their form*; but their content is not adequate to this form, and, therefore, they are not truth nor imperishable. Their content is not adequate to the form, since it is not determinateness itself in its universality, that is to say, it is not the totality of the differentiation of the concept; in other words, it is not itself the whole form; but for this reason, the very form of the limited understanding is the imperfect form, namely, *abstract* universality.—But, further, we must recognize the infinite force of the understanding in splitting the concrete into abstract particulars and sounding the depth of the opposition, which force, and which only, is at the same time the power that effects their transition. The concrete of *intuition* is a *totality*, but a *sensuous* totality—a real material that subsists in indifferent *externality* in space and time; but surely this incoherence of the manifold, in which it is the

content of intuition, should not be counted to it for merit, or for superiority over the world of understanding. The changeableness which it displays in intuition already points onward to the universal; but all that intuition can show in that direction is a *second* thing equally changeable; consequently only a repetition of the same thing, not the universal coming forward to take its place. Least of all, however, should we count as a merit in sciences, such as geometry and arithmetic, the *intuitive* element that their material involves, or imagine their propositions to be founded on that element. On the contrary, the material of such sciences is, by reason of that element, of an inferior nature; the intuition of figures or numbers is of no avail for the knowledge of them; it is only *thinking* about them that can produce a science.—In so far, however, as one understands by intuition not merely the sensuous element but the *objective totality*, so far it is an *intellectual* intuition; that is to say, it has for its object, not the world of things in its external existence, but what that world involves of imperishable reality and truth—that reality alone which is *determined* essentially in and through the concept; in other words, the *idea*, whose more precise nature has to appear at a later stage. The start that intuition, as such, is supposed to have of the concept is the external reality, the irrational element, that first receives a value by means of the concept.

Whereas, then, the understanding exhibits the infinite force that determines the universal, or, conversely, by means of the form of universality communicates rigidity and persistence to the determinateness that in its own nature is shifting, it is not the fault of the understanding if a further advance is not made. It is a subjective *impotence of the reason* that accepts these particulars as they are, and cannot succeed, by means of the dialectical

force opposed to that abstract universality, in other words, by means of the peculiar nature or concept of those particulars, in reducing them to unity. The understanding, no doubt, bestows on them through the form of abstract universality such an *inflexibility* of being, so to speak, as they do not possess in the qualitative sphere and in the sphere of reflection ; but, at the same time, by this isolation it *animates* them, and so accentuates them, that it is just at this point only that they gain the faculty of dissolving themselves and passing over into their contradictory. The highest maturity, the highest stage that anything can reach, is the stage in which its destruction is beginning. The rigid element in the particulars into which the understanding seems to run, the form of the imperishable is the form of self-related universality. But this form properly belongs to the concept ; and consequently involves in itself—and in infinite proximity—the enunciation of the *dissolution* of the finite. This universality immediately *refutes* the determinateness of the finite, and *enunciates* its inadequacy. Or, better, its inadequacy is already given ; the abstract determinate is posited as one with universality ; for that very reason it is posited, not as independent, as though it was a mere determinateness, but only as the unity of itself and the universal, that is, as concept.

Therefore the usual hard and fast line between the understanding and the reason is from every point of view to be rejected. Instead of saying that the concept is irrational, we must rather say that reason sometimes fails to recognize itself in the concept. The determinate and abstract concept is the *condition*, or rather an *essential factor, of the reason* ; it is animated form, in which the finite, by reason of the universality in which it relates to itself, ignites of itself, is posited as dialectical

and thereby becomes the *first step* in the revelation of reason.

In the foregoing statement the determinate concept has been presented in its truth, and it only remains to indicate its character as already posited therein.—Opposition, which is an essential factor of the concept, but is not yet posited as opposition in the pure universal, comes by its rights in the determinate concept. Determinateness in the form of universality is combined with the universal to form a simplicity; this determinate universal is self-related determinateness, determinate determinateness or abstract negativity posited in its own right. But self-related determinateness is *singularity*. Just as universality is immediately by its own very nature particularity, just so immediately is particularity by its own very nature *singularity*; which singularity is to be regarded, in the first instance, as the third factor of the concept, in so far as we stand rigidly by its *opposition* to the first two factors, but must also be regarded as the absolute return of the concept into itself, and, at the same time, as the posited forfeiture of itself.

NOTE.

It follows from the foregoing statement that *universality*, *particularity*, and *singularity* are the *three* determinate concepts—that is, if one insists on *counting* them. It has been already pointed out that number is an inappropriate form in which to comprise determinations of conception, but most of all unsuitable for the modes of the concept itself; since number has the unit for its principle, it makes the things that are numbered into separate and mutually indifferent entities. We have seen in the foregoing that the several determinate concepts, so far from being separable into a number, are on the contrary *one* and the same concept.

In the ordinary treatment of logic various *divisions* and *species* of concepts occur. We are immediately struck with the inconsequence of the species being introduced by the phrase: In respect of quality, quantity, &c., *there are* the following concepts. *There are* expresses no other justification than that *we find such species existing*, and that they present themselves in the course of *experience*. In this way we get an *empirical logic*—surely an odd science, an *irrational* cognition of the *rational*. Logic thus affords a very bad example of obedience to its own lessons; for it allows itself for its own purposes to violate a rule that it prescribes, namely, that concepts should be deduced and that the propositions of science (and, therefore, the proposition: there are such and such species of concepts) should be proved.—In this matter the Kantian philosophy commits a further inconsequence; for the purpose of the *transcendental logic*, it *borrow*s the categories, as so-called radical concepts, from the subjective logic in which they are assumed empirically. As it admits the latter fact, it is impossible to see why the transcendental logic resolves to borrow from such a science, instead of going itself to experience directly.

To cite a few details, one main division of concepts divides them in respect of their *clearness*; thus there are *clear* and *obscure* concepts, *distinct* and *confused*, *adequate* and *inadequate*. We might here include also *complete* concepts, *superfluous* concepts, and other like superfluities.—As regards this division in respect of *clearness*, it is easily seen that this point of view, and the classifications relative to it, are taken from *psychological*, and not from *logical*, distinctions. The so-called *clear* concept suffices, we are told, to distinguish one object from another; this should not be called a concept at all, it is nothing more than the subjective representation.

What an *obscure* concept may be, must be left to itself, for, if not, it would not be obscure but would become a distinct concept.—The *distinct* concept, we are told, is one of which we can state the *marks*. In this sense, it is really the *determinate concept*. The mark—that is to say, taking the term in its correct signification—is nothing but the *determinateness* or simple *content* of the concept, as distinct from the form of universality. But in the first instance the *mark* is not given precisely this exact significance, but means in general merely a particular feature by which a *third party* notes for himself an object or concept ; it may, therefore, be a very contingent circumstance. In general, it expresses not so much the immanence and essentiality of the feature in question, as its relation to an *external* understanding. If the latter is really an understanding, it has for its object the concept, and distinguishes that concept by nothing but *what is in the concept*. If, however, the mark is to be different from the content of the concept, then it is a mere *token*, and may be any feature that belongs to the *representation* of the thing, and not to its concept.—What the *confused* concept is may be passed over as superfluous.

The *adequate* concept, however, is something higher ; it implies, properly speaking, a notion of the agreement of the concept with reality, which is not the concept as such, but the *idea*.

If the *mark* of the distinct concept was really to be the determination of the concept itself, logic would find itself in perplexity over *simple* concepts, which according to another principle of division are opposed to *compound*. For if a true, that is, an immanent mark of the simple concept was to be given, we should be refusing to regard it as simple ; but in so far as no mark was given, it would not be a distinct concept. Here, however, the *clear*

concept comes to the rescue. Unity, reality, and other such determinations are held to be *simple* concepts, doubtless only on the ground that the logicians had not succeeded in discovering their nature, and contented themselves therefore with having merely a *clear* concept of them ; in other words, no concept at all. *Definition*, that is, the statement of the concept, demands in general the statement of the genus and of the specific difference. Consequently it presents the concept, not as something simple, but in two numerically distinct *components*. Yet such a concept is certainly not to be regarded for that reason as a *compound*.—The simple concept seems to suggest the notion of *abstract simplicity*, a unity which does not contain within itself difference and determinateness, and which for that reason is not the unity that belongs to the concept. In so far as an object occurs in representation, especially in memory, or is an abstract mode of thought, so far it can be completely simple. Even the object that is richest in its import, such an object, for example, as spirit, or nature, the world, even God, when gathered unreasoningly into the simple representation of the equally simple expression, spirit, nature, world, God, is doubtless something simple at which consciousness may stop short, without drawing out its proper nature or its mark. But the objects of consciousness should not be these simple entities, these representations or abstract modifications of thought ; they must be *conceived*, or, in other words, their simplicity must be determined by their inner difference.—The *compound* concept, however, is as bad as a square circle. We can have, of course, a concept of a compound thing ; but a compound concept would be worse than *materialism*, which only assumes *the substance of the soul* as a compound, but accepts *thinking*, for all that, as *simple*. Rude reflection first lights upon composition, because it is the

purely *external* relation, the poorest form in which things can be regarded ; even the lowest natures must be an *inner* unity. That, above all, the form of the most untrue existence should be transferred to the ego or concept is more than we had a right to expect, and can only be regarded as an indecency and a barbarism.

A further main division of concepts is into *contrary* and *contradictory*.—If it was our business, in treating of the concept to state what *determinate* concepts there are, all possible modifications of thought would have to be adduced,—for *all* such are concepts, and consequently determinate concepts—and all categories of *being*, as well as all modifications of *essence*, would have to be cited among the species of concepts. Just as in the various works on logic—to a *greater* or *lesser* degree according to the discretion of the author—we find it recounted that there are *affirmative, negative, identical, conditioned, necessary* concepts, and the like. As *the very nature of the concept* has already left all such forms of thinking behind it, and as, therefore, if introduced in connexion with the concept, they do not occur in their proper place, they only admit of superficial verbal explanations, and appear at this stage destitute of all interest.—At the basis of *contrary* and *contradictory* concepts—a distinction which is made an object of main interest here—lie the reflective modes of *diversity* and *direct opposition*. They are regarded as two particular *species*, that is to say, each as firmly fixed in its own self and indifferent to the other—without any thought of the dialectic and inner nullity of these differences ; as though what is *contrary* must not equally be determined as *contradictory*. The nature and essential transition of the reflective forms which they express have been considered in their proper place. In the concept identity has developed to universality, opposition to par-

ticularity, and direct opposition, that withdraws into the the ground, to singularity. In these forms we see the above reflective modes as they are in their concept. The universal has proved to be not only the identical, but, at the same time, the diverse or *contrary* as against the particular and singular; and yet further to be directly opposed to them or *contradictory*; yet in this direct opposition it is identical with them, and their true ground in which they are merged. The same thing holds of particularity and singularity, which are similarly the totality of the reflective modes.

Further, concepts are divided into *subordinate* and *co-ordinate*—a difference which touches more closely the determination of the concept, that is to say, the connexion between universality and particularity, in dealing with which these expressions have been frequently mentioned. Only, it is usual to regard them as absolutely rigid relationships, and from this point of view to lay down a multiplicity of unfruitful propositions concerning them. The most prolix discussion on this point concerns again the relation in which contrariety and contradiction stand to subordination and co-ordination. As the *judgement* is *the relation of determinate concepts*, it is only when we reach the judgement that the true nature of the relationship can declare itself. That other fashion of *comparing* these forms without a thought for their dialectic and the progressive alteration of their character, or, rather, for the combination which they involve of opposite characters, renders the whole consideration of what is *consonant* or not consonant in them—as though this consonance or dissonance were something separate and permanent—a barren and vain thing.—The great *Euler*, who displays such infinite fertility and acumen in the comprehension and combination of the deeper relations of algebraic magnitudes, the frigidly intellectual *Lambert* in particular,

and others have attempted to apply to this class of relationships between concept-modes a *method of notation* by lines, figures, and the like—the general intention being to *elevate*, or rather in point of fact to degrade, logical forms of relation to a *calculus*. The very attempt at notation, if one compares the nature of the sign and of the thing to be signified, displays at once its inherent and absolute nullity. The modes of the concept, universality, particularity, and singularity, are certainly *diverse*, as are lines or the letters of algebra; further, they are also *directly opposed*, and to this extent admitted also of the signs *plus* and *minus*. But they themselves, and above all their relations—even stopping at *subsumption* and *inherence*—are in their essential nature quite opposed to letters and lines and their relations, the equality and diversity of magnitudes, the *plus* and *minus*, or a superimposition of lines, or their combination into angles and the dispositions of spaces which they enclose. Contrasted with the concept-modes objects of the latter kind have the peculiarity of being *external* to one another, and of possessing a *rigid* character. Now if concepts are so taken as to correspond with such signs they cease to be concepts. Their modes are not a dead thing like numbers and lines, whose very relations are not a part of themselves; they are living movements; the particular determinateness that belongs to the one side of the relation is immediately internal to the other side also. What would be a complete self-contradiction in the case of numbers and lines is essential to the nature of the concept.—The science of higher mathematics, which also proceeds to the infinite and allows itself self-contradictions, finds its usual signs inadequate for the presentation of such forms. To denote the representation—which still is very short of conception—of the *infinite approximation* of two ordinates, or in equalizing a curve to

an infinite number of infinitely short chords, it does nothing but draw the two straight lines *outside one another*, and make the chords approach the curve, while keeping them actually *distinct* from it—for the infinite element, which is the whole concern in these cases, it refers us to the *representation*.

What has chiefly misled logicians into this useless experiment is the *quantitative* relation in which *universality*, *particularity*, and *singularity* apparently stand to one another; we speak of the universal as *wider* than the particular and singular, and of the particular as *wider* than the singular. The concept is the *concretion* and the *supreme wealth* of thought, because it is the ground and *totality* of the earlier forms that thought has taken—of the categories of being and the modes of reflection. Hence these earlier forms certainly appear in it also. But its nature is totally misunderstood if they are maintained in it in their old abstraction; if the *wider extent* of the universal is taken to mean that it is *more numerous*, or a greater *quantum*, than the particular and singular. As absolute ground, the concept is *the possibility of quantity* but equally so of *quality*; that is to say, its modes are just as much qualitatively distinct, and are therefore viewed in direct opposition to their truth, when they are posited under the form of quantity alone. Again, the mode of reflection is a *correlate*, and its counterpart shows in it; it does not stand in external connexion like a *quantum*. But the concept is more than all this; its modes are determinate *concepts*, and are themselves essentially the *totality* of all determinations. In order, therefore, to apprehend such inner totality, it is quite inappropriate to apply relations of number and space, in which all particulars fall outside one another; on the contrary, they are the last and worst medium that could be employed. Physical relationships such as magnetism, or

colour-relations would be infinitely higher and truer symbols for the purpose. Seeing that man possesses in language the means of notation peculiar to reason, it is a wanton caprice to go casting about for a less perfect manner of representation with which to plague oneself. It is essentially with the mind alone that the concept can be apprehended as concept, for it is not merely the property of the mind, but the mind's pure self. It is in vain that one tries to fix it by means of figures in space and algebraic signs, for the behoof of *the outer eye* and an *irrational mechanical mode of treatment*, such as a *calculus*. Indeed, everything else that might be taken to serve as symbol can at the most—like symbols for the nature of God—evoke suggestions and echoes of the concept; but should one seriously think of expressing and cognizing the concept thereby, then the *external nature* of all symbols is inadequate to the task, and we find, on the contrary, the order of things inverted, so that what in the symbol is an echo of a higher form must first be cognized by the concept, and can only be approximated to the concept by the *removal* of the sensuous presence that is designed to express it.

C. THE SINGULAR.

Singularity, as we have seen, is already posited by particularity; particularity is *determinate universality*, and therefore self-related determinateness, or the *determinate determinate*.

1. In the first instance, therefore, singularity appears as the *reflection* of the concept out of its determinateness *into itself*. It is the *self-mediation* of the concept, inasmuch as its *opposition* has again passed into an *opposite*, by which process the concept is restored in its self-

identity, but in the character of *absolute negativity*.—The negative element in the universal, whereby the universal is a *particular*, was defined above as a twofold manifestation ; in so far as it is manifestation *inwards*, the particular remains a universal ; through the manifestation outwards it is a *determinate* ; the return of the latter side into the universal takes place in two ways ; *either* by *abstraction*, which lets drop the determinate, and ascends to *higher genera* and the *highest genus*, or, on the other hand, by *singularity*, to which the universal element in particularity itself descends.—Here is the branching of the false path, by which abstraction strays from the high road of the concept, and abandons the truth. Its higher and highest universal to which it rises is only an emptier and ever emptier superficiality ; the singularity that it despises is the profundity in which the concept comprehends itself and is posited as concept.

Universality and *particularity* appeared in one aspect as the factors in the *genesis* of singularity. But it has been already shown that they are in themselves the total concept, and consequently in *singularity* do not pass into an *opposite*, but that there is merely posited in singularity what universality and particularity are in their own absolute nature. The *universal* is *self-existent*, because it is in itself the absolute mediation, or self-relation solely as absolute negativity. It is an *abstract* universal in so far as this merging is an *external* activity, and so a *dropping* of the determinateness. This negativity, therefore, though no doubt implied in the abstract, remains *outside* it as its mere *condition* ; it is the abstracting activity itself, which stands *confronting* its universal ; this universal, therefore, does not possess singularity within itself, and falls short of the nature of true conception.—Life, spirit, God, as well as the pure concept, lie beyond the grasp of abstraction. For abstraction keeps

its products aloof from singularity, or the principle of individuality and personality, and in this way attains to nothing but lifeless and spiritless, colourless and meaningless, universalities.

Yet, the unity of the concept is so indissoluble, that even these products of abstraction, though purporting to drop singularity, are, on the contrary, *singulars* themselves. Abstraction raises the concrete into universality, but apprehends the universality merely as determinate universality; yet this is nothing else than singularity which we have seen to consist in self-related determinateness. Abstraction is therefore a *sundering* of the concrete, and a *singularization* of its particularities; by abstraction we apprehend only *single* properties and factors; for its product must contain what it is itself. The difference, however, between the singularity of its products and the singularity of the concept is that in the products of abstraction the singular as *content* and the universal as *form* are distinct from one another—just because the content does not appear as the absolute form, as the concept itself, or the form does not appear as the totality of the form.—Still this closer examination shows that even the abstract is the unity of singular content and abstract universality, and is therefore a *concrete* and the direct opposite of what it aims to be.

For the same reason, the *particular*, since it is merely the determinate universal, is also a *singular*; and, conversely, as the singular is the determinate universal, it is just as much a particular. If we keep to this abstract determinateness, the concept has three particular modes, the universal, particular, and singular; whereas above we have given only the universal and particular as the species of the particular. Singularity being the return-into-self of the concept as the negative, this very recoil from the abstraction, which is properly speaking

merged therein, may be placed and reckoned as an indifferent factor *beside* the others.

If singularity is introduced as one of the *particular* concept-modes, then particularity is the *totality* that includes them all; in being this totality, it is the concretion of them, or, in other words, it is singularity itself. But it is also the concrete in its above noted aspect of *determinate universality*; in that aspect it appears as the *immediate* unity in which none of these factors is posited as distinct or as the determinant, and in this form it will constitute the *middle term* of the *formal syllogism*.

It is self-evident that each mode that has been established in the above exposition of the concept has immediately dissolved itself and lost itself in its opposite. Each distinction becomes confounded in the contemplation that strives to isolate and maintain it. Only the mere *representative* faculty, for which abstraction has isolated them, is capable of holding the universal, particular, and singular rigidly apart from one another; accordingly it can count them, and for a further distinction it holds to the *completely external* difference of *being*, namely, *quantity*, which is nowhere less in place than here.—In singularity the true relationship above stated, the *inseparability* of the modes of the concept, is *posited*; for, being the negation of negation, it contains the opposition of these modes, and contains it at the same time in its ground or unity; the effected junction of each with its opposite. Since this reflection in its own very nature involves universality, it is essentially the negativity of the concept-modes, not merely as though it were a third thing distinct from them; on the contrary, it is now *posited* that positivity is *absolute existence*; in other words, that the particular modes that enter into opposition are themselves each of them the *totality*. The return of the determinate concept into itself means that it is the

quality of the determinate concept to be *in its determinateness* the *whole* concept.

2. But singularity is not only the return of the concept into itself, but immediately its forfeiture. By means of singularity, where the concept appears *inside itself*, it passes *outside itself* and enters into actuality. *Abstraction*—which, as the *soul* of singularity, is the relation of the negative to the negative—is not, as we have seen, something external to the universal and particular, but is immanent in them; and through it they become a concrete, a content, a singular. But because it is this negativity, singularity is determinate determinateness, or *differentiation* pure and simple; through this reflection of opposition into itself the opposition becomes a fixed one; it is only by singularity that the particular gets determined; for *singularity* is the abstraction above mentioned, which appearing now as singularity is *abstraction posited*.

The singular, therefore, by being self-related negativity, is the immediate self-identity of the negative; it is *self-existent*. In other words, it is the abstraction which determines the concept by its ideal factor of *being* as an *immediate*.—Thus the singular is a qualitative *one* or *this*. In this its qualitative aspect, it is, first, its own *self-repulsion*, whereby the many *other* ones are presupposed; *secondly*, it is a negative relation towards these presupposed *others*, and thus the singular is *exclusive*. Universality in relation to these singulars as indifferent units—and related to them it must be, since it is a factor in the concept of singularity—is merely their *common* element. When one understands by the universal what is *common* to several singulars, one is starting from the *indifferent* subsistence of these singulars, and dragging the immediacy of *being* into the nature of the concept. The lowest notion that one can have of

the universal in its relation to the singular is this external connexion of it therewith as a mere *common* element.

The singular which appears in the reflective sphere of real existence as *this* has not the *exclusive* relation to another one which pertains to qualitative self-existence. *This*, as the *self-reflected* one, is self-existent without repulsion; or repulsion in this reflection is one with abstraction, and is the reflecting *mediation* which takes the form that the *this* is a *posited* immediacy *indicated* by an outsider. *This is*; it is *immediate*; but it is only *this* by being *pointed out*. This 'pointing out' is the reflecting movement which contracts into itself and posits the immediacy—but as something external to itself.—Now no doubt the singular is also 'this', as the immediate restored out of mediation; but it has not the mediation outside itself, it is itself repulsive separation, or *posited abstraction*, yet in its very act of separation affirmative relation.

This abstracting action of the singular, by being the reflection of opposition into itself, is, in the first place, a positing of the opposed elements as *self-dependent* or reflected into self. They have immediate *being*; but, further, this sundering is reflection in general, the *manifestation of the one in the other*; thus they stand in essential relation. Further, they are not merely *existing* singulars in relation to one another; such multiplicity belongs to being; the *singularity* that posits itself as determinate does not posit itself in an external opposition, but in the opposition peculiar to the concept; accordingly it excludes from itself the *universal*, but, as this latter is a factor of itself, it no less essentially relates to it.

The concept, as this relation of its *self-dependent* modes, has lost itself; for in this form it is no longer their *posited unity*, and they no longer appear as its *factors* or

manifestation, but as subsistent in and for themselves.— In the form of singularity the concept in its determinateness retreats into itself; thereby the determinate has itself become a totality. Its return into itself is therefore its absolute original *self-analysis*; or, in other words, in singularity the concept is posited as *judgement*.

SECOND CHAPTER

THE JUDGEMENT.

THE judgement is the *determinateness* of the *concept posited* by the concept itself. The modes of the concept, or—what we have seen to be the same thing—the determinate concepts, have been already separately considered ; but this consideration of them was rather a subjective reflection or subjective abstraction. But the concept is itself this act of abstraction ; the mutual opposing of its modes is its own act of determination. The *judgement* is this positing of the determinate concepts by the concept itself.

Judgement is *another* function than conception, or rather it is *the other* function of the concept, inasmuch as it is the concept's *self-determination* ; and the further advance of the judgement into the different kinds of judgements is this progressive determination of the concept. What determinate concepts *there are*, and how these modifications of the concept necessarily arise, has to show itself in the judgement.

The judgement, therefore, may be called the primary *realization* of the concept, where reality signifies in general entrance into *existence* as *determinate* being. More precisely, we have traced the nature of the realization to be this, that *on the one hand* the factors of the concept, in consequence of its reflection into self or singularity, have become self-dependent totalities, while *on the other hand* the unity of the concept appears as *their relation*. The self-reflected modes are *determinate totalities*, standing essentially in indifferent unrelated

subsistence, and no less essentially in reciprocal mediation with one another. Only by containing these totalities and their relations is the determining act the totality. This totality is the judgement.—Accordingly the judgement contains, in the first place, the two self-dependent elements which are called *subject* and *predicate*. What each of these is, we cannot properly say as yet; they are still indeterminate, for it is only by the judgement that they are to be determined. The judgement being the concept as determined, we have only the general distinction to go on with, that the judgement contains the *determinate* concept opposed to the still *indeterminate*. Accordingly, the subject may, in the first instance, be opposed to the predicate, as the singular to the universal, or again as the particular to the universal, or as the singular to the particular; the two being only opposed to each other generally as the more determinate and the more universal.

It is, therefore, proper and necessary to have these *names* of *subject* and *predicate* for the terms of the judgement; as names, they are something indeterminate that has still to await its determination, and therefore they are no more than names. This is one reason why modes of the concept could not be employed for the two sides of the judgement; another still stronger reason is that it is pronouncedly the nature of the concept-mode not to be an abstraction and fixture, but to possess within itself its opposites and to posit them in itself; the sides of the judgement, being themselves concepts and therefore the totality of the concept-modes, must run through and exhibit in themselves all those same modes, whether in abstract or concrete form. Now, in order to maintain the sides of the judgement in a general way despite this change of mode, there is nothing so serviceable as names that remain identical in such alteration.—The name,

however, is opposed to the thing or the concept; this distinction appears in the judgement itself as such. Since the subject expresses in general the determinate, and therefore rather the immediately *existing* thing, while the predicate expresses the *universal*, the essence, or the concept, the subject as such is at first only a kind of *name*; for *what it is* is only expressed by the predicate, which contains *being* in the sense of the concept. When persons ask *what is this?* or *what plant is this?* &c., by this *being* that they ask about they often mean only the *name*, and when they have ascertained that, they are satisfied, and know now what the thing *is*. This is *being* in the sense of the subject. But the *concept*, or at least the essence and the universal in general, are first given by the predicate, and it is about this that one asks in the sense of the judgement.—Accordingly *God, spirit, nature*, or whatever it may be, taken as the subject of a judgement, is as yet merely a name; what such a subject *is* in regard to the concept, is first forthcoming in the predicate. When we inquire, what predicate belongs to such a subject, the possibility of our deciding such a question implies an underlying *concept*; but this concept is first expressed by the predicate itself. Properly speaking, therefore, it is the mere representation that constitutes the presupposed significance of the subject and that leads to a nominal definition, in which it is a contingency and historical fact, what is, or is not, understood by a name. Thus many disputes as to whether a predicate belongs to a certain subject or not are nothing but verbal disputes, since they start from the form above stated; the underlying factor (*subjectum, ὑποκείμενον*) is as yet nothing more than the name.

We must now examine, *secondly*, how the *relation* of subject and predicate is determined in the judgement, and how the subject and predicate themselves are

determined in the first instance by that very relation. The judgement has in general for its sides totalities that, to begin with, appear as essentially self-dependent. The unity of the concept, therefore, is as yet a mere *relation* of self-dependent entities; it is not as yet the *concrete* and *pregnant* unity that has returned to itself out of this reality, but only a unity *outside* which these entities subsist as *extremes that are not merged in it*.—Now, the consideration of the judgement may start either from the original unity of the concept, or from the self-dependence of the extremes. The judgement is the self-diremption of the concept; *this unity*, therefore, is the foundation from which the consideration of it in accordance with its true objectivity should start. From this point of view it is the *original analysis* of the original one; thus the word *Urtheil* points to what it is in its own intrinsic nature. But from another aspect the concept, as it occurs in the judgement, is phenomenal, since its factors have there attained self-dependence—and it is on this aspect of *externality* that the representative faculty prefers to fasten.

In this *subjective* view, then, subject and predicate are regarded as severally and separately complete and independent; the subject as a thing that would exist even if it did not possess this predicate; the predicate as a universal quality that would exist even if it did not belong to this subject. From this point of view the judgement involves the reflection, whether this or that predicate, which exists in the *brain*, may be, and should be, *attached* to the object, which exists on its own account *outside*; the very act of judgement consists in this, that through it, and it only, a predicate is *combined* with the subject, so that, if this combination did not take place, subject and predicate would remain severally and separately each what it is, the former an existing

object, the latter a representation in the brain.—The predicate, however, that is being attached to the subject must also *apply* to it ; in other words, it must in its own nature be identical with it. Through this latter significance of *attachment* the *subjective* meaning of judgement and the indifferent external subsistence of the subject and predicate are again merged ; this action *is* good ; the *copula* denotes that the predicate belongs to the *being* of the subject, and is not merely externally combined with it. In the *grammatical* sense the above subjective order, in which one starts from the indifferent externality of subject and predicate, has its complete validity ; for it is *words* that are here externally combined.—We may take this opportunity of observing that a *proposition*, though possessing a subject and predicate in a grammatical sense, is not for that reason a *judgement*. A judgement involves that the predicate should stand to the subject as one concept-mode to another ; accordingly, as a universal to a particular or singular. If the statement concerning the singular subject only enunciates something singular, then that is a mere proposition. For example, ‘Aristotle died in the 73rd year of his age, in the 4th year of the 115th Olympiad’ is a mere proposition, and not a judgement. There would be something of a judgement in it only if doubt had been thrown on one of the circumstances, the date of the death, or the age of the philosopher, and the given figures had been asserted on the strength of some reason or other. For in that case the circumstances would be regarded as a certain universal, as time that would still subsist apart from this particular content of the death of Aristotle, whether as time occupied with some other content, or even as empty time. Similarly the news that my friend N. is dead is a proposition ; and would only be a judgement if

the question was whether he was actually dead or only apparently so.

As for the common definition of the judgement as the *connexion of two concepts*, we may indeed accept for the external *copula* the indefinite expression *connexion*, and admit, further, that the connected elements at least *purport* to be concepts. In other respects, however, this definition is in the highest degree superficial; not merely that in the disjunctive judgement, for example, more than *two* so-called concepts are connected, but rather that the definition is far too good for the facts; for, in general, it is not concepts that are meant, and hardly even modes of the concept, but properly speaking only *modes of representation*; it has been remarked, *à propos* of the concept in general and of the determinate concept, that what is usually called concept by no means deserves that name; where then should concepts come from in the case of the judgement?—Above all, the definition in question passes over the essential feature of the judgement, namely, the distinction of its terms; still less does it take notice of the relationship between the judgement and the concept.

As regards the further determination of the subject and predicate, it has been observed that, properly speaking, it is in the judgement first that they have to receive their determination. But, as the judgement is the posited determinateness of the concept, this determinateness possesses the said opposites in their *immediacy* and *abstraction*, as *singularity* and *universality*.—But, in so far as the judgement is in general the *existence* or *opposition* of the concept which has not yet restored itself to the unity whereby it appears *as concept*, there emerges also the determinateness which lies below the plane of conception; the opposition of *being* and reflection or *intrinsicity*. Since, however, the concept constitutes

the essential *ground* of the judgement, the above determinations are at least so indifferent, that when one belongs to the subject, and the other to the predicate, the converse relationship holds equally good. The *subject* as the *singular* appears in the first instance as the *existent* or *self-existent*, in the determinate determinateness of the singular—as an actual object even if only an object in *representation*—as for example, courage, right, agreement, &c.—on which a judgement is being passed;—the *predicate*, on the other hand, being the *universal*, appears as this *reflection* on the object, or rather as the object's reflection into itself, which goes out beyond that immediacy and merges the determinateness as merely existent—in other words, appears as the *object's intrinsicity*.—In this way one starts from the singular as primordial and immediate, and it is *raised* by the judgement into *universality*; just as, conversely, the universal that has only *intrinsic* being descends in the singular into existence, or becomes *self-existent*.

This signification of the judgement is to be taken as its *objective* meaning, and at the same time as the *truth* of the previous forms of transition. The existent *comes into being*, and *changes*; the finite *is swallowed up* in the infinite; the real existence *issues* out of its *ground* into the phenomenal world, and *falls again to the ground*; the accident *manifests* the *wealth* of substance as well as its *power*; in being there is *transition* into an opposite, in essence manifestation in an opposite by which the relation of *necessity* is revealed. This transition and manifestation has now passed into the *original analysis of the concept*, which, while reducing the singular to the *intrinsicity* of its universality, no less determines the universal as *actual*. These two acts constitute one and the same process by which singularity is posited

in its self-reflection, and the universal is posited as determinate.

This objective signification, however, implies no less that the said opposites, in reappearing in the determinateness of the concept, are at the same time posited only as phenomenal ; in other words, that they are not anything fixed, but apply as much to one mode of the concept as the other. The subject, therefore, may equally be regarded as the *intrinsicity*, and the predicate, on the contrary, as the *existence*. The *subject without predicate* is what the *thing without qualities*, or the *thing per se* is in the world of phenomena—an empty indeterminate basis ; as such, it is the *self-enclosed concept*, which only in the predicate attains to differentiation and determinateness ; the predicate, therefore, constitutes the *existential* side of the subject. Through this determinate universality the subject stands in relation to an external world, is open to the influence of other things, and thereby enters into activity towards them. *That which exists* passes out from its *internality* into the *universal* element of connexion and intercourse, into the negative relations and the reciprocal play of actuality, which is a *continuation* of the singular into other singulars, and therefore universality.

The identity just demonstrated, namely, that the characterization of the subject equally applies to the predicate, and vice versa, is not a mere incident to our way of looking at things ; it is not merely *intrinsic*, but is also *posited* in the judgement ; for the judgement is the relation of the two ; the copula expresses that *the subject is the predicate*. The subject is the determinate determinateness, and the predicate is this *posited* determinateness of it ; the subject is determined only in its predicate ; in other words, only in the predicate is it a subject, and in the predicate it has returned to itself,

and is therein the universal.—As, however, the subject is the self-dependent, the identity before us involves the relationship that the predicate does not possess a self-dependent subsistence on its own account, but only has its subsistence in the subject; it *inheres* in the subject. In this aspect of the distinction between subject and predicate, the predicate is only an *isolated* determinateness of the subject, only *one* of its properties; while the subject itself is the *concrete*, the totality of manifold particularities like the one contained by the predicate; it is the universal.—But, on the other hand, the predicate is also self-dependent universality, and the subject conversely only a mode of it. From this aspect the predicate subsumes the subject; singularity and particularity are not self-existent, but have their essence and substance in the universal. The predicate enunciates the subject in its concept; the singular and particular are contingent modes in the subject; the predicate is their absolute possibility. When in the case of *subsumption* one thinks of an external relation of subject and predicate, and represents the subject as a self-dependent thing, the subsumption refers to the subjective process of judgement mentioned above, in which one starts from the self-dependence of *both* subject and predicate. From this point of view subsumption is merely the *application* of the universal to a particular or singular, which is placed *under* the universal in accordance with a vague mental representation, as being of lesser quantity.

When the identity of subject and predicate is regarded in the light that *at one time* one concept-mode applies to the former and the other to the latter, but *at another time* vice versa, the identity is even still only an *intrinsic* one; on account of the self-dependent diversity of the two sides of the judgement, their posited relation

has also these two sides, which to start with are distinct from each other. But *identity without difference* properly constitutes the *true* relation of the subject to the predicate. The concept-mode itself is essentially a *relation*, for it is a *universal*; therefore the same characters as the subject and predicate possess are also possessed by their relation. It is *universal*, for it is the positive identity of the two, subject and predicate; but it is also *determinate*, for the determinateness of the predicate is that of the subject; further, it is *singular*, too, for in it the self-dependent extremes are merged, as in their negative unity.—But in the judgement this identity is not yet posited; the copula appears as the still indeterminate relation of *being* in general—A is B; for in the judgement the self-dependence of the particulars of the concept or extremes is the *reality* which the concept contains in it. Were the *is* of the copula already *posited* as the above determinate and pregnant *unity* of subject and predicate, that is, as their *concept*, it would already be the *syllogism*.

To restore, or rather to *posit*, this *identity* of the concept is the goal of the *movement* of the judgement. What we have as *data* in the judgement are, on the one hand, the self-dependence and yet antagonistic determinateness of subject and predicate, and, on the other hand, their none the less *abstract* relation. The judgement starts by enunciating that *the subject is the predicate*; but, as the predicate purports *not* to be what the subject is, we are presented with a self-contradiction which must *solve* itself and *pass over* into a result. Nay, rather, since *in their own absolute natures* subject and predicate are the totality of the concept, and the judgement is the reality of the concept, its forward movement is only an *evolution*; there is already present in it what afterwards comes to view in

it; and thus *proof* comes to be merely an *exposition*, a reflection as the *positing* of what is already *given* in the extremes of the judgement; but even this *positing* is already given; it is the *relation* of the extremes.

The judgement in *its immediacy* is in the first instance the judgement of *existence*; its subject is immediately an *abstract existent singular*; its predicate an *immediate determinateness* or property of this singular, an abstract universal.

This qualitative character of the subject and predicate being merged, the nature of the one *shows itself*, to begin with, in the other; the judgement is then, *secondly*, the judgement of *reflection*.

But this more or less external coincidence passes into the *essential identity* of a substantial *necessary connexion*; in this form the judgement is, *thirdly*, the judgement of *necessity*.

Fourthly, since in this essential identity the opposition of subject and predicate has become a *form*, the judgement becomes *subjective*; it involves the opposition between the *concept* and its *reality*, and the equation of the two; it is the *judgement of the concept*.

This emergence of the concept supplies the foundation for the *transition of the judgement into the syllogism*.

A. THE JUDGEMENT OF EXISTENCE.

In the subjective judgement we elect to regard *one and the same* object in a double light, first in its singular actuality, then in its essential identity or in its concept; the singular raised into its universality, or—what is the same—the universal singularized into its actuality. In this fashion the judgement is *truth*; for it is the agreement of concept and reality. But this is not the nature of the judgement *at first*; for *at first* it is *immediate*, since as yet no reflection and movement of the terms

has appeared in it. This *immediacy* makes the first judgement a *judgement of existence*; it may also be called the *qualitative* judgement, but only on the understanding that *quality* does not apply only to the determinateness of *being*, but also includes the abstract universality which, in virtue of its simplicity, likewise possesses the form of *immediacy*.

The judgement of existence is also the judgement of *inherence*. Since immediacy is its note, and since the subject, as distinguished from the predicate, is the immediate, and consequently the primordial and essential element in a judgement of this type, the predicate has the form of a dependent that has its foundation in the subject.

(a) *The Affirmative Judgement.*

1. The subject and predicate, as we have remarked, are, in the first instance, names, whose actual determination is only received through the course of the judgement. Yet, as sides of the judgement, which is the *posited* determinate concept, they possess the character of its factors; but in virtue of their immediacy this character is as yet quite *simple*. It is, therefore, for one thing, not enriched by mediation, and, for another thing, it is determined in the first instance by abstract opposition as *abstract singularity* and *universality*.—The predicate—to speak of this first—is the *abstract* universal; as, however, the abstract is conditioned by a mediation in which the singular or particular is merged, this mediation is so far only a *presupposition*. In the sphere of the concept there cannot be any *immediacy* except such as *in its own absolute nature* includes mediation, and has only arisen through the merging of that mediation; in other words, the immediacy of *the universal*. Thus, too, even *qualitative being* is *in its concept* a universal, but in

the form of *being* the immediacy is not yet so *posited*; it is only as *universality* that it has become the concept-mode wherein it is *posited* that negativity essentially belongs to it. This relation is given in the judgement, where the universal is predicate of the subject.—Similarly the subject is an *abstract* singular, or the *immediate* that purports to be *as such*; consequently the singular taken as a *something* in general. Thus the subject constitutes the abstract aspect in the judgement, according to which the concept has in it passed over into *externality*.—As the two terms are determined, so is also their relation, the *is* or *copula*; it, too, can only have the significance of an immediate abstract *being*. Owing to the relation, which as yet contains no mediation or negation, this judgement is called the *affirmative*.

2. The immediate pure enunciation, therefore, of the affirmative judgement is the proposition:—

The Singular is Universal.

This enunciation must not be couched in the form: A is B; for A and B are entirely formless and therefore meaningless names; whereas the judgement in general, and therefore even the judgement of existence, has concept-modes for its extremes. *A is B*, can represent any mere *proposition* just as well as a *judgement*. But every judgement, even those that are more richly determined in their form, involve the assertion of this definite content: *the universal is singular*; inasmuch, namely, as every judgement is also in general an abstract judgement. With the negative judgement, how far it likewise comes under this expression, we shall deal presently.—If it is commonly ignored that at least, to begin with, every affirmative judgement involves the assertion that the singular is universal, this is due to various causes. For one thing, the *determinate form* whereby the subject and predicate are distinguished is overlooked—the

judgement being taken to be merely the relation of *two* concepts; for another thing, probably the remaining *content* of the judgement, *Caius is learned*, or *the rose is red*, obsesses the mind, which busies itself with the representation of *Caius* &c., and does not reflect on the form—although such content, at any rate, as the *logical Caius*, who usually has to suffer as an example, is a content of very little interest, and, indeed, is expressly chosen of such an uninteresting nature, so as not to divert the attention from the form to itself.

In its objective signification the proposition *that the singular is universal* connotes, as has been incidentally remarked, the perishable nature of individual things, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, their affirmative subsistence in the concept in general. The concept itself is immortal; but that which emerges from the concept in its partition is subject to alteration and to relapse into its *universal* nature. But, conversely, the universal gives itself an *existence*. Just as essence issues into *manifestation* in its modifications, as the ground issues into the *phenomena* of real existence, and substance into its revelation or its accidents, so the universal *resolves* itself into the singular; and the judgement is this *resolution* of the universal, the *evolution* of the negativity already intrinsically involved in it.—The latter fact is expressed by the converse proposition, *the universal is singular*, which is equally enunciated in the affirmative judgement. The subject, which in the first instance is the *immediate singular*, is related in the judgement to its *opposite*, namely, the universal; consequently, it is posited as the *concrete*; in terms of being, as a something of *many qualities*;—or as the concrete of reflection, *a thing of manifold properties*, an *actuality of manifold possibilities*, a *substance* of such and such *accidents*. Since this multiplicity here belongs to the

subject of the judgement, the something or the thing &c., is self-reflected in its qualities, properties, or accidents; or, in other words, it *continues* itself through them, maintaining itself through them, and them no less in itself. The positivity or determinateness belongs to the absolute existence. The subject, therefore, is in itself the *universal*.—The predicate, on the other hand, as this *universality*, that is neither real nor concrete, but *abstract*, is in contrast to the subject the *determinateness*, and contains only *one factor* of the subject's totality to the exclusion of the remainder. In virtue of this negativity, which at the same time is an extreme of the judgement, and, as such, self-related, the predicate is an *abstract singular*.—For instance, in the proposition, *the rose is fragrant*, the predicate expresses only *one of the many* properties of the rose; it singles out this particular one which in the subject has coalesced with the others; just as in the dissolution of the thing, the manifold properties which inhere in it, in gaining their self-dependence as *material elements*, become *separated into singleness*. The proposition of the judgement, therefore, from this point of view runs thus:—*the universal is singular*.

Bringing together this *reciprocal determination* of the subject and predicate in the judgement, we get a twofold result. *First*, the subject appears immediately as the existent or singular, while the predicate is the universal. But since the judgement is the *relation* of the two, and the subject is determined by the predicate as a universal, the subject is the universal. *Secondly*, the predicate is determined in the subject; for it is not a determination *in general*, but a determination *of the subject*; when we say *the rose is fragrant*, this fragrancy is not any random indeterminate fragrancy, but the fragrancy of the rose; thus the predicate is *a singular*.—Now, since

subject and predicate stand in the relationship of the judgement, they are presumed to remain opposed to one another as one concept-mode to another ; just as in the *reciprocity* of causality, before it reaches its truth, the two factors are presumed to retain their self-dependence and mutual opposition in the face of their identical character. When, therefore, the subject is determined as universal, we must not take the predicate also in its character of universality—else we should have no judgement—but only in its character of singularity ; similarly, where the subject is determined as a singular, the predicate is to be taken as a universal.—Reflection on the above bare identity gives us the two identical propositions *the singular is singular* and *the universal is universal*, in which the terms of the judgement would have fallen completely apart (and only their self-relation would be expressed), while their relations to one another would be dissolved, and the judgement consequently merged.—Of the two original propositions, one, namely, *the universal is singular*, enunciates the judgement in respect of its *content*, which in the predicate is a single property, while in the subject it is their totality ; the other, namely, *the singular is universal*, enunciates the *form*, which is stated immediately by that proposition itself.—In the immediate affirmative judgement the extremes are still simple ; form and content are, therefore, still united. In other words, it does not consist of two propositions ; the twofold relation which we have found in it constitutes immediately the *one* affirmative judgement. For (a) its extremes appear as the self-dependent, abstract terms of the judgement, and (b) each side is determined by the other in virtue of the copula relating them. But, for that very reason, the opposition of form and content is, as we have seen, *intrinsically* involved in it ; thus the significance of the first proposition *the*

singular is universal, pertains to the form, because it expresses the *immediate determinateness* of the judgement. On the contrary, the relation expressed by the other proposition *the universal is singular*, that is to say, the determination of subject as universal, and predicate as particular or singular, concerns the *content*; for here the terms only arise through self-reflection, whereby the immediate determinateness of subject and predicate is merged, and, as a result, the form converts itself into a self-retired identity that persists in opposition to the formal distinction; in other words, converts itself into content.

3. Now if the two propositions, that of the form and that of the content:—

<i>Subject</i>	<i>Predicate</i>
The Singular is Universal	
	The Universal is Singular,

were, because contained in *one* affirmative judgement, to be united, so that both subject and predicate alike were determined as the unity of singularity and universality, then both subject and predicate would be the *particular*; which must be recognized as *intrinsically* their inner character. But, in the first place, this combination would only have been effected by an external reflection; and, in the second place, the resultant proposition, *the particular is the particular*, would no longer be a judgement, but an empty, identical proposition like those already derived from such combinations, namely, *the singular is singular* and *the universal is universal*.—Singularity and universality cannot yet be united into particularity, because in the affirmative judgement they are still posited as *immediate*.—In other words, the judgement must still be distinguished in respect of its form and its matter, just because subject and predicate are still distinguished as

immediacy and mediacy, or because the judgement in respect to its relation implies two things: the self-dependence of the things related, and their reciprocal determination, or mediation.

First, then, the judgement, regarded in respect of its *form*, asserts that *the singular is universal*. But, on the contrary, such an *immediate* singular is *not* universal; its predicate is of wider extent and therefore does not answer to it. The subject is an *immediate self-existence*, and therefore the *direct opposite* of that abstraction, the mediation-positing universality, that one thought to predicate of it.

Secondly, if we consider the judgement in respect of its *content*, or as the proposition *the universal is singular*, then the subject is a universal of qualities, a concrete that is infinitely determined; and since its determinations are as yet only qualities, properties, or accidents, its totality is the *spuriously infinite multitude* of them. Such a subject, therefore, is, on the contrary, not a *single* property, such as its predicate enunciates. Thus both propositions must be *denied*, and the affirmative judgement must be posited as *negative* instead.

(b) *The Negative Judgement.*

1. We alluded above to the common notion that it depends merely on the content of the judgement, whether it be true or not, logical truth being concerned solely with the form, and only demanding that this content shall not contradict itself. The form of the judgement itself is credited with nothing beyond being the relation of *two* concepts. We have come to see, however, that this pair of concepts have not merely the unrelated character of a *sum*, but stand in the relationship of *singular* and *universal*. These terms constitute the true logical *content*; and in particular they constitute in this

abstract form the content of the affirmative judgement. All *other content* that occurs in a judgement (*the sun is round, Cicero was a great orator in Rome, It is day now, &c.*) does not touch the judgement as such; the judgement merely enunciates that the *subject is predicate*, or, more definitely, since these are only names, that the *singular is universal and vice versa*.—By virtue of this *purely logical content* the affirmative judgement is *not true*, but has its truth in the negative judgement.—We demand that the content in a judgement shall not contradict itself; but, as we have shown, it does contradict itself in the above judgement.—It is, however, completely a matter of indifference for us to call the above logical content the form, and to understand by content merely the remaining empirical import; if so, the form is not confined to an empty identity standing aloof from the definite content. In that case, the affirmative judgement, owing to its *form* as affirmative judgement, possesses no truth; the man who should give the name of *truth* to the *correctness* of an *intuition* or *perception*, or to the agreement of the *representation* with the object, at any rate has no expression left for what is the object and aim of philosophy. We should be bound at least to reserve the title of rational truth for the latter; and it will surely be granted that such judgements as that Cicero was a great orator, that it is day now, &c., are not rational truths. But the cause of their not being so is, not that they possess, as it were contingently, an empirical content, but that they are only affirmative judgements, that can import, and purport to import, no content but an immediate singular and an abstract determinateness.

The affirmative judgement has its proximate truth in the negative; *the singular is not an abstract universal*—*but on the contrary*, the predicate of the singular, because

it is such a predicate, or—regarding it apart from its relation to the subject—because it is an *abstract* universal, is itself determinate; the *singular* therefore is *in the first instance a particular*. Again, in respect of the other proposition contained in the affirmative judgement, the negative judgement asserts that the *universal is not* an abstract *singular*, but, on the contrary, this predicate, merely because it is a predicate, or because it stands in relation to a universal subject, is something wider than mere singularity, and therefore the *universal* is similarly *in the first instance a particular*.—Inasmuch as this universal is a subject, and, as such, is itself the judgement-mode of singularity, both propositions reduce themselves to one: *the singular is a particular*.

We may remark (a) that here we have established for the predicate the *particularity* to which we referred above; but here it is not posited by external reflection, but has arisen by means of the negative relation exhibited by the judgement; (b) that this character is here established only for the predicate. In the *immediate* judgement, the judgement of existence, the subject is the underlying factor; the *process of determination*, therefore, seems to *run its course* at first *in the predicate*. But, as a matter of fact, this first negation cannot as yet be a determination, or, to speak properly, a *positing of the singular*, since the singular only appears as the second negation, or the negative of the negative.

The singular is a particular, is the *affirmative* expression of the negative judgement. This expression is itself to a certain extent not an affirmative judgement; for the affirmative judgement, by reason of its immediacy, has only the abstract for its extremes, while the particular, through the positing of the relation of the judgement, presents itself as the first *mediated* term.—But this term is not merely to be taken for a factor of the extreme, but also,

as it properly is in the first instance, for a *determination* of the *relation*; in other words, the judgement is to be regarded also as *negative*.

This transition is founded on the general relationship that holds in the judgement between the relation of the extremes and the extremes themselves. The affirmative judgement is the relation of the *immediate* singular and universal, consequently the relation of things one of which is *not* what the other is; the relation is therefore no less essentially *separation* or *negative*; accordingly the affirmative judgement had to be stated as negative. Hence it was unnecessary for logicians to make such a fuss over the *not* of the negative judgement being attached to the *copula*. In the judgement, what is a *determination* of the extreme is no less a *determinate relation*. The extreme, or term of the judgement, is not the purely qualitative category of *immediate* being that only purports to confront an *external opposite*. Neither is it the mode of reflection which takes the general attitude of a positive or negative, each of these being posited as exclusive, and being only *intrinsically* identical with the other. The term of the judgement is a mode of the concept, and, as such, is in itself a universal, posited as *continuing* itself in its opposites. Conversely, the *relation* of the judgement has the same character as is possessed by the extremes, for it is just this universality and continuation of them into one another; and in so far as the extremes are opposed, so far the relation has negativity in it.

The transition above stated from the form of the *relation* to the form of the *term* establishes the *immediate consequence* that the *not* of the copula must no less be attached to the predicate, and the predicate determined as the *not-universal*. But the not-universal is by a no less immediate consequence the *particular*.—If the *negative*

is confined to the wholly abstract category of immediate *not-being*, the predicate is only the *wholly indeterminate* not-universal. This term is commonly treated in logic in connexion with *contradictory* concepts; and it is inculcated, as of grave import, that in the *negative* of a concept one is to confine oneself to the negative only, and that it is to be regarded as the merely *indeterminate* extent of the *opposite* of the positive concept. Thus the mere *not-white* would be just as much red, blue, yellow, &c., as black. But *white* as such is an *irrational* term of intuition; the *not* of white is in that case the equally irrational *not-being*, an abstraction that has been examined at the very beginning of the logic, where *becoming* was found to be its immediate truth. In examining the terms of the judgement it is not uncommon to draw for examples on this irrational content taken from intuition and representation, and to take terms of *being* and *reflection* for terms of judgement. But this is really the same *uncritical* procedure as when, in the language of Kant, the concepts of understanding are applied to the infinite idea of reason, or the so-called *thing-per-se*. The *concept*, which includes the *judgement* that proceeds from it, is the true *thing-per-se* or *the rational*, while terms like the one above pertain to *being* or *essence*, and are forms not yet developed to their true shape that they attain in the concept.—When we stop at white and red as *sensuous* representations, we are giving, as is commonly done, the name of concept to what is merely a mode of representation, and in that case the not-white or not-red is of course not a positive entity; just as also the not-triangular is something quite indeterminate, for the numerical and quantitative determination of things in general is essentially the *indifferent* and *irrational* one. But this kind of sensuous content, like *not-being* itself, must be *conceived*, and so must lose the indifferent and abstract immediacy which

it possesses in the blind inertia of representation. Even in existence the meaningless *nothing* becomes the *limit*, through which *something*—for all that it is *something*—relates to an *other* outside it. In reflection, again, it is the *negative* that *essentially relates* to a *positive* and consequently is *determined*; a negative is already something more than the first *indeterminate not-being*; it is posited as necessarily implying for its existence the positive as its counterpart, and the triad is completed by their *ground*; thus the negative is confined within an enclosed sphere in which, what the one is *not*, is something *determinate*.—Still more, however, in the absolutely fluid continuity of the concept and its modes the *not* is immediately an affirmative, and *negation* is not merely determinateness, but is taken up into the universality and posited in identity with it. The non-universal is therefore immediately the *particular*.

2. In so far as the negative affects the relation of the judgement, and the *negative judgement* is still regarded as such, it is *in the first place still a judgement*; consequently, it involves the relationship of subject and predicate, or of singularity and universality, and the relation between them; in other words, *the form of the judgement*. The subject, as the underlying immediacy, remains unaffected by the negation; it retains, therefore, its character of having a predicate, or its relation to universality. Consequently, what is negated is not universality in general in the predicate, but the abstraction or determinateness of the latter; which in contrast to the universality appeared as the *content*.—Thus the negative judgement is not total negation; the universal sphere which the predicate involves still subsists; the relation of the subject to the predicate is therefore essentially still *affirmative*; the *determination* that the predicate still retains is no less a *relation*.—When, for example, we say the rose is *not* red, we

thereby negate only the predicate's *determinateness*, and separate it from the universality which also belongs to it; the universal sphere, *colour*, is retained; if the rose is not red, we are therein assuming that it has colour and another colour; in respect of this universal sphere the judgement is still affirmative.

The singular is a particular—this affirmative form of the negative judgement enunciates immediately that the particular contains universality. It expresses, moreover, that the predicate is not only a universal, but is also determinate. The negative form involves the same thing; for in that the rose, for example, is not red, it must not only keep the universal sphere of colour for predicate, but must also possess *some other determinate colour*. Thus it is only the *single* determinateness of red that is merged; and not only is the universal sphere left, but even the determinateness is retained, though reduced to an *indeterminate* or universal determinateness; that is, to particularity.

3. *Particularity*, which we have found to be the affirmative character of the negative judgement, is what mediates between singularity and universality; so, now, the negative judgement is in general the mediating factor leading to the third step, to *the self-reflection of the judgement of existence*. Taken in its objective signification, it is merely the factor of alteration of the accidents, or, in the sphere of existence, of the isolated properties of the concrete. From this alteration emerges the complete determinateness of the predicate, or the *concrete* as posited.

The singular is a particular, according to the affirmative expression of the negative judgement. But the singular is also *not* a particular; for particularity is of wider extent than singularity; hence it is a predicate that is inconsistent with the subject, and one in which,

therefore, the subject does not yet possess its truth. *The singular is only a singular*, the negativity that does not relate to an opposite whether affirmatively or negatively, but only to itself.—The rose is not a thing of *some colour or other*, but possesses only the determinate colour that is rose-colour. The singular is not an undetermined determinate, but the determined determinate.

Starting from the affirmative form of the negative judgement, this negation of it appears again merely as a *first* negation. But it is not so. On the contrary, the negative judgement is in its own absolute nature already the second negation, or the negation of negation, and this, which is its absolute nature, must be posited. That is to say, it *negates* the *determinateness* of the predicate of the affirmative judgement, the predicate's *abstract* universality or, from the content point of view, the single quality which the predicate contains of the subject. But the negation of determinateness is already the second negation, and accordingly the infinite return of singularity into itself. Here, therefore, has been effected the *restoration* of the concrete totality of the subject, or, rather, the subject is now for the first time *posited* as a singular, inasmuch as it has been mediated with itself through negation and merging of negation. Concurrently, the predicate on its side has passed from the first universality to absolute determinateness, and has equated itself with the subject. Thus the judgement runs: *the singular is singular*.—From the other aspect of the judgement, as we had to regard the subject as a universal also, and as the predicate (which appears as the singular in contrast to that character of the subject) *widened* itself in the negative judgement *into particularity*, and as now, further, the negation of this *determinateness* is no less the *purification* of the universality contained

in it, this judgement also runs: *the universal is the universal.*

In these two judgements, which we had already reached by external reflection, the predicate is already expressed in its affirmative character. But, in the first instance, the negation of the negative judgement must present itself in the form of a negative judgement. We saw that in the negative judgement there still remained an *affirmative relation* of the subject to the predicate, and the *universal sphere* of the latter. Consequently, from this aspect it contained a universality more purified from limitation than the affirmative judgement, and, for that very reason, it must be all the more negated of the subject as singular. In this way the *whole extent* of the predicate is negated, and there is no longer any affirmative relation between it and the subject. This is the *infinite judgement.*

(c) *The Infinite Judgement.*

The negative judgement is as little a true judgement as the affirmative. But the infinite judgement, which purports to be its truth, is in respect of its negative expression the *negative infinite*; a judgement in which even the form of the judgement is merged.—But this is a *nonsensical judgement.* It purports to be a *judgement*, and so to contain a relation of subject and predicate; but *at the same time* there is *not* to be any such relation in it.—Though the name of the infinite judgement is commonly quoted in the ordinary logics no light is thrown on the state of its case.—Examples of negative infinite judgements are easily got by connecting negatively as subject and predicate two terms, one of which not only does not contain the determinateness of the other, but does not even contain its universal sphere; thus, for example, the mind is not red, yellow, &c., is not an acid, alkali,

&c., the rose is not an elephant, the understanding is not a table, and the like.—These judgements are *correct* or *true*, as the phrase goes, but in spite of such truth they are nonsensical and absurd.—Or, better, they are *not judgements at all*.—A more real example of the infinite judgement is the *evil* action. In *civil litigation* something is negated merely as the property of the other party; it being granted all the while that it should be theirs if they had the right to it, and the claim to it being made solely under the title of right. Thus the universal sphere of right is recognized and maintained in that negative judgement. But *crime* is the *infinite judgement*, which not merely negates the *particular* right, but also negates the universal sphere, negates *right as right*. Such action has of course the *correctness* of actually taking place; but because its relation to morality, which constitutes its universal sphere, is absolutely negative, it is nonsensical.

The *affirmative* form of the negative judgement, of the negation of negation, is the *self-reflection of singularity*, whereby it is posited for the first time as *determinate determinateness*. According to that reflection, the expression of the judgement was *the singular is singular*. In the judgement of existence the subject appears as an *immediate* singular, and therefore, rather, as a mere *something* in general. Through the mediation of the negative and infinite judgement it is for the first time *posited* as a singular.

The singular is hereby *posited* as *continuing itself into its predicate*, which is identical with it; consequently, the universal, too, no longer appears as *immediate*, but as a *comprehension* of opposed elements. The affirmative infinite judgement may equally be expressed as *the universal is universal*; and in this form it is again posited as return into self.

Now, by this self-reflection of its terms the judgement

has merged itself ; in the negative infinite judgement the opposition, so to speak, is too great for it to remain a judgement—subject and predicate have no affirmative relation at all to one another ; in the affirmative infinite judgement, on the contrary, there is nothing present but identity, and owing to the entire lack of opposition it is no longer a judgement at all.

More precisely, it is the *judgement of existence* that is merged ; thus there is *posited* what the *copula* of the judgement involves, that the qualitative extremes are merged in this their identity. But this unity, being the concept, is immediately sundered once more into its extremes, and appears as a judgement, whose terms, however, are no longer immediate, but reflected into self. The *judgement of existence* has passed into the *judgement of reflection*.

B. THE JUDGEMENT OF REFLECTION.

In the judgement that has now arisen, the subject is a singular as such ; similarly, the universal is no longer *abstract* universality, or a *single property*, but is posited as a universal that has gathered into one through the relation of opposites ; or—regarding it from the point of view of the content of diverse determinations in general—as the *congregation* of manifold properties and real existences.—If examples are to be given of predicates of the reflective judgement, they must be of another kind than for judgements of existence. Properly speaking, it is first in the reflective judgement that we find a *determinate content*, that is a content in general ; for the content is the formal term reflected into identity as distinct from the form, in so far as the latter is a distinct and separate determinateness—as it still is in the judgement. In the judgement of existence the content is merely an immediate, or abstract, indeterminate content.—The following may,

therefore, serve as examples of reflective judgements: man is *mortal*; things are *perishable*; this thing is *useful*, *harmful*. *Rigidity* and *elasticity* of bodies, *happiness* &c., are predicates of this peculiar kind. They express an essentiality, but one which is a *connective* determination or a *comprehensive* universality. This *universality*, which will further determine itself in the movement of the reflective judgement, is still distinct from the *universality of the concept* as such; true, it is no longer the abstract universality of the qualitative judgement, but it still retains the relation to the immediate out of which it proceeds, and presupposes that immediate as its negativity.—The concept determines existence, in the first instance, to *connective categories*, to self-continuities in the diverse multiplicity of real existence—yet in such wise that the true universal, though it is the inner essence of that multiplicity, is nevertheless *in the phenomenal sphere*, and this *relative* nature of the multiplicity—or, as it may be, its *mark*—has not yet become its absolute existence.

It may seem a short step to defining the reflective judgement as a judgement of *quantity*, just as the judgement of existence was also defined as a *qualitative* judgement. But, as the *immediacy* in this latter was not merely *existent* immediacy, but essentially also mediated and *abstract*, so here, too, that immediacy when merged is not merely merged quality, and therefore not merely *quantity*; on the contrary, as quality is the most external immediacy, quantity is similarly the *most external determination* belonging to mediation.

Further, as regards the development of the *terms* in the reflective judgement, we should remark that in the judgement of existence the *development* showed itself *in the predicate*, because that judgement was in the sphere of immediacy, and, therefore, the subject appeared as the

fundamental factor. For a like reason, the development in the reflective judgement runs its course *in the subject*, because this judgement has *reflected intrinsicity* for its note. Here, then, the essential element is the *universal* or predicate ; hence it constitutes the *basis* by which, and in accordance with which, the subject is to be measured and to be determined.—Notwithstanding, the predicate also undergoes a further determination owing to the development of the form of the subject ; this advance, however, is *indirect*, whereas the development of the subject shows itself for the stated reason as a *direct* advance.

As regards the objective signification of the judgement, the singular enters by means of its universality into existence, but in an essentially connective character, in an essentiality that maintains itself throughout the multiplicity of phenomena. The subject *purports* to be the absolutely determinate ; this determinateness it possesses in its predicate. On the other hand, the singular is reflected into this its predicate, which is its universal essence ; thus the subject is a real existence and phenomenon. In this judgement the predicate no longer *inheres* in the subject ; on the contrary, it is the *intrinsic* under which the singular is *subsumed* as an accidental. If the judgements of existence may also be defined as *judgements of inherence*, then the judgements of reflection are on the contrary *judgements of subsumption*.

(a) *The Singular Judgement.*

The immediate judgement of reflection is once again *the singular is universal* ; but with subject and predicate in the signification just stated. It can, therefore, be more precisely expressed as *this is an essential universal*.

But a 'this' is *not* an essential universal. The above, which in its general form is an *affirmative* judgement in the wide sense, must be taken negatively. But, since the

reflective judgement is not merely an affirmative one, the negation does not directly affect the predicate, which does not inhere but is the *intrinsic*. It is the subject, instead, that is liable to alteration and determination. Here, therefore, the negative judgement must take the form:—*not a this* is a universal of reflection; an *intrinsicity* of this kind has a more universal real existence than merely in a 'this'. Accordingly, the singular judgement has its proximate truth in the *undistributed* judgement.

(b) *The Undistributed Judgement.*

The non-singularity of the subject, which must be posited instead of its singularity in the first reflective judgement, is *particularity*. But singularity in the reflective judgement is determined as *essential singularity*; consequently, particularity cannot be a *simple abstract* term, in which the singular would be merged, and the real existence annihilated, but must be merely an extension of the singular in external reflection. The subject is, therefore, *some these*, or a *particular multitude of singulars*.

This judgement, that *some singulars are a universal of reflection*, appears, in the first instance, as an affirmative judgement, but is no less negative. For *some* contains universality; in this respect it may be regarded as *comprehensive*. But in so far as it is particularity, it is at the same time inadequate to that universality. As we have shown above, the *negative* determination which the subject has received through the transition of the singular judgement determines also the relation or copula.—The judgement, *some men are happy*, involves the *immediate consequence* that *some men are not happy*. If *some things are useful*, on that very account *some things are not useful*. The affirmative and negative judgements no

longer fall outside one another, but the undistributed judgement immediately contains both at the same time, just because it is a judgement of reflection.—But the undistributed judgement is for that reason *indeterminate*.

If we take an example of such a judgement, and examine its subject *some men, animals, &c.*, we find that it contains besides the undistributed formal term *some* a content-term *man, &c.* The subject of the singular judgement might be expressed by *this man*, a singularity which properly pertains to external indication; we shall, therefore, express it better, say, by *Caius*. But the subject of the undistributed judgement can no longer be *some Caii*; for *Caius* stands for a singular as such. Consequently we add to the *some* a universal *content*, say, *man, animal, &c.* This is not merely an empirical content, but one determined by the form of the judgement. That is to say, it is a *universal*; for *some* involves universality, and this latter must at the same time be separated from the singulars, since reflected singularity is here fundamental. More precisely, it is also the *universal nature*, or the *genus* man, animal—that universality, which is the result of the reflective judgement, *anticipated*; just as the affirmative judgement, in having *the singular* for subject, anticipated the determination which is the result of the judgement of existence.

Thus the subject, which contains the singulars, their relation to particularity, and the universal nature, is already posited as the totality of the concept-modes. But this view is, properly, an external consideration of the matter. What is, in the first instance, already posited in the subject by its form, as regards the mutual *relation* of these modes, is the *extension* of the *this* to particularity; but this universalization is not adequate to the *this*; *this* is completely determinate, while *some this* is indeterminate. The extension must fit the *this*,

and must, therefore, in conformity with it, be *completely determined*. Such an extension is totality, or, in the first instance, *universality* in general.

This universality has the *this* at its basis, for the singular here is the singular reflected into itself; its developments, therefore, run their course *externally* in it; and as the particularity, for this reason, took the shape of *some*, so the universality which the subject has attained is *all* or the *complete extension*, and the undistributed judgement has passed into the *distributed*.

(c) *The Distributed Judgement.*

Universality, as it appears in the subject of the distributed judgement, is the external universality of reflection, or the *complete extension*; by *all* is meant all the *singulars*; the singular remains unaltered in it. This universality, therefore, is only a *comprehension* of the individually subsisting singulars; it is a *community* of character, which only belongs to them in *comparison*.— This community is usually the first thing that occurs to subjective *representation*, when universality is mentioned. It is given as the immediate reason, why a determination is to be regarded as universal, *that it applies to several things*. It is mainly this conception of universality, too, that is in view in the case of *analysis*, when, for example, the development of a function in a *polynomium* is taken to be *more universal* than its development in a *binomium*, because the *polynomium* presents a *greater number of individuals* than the *binomium*. The demand for the presentation of the function in its universality requires, properly speaking, a *pantonomium*, the exhausted infinity; but here the limit of the demand asserts itself, and the representation of the infinite multitude must content itself with the *ideal* of it, and, therefore, also with a *polynomium*. But,

as a fact, the binomium is already the pantonomium in the cases where the *method* or *rule* only concerns the dependence of one member on one other, and where the dependence of several members on their predecessors does not particularize itself but is based on one and the same function. The *method* or *rule*, is to be regarded as the true *universal*; in the progress of development, or in the development of a polynomium, the rule is merely *repeated*; thus it gains nothing in universality by the increased number of the members. We have already spoken at an earlier stage of the spurious infinity and its illusion; in the universality of the concept *the beyond is reached*; the spurious infinity remains burdened with the beyond as something unattainable, for it never gets further than the mere *progress* to the infinite. When the imagination pictures universality merely as a *complete extension*, as a universality ideally exhaustible in the singulars as singulars, this is a lapse into the spurious infinity; or, to put it otherwise, what is only *many* is taken for *all*. Yet multitude, however great it may be, remains absolutely mere particularity, and falls short of *all*.—Notwithstanding, the imagination has here some dim vision of the absolute universality of the *concept*; it is the concept that forces its way beyond the persistent singularity to which the representation clings, and beyond the externality of its reflection, and substitutes the complete extension *as totality*, or rather the absolute existence of the categorical judgement.

Besides all this, the complete extension that in general is *empirical* universality gives us the same result. As the singular is presupposed in its immediacy, and therefore *found existing* and externally *adopted*, the reflection which gathers it into complete extension is at the same time external to it. But since the singular as

this is absolutely indifferent to this reflection, the universality and a singular of this kind cannot be combined into a unity. Hence the complete extension of empiricism *remains a problem*; an *ideal*, which as such cannot be-presented as existent. Thus an empirically universal proposition—for such nevertheless are framed—rests on the tacit understanding that, if only no *instance* of the contrary can be adduced, the *many* cases shall pass for *all*; or that the *subjective* complete extension, that is to say, the totality of the cases *with which we are acquainted*, may be regarded as *objectively* complete.

Now, examining more closely the *distributed judgement* that lies before us, we see that the subject, which, as already remarked, contains intrinsic and self-existent universality *as presupposed*, now contains it also as *posited* in it. *All men* expresses *first* the *genus* man, *secondly* this genus in its singularization, but with the singulars extended to the universality of the genus; conversely, the universality, through this connexion with singularity, is just as completely determined as the singularity; hereby the *posited* universality has become *equated with the presupposed*.

Properly, however, we should not anticipate the *presupposed*, but consider the result in the determination of the form itself.—The singular, in having extended itself to complete extension, is *posited* as negativity that is identical relation to self. Thus it has not remained the first singularity, with which it began, as, for example, the singularity of a Caius, but has become the determination that is identical with universality, or the absolute determinateness of the universal.—The *first* singularity of the singular judgement was not the *immediate* singularity of the affirmative judgement, but had come into being through the dialectical movement of

the judgement of existence in general; it was already determined as the *negative identity* of the terms of that judgement. This is the true presupposition in the reflective judgement; in contrast to the positing that runs its course in this judgement, that *first* determinateness of singularity was its *intrinsicity*; what it thus is *intrinsically* is now *posited* by the movement of the reflective judgement; namely, singularity, as the identical self-relation of the determinate. Therefore, the above *reflection*, which extends singularity to complete extension, is not a reflection external to it; it is merely that singularity is coming to be *expressly* what it already is *intrinsically*.—Hence the result is in truth *objective universality*. Thus the subject has stripped off the formal term of the reflective judgement, which passed from *this* through *some* to *all*; instead of *all men* we have now to say *man*.

The universality, which has hereby come into being, is the *genus*; the universality which is in itself a concrete. The genus does not *inhere* in the subject; in other words, it is not a *single* property, or a property at all, of the subject; it contains all isolated determinateness dissolved in its substantial solidity.—Because it is posited as this negative self-identity, it is essentially a subject; but is no longer *subsumed* in its predicate. This carries with it a general change in the nature of the reflective judgement.

The reflective judgement was essentially a judgement of *subsumption*. The predicate was determined in contrast to its subject as the *intrinsically existent* universal. According to its content it could be taken as an essential connective characteristic, or again, as a mark; and with a predicate so determined, the subject becomes only an essential *phenomenon*. But when the subject is determined to *objective universality*, it ceases to be

subsumed under such a connective determination, or comprehensive reflection; on the contrary, such a predicate, in contrast to this universality, is itself a particular. Consequently the relation of subject and predicate has become inverted, and hence the judgement, in the first instance, merged.

This merging of the judgement coincides with the growth in *the determination of the copula*, which we have still to consider; the merging of the terms of the judgement and their transition into the copula is the same thing.—That is to say, in raising itself to universality, the subject has in this character become equated with the predicate, which as reflected universality also contains particularity within itself; subject and predicate are therefore identical; that is to say, they have collapsed into the copula. This identity is the genus, or the intrinsic and self-existent nature of a thing. In so far as this identity sunders itself again into a judgement, it is by their *inner nature* that subject and predicate are related to one another—a relation of *necessity* in which these terms have become merely inessential distinctions. *What belongs to all the individuals of a genus belongs to the genus by its nature* is an immediate inference, and the expression of what we have just witnessed, that the subject e. g. *all men* strips off its formal term and *man* is to be substituted for it.—This absolute nexus constitutes the foundation of a new judgement, *the judgement of necessity*.

C. THE JUDGEMENT OF NECESSITY.

The form into which universality has developed, is, as we have seen, the *intrinsic and self-existent* or *objective universality*, to which in the sphere of essence *substantiality* corresponds. The former differs from the latter in that it belongs to the *concept* and is therefore

not merely the *inner*, but also the *posited* necessity of the factors ; or, in other words, involves an immanent *opposition* ; whereas substance possesses its opposition only in its accidents, and not as a principle in itself.

Now in the judgement this objective universality is *posited* ; *first*, therefore, with this its essential determinateness immanent in it, *secondly*, with its determinateness opposed to it as a *particularity* of which the universality constitutes the substantial foundation. In this way it is determined as *genus* and *species*.

(a) *The Categorical Judgement.*

The genus *sunders* itself, or essentially repels itself into *species* ; it is genus only in so far as it comprehends species under it ; and the species is species only in so far as, on the one hand, it has a real existence in singulars, and, on the other hand, finds a higher universality in the genus.—Now the *categorical judgement* possesses such a universality for its predicate, and in that predicate the subject has its *immanent* nature. But the categorical judgement is itself the first or *immediate* judgement of necessity ; therefore the determinateness of the subject, whereby it is a particular or singular as against the genus or species, so far belongs to the immediacy of external existence.—But, similarly, the objective universality has here as yet only its *immediate* particularization ; hence, on the one hand, it is itself a determinate genus, in contrast to which there are higher genera ;—and on the other hand, it is not expressly the *proximate* genus, that is, its determinateness is not expressly the principle of the specific particularity of the subject. But what is *necessary* in it is the *substantial identity* of the subject and predicate, contrasted with which the special features, by which the former is distinguished from the latter, become merely an inessential positivity

—or, indeed, merely a name ; the subject is reflected in its predicate into its absolute existence.—A predicate of this kind should not be compared with the predicates of the preceding judgements. To throw, for instance, the judgements

	The rose is red
and	The rose is a plant
or	This ring is yellow
and	This ring is gold

into the one class, and to place such an external property as the colour of a flower on a par with its vegetable nature, is to overlook a distinction that must strike the most ordinary intelligence.—The categorical judgement, therefore, must be definitely distinguished from the affirmative and negative judgements ; in the latter what is predicated of the subject is a *single contingent* content, in the former the content is the totality of the self-reflected form. Accordingly the copula has here the signification of *necessity*, whereas in the others it merely signifies abstract immediate *being*.

The *determinateness* of the subject, which makes it a *particular* in contrast to the predicate, is in the first instance, a *contingency*; subject and predicate do not receive a necessary relation from the *form* or *determinateness*; the necessity, therefore, still appears as *inner* necessity.—But it is only as a *particular* that the subject is subject, and in so far as it possesses objective universality it must possess it essentially in respect of its primarily immediate determinateness. The objective universal, in *determining* itself, that is, in positing itself in the judgement, stands essentially in identical relation with its expelled *determinateness* as such ; that is to say, the determinateness must be posited as essential, and not as a mere contingency. It is only by this *necessity* of its immediate being that the categorical judgement conforms

to its objective universality; and in this way it has passed into the *hypothetical judgement*.

(b) *The Hypothetical Judgement.*

If A is, then B is; or, the being of A is not its own being, but the being of an opposite, namely, of B.—What is posited in this judgement is the *necessary connexion* of one immediate determinateness with another, a connexion not yet posited in the categorical judgement.—There are here *two* immediate real existences or external contingencies, of which in the categorical judgement there is, to begin with, only one, namely, the subject; but inasmuch as one is external to the other, this other is also immediately external to the first.—It follows from this immediacy, that the *content* of the two sides is still mutually indifferent; hence this judgement is in the first instance a proposition of empty form. Now, no doubt, the immediacy is *first*, as such, a self-dependent concrete *being*; but *secondly* the relation of this being is the essential thing; therefore the being appears no less as mere *possibility*; the hypothetical judgement involves, not *that A is*, or *that B is*, but only that *if one is, then the other is also*; only the interdependence of the extremes is posited as existent, not the extremes themselves. On the contrary, each extreme is posited in this necessity, as no less the *being of an opposite*.—The principle of identity affirms that A is only A, not B; and that B is only B, not A; in the hypothetical judgement, on the contrary, the being of finite things is posited by the concept in accordance with their formal truth, namely, that the finite is *its own* being, but nevertheless at the same time not *its own*, but the being of an opposite. In the sphere of being the finite *alters* and becomes its opposite; in the sphere of essence it is a *phenomenon*, and its being is posited as the *manifesta-*

tion of an opposite, and *necessity* is the *inner* relation not yet posited as such. But the meaning of concept is that this identity is *posited*, and that the existent is not abstract self-identity but *concrete* identity, and is immediately in itself the being of an opposite.

By employing the correlative modes of reflection the hypothetical judgement may be specialized into a relationship of *ground* and *consequence*, *condition* and *conditioned*, *causality*, &c. The nexus of causality appears in the hypothetical judgement, as did substantiality in the categorical, in its conceptual form. Causality and the other relationships all come under the hypothetical judgement; but here they no longer appear as relationships of *independent elements*, but these elements appear essentially as mere factors of one and the same identity.—Nevertheless, in the hypothetical judgement these factors are not yet opposed as one concept-mode to another, as singular or particular to universal, but so far only as *factors in general*. Thus the hypothetical judgement has rather the aspect of a proposition; just as the undistributed judgement is indeterminate in content, so the hypothetical is indeterminate in form, since its content is not determined as subject against predicate.—Yet since the being is the being of an opposite, for that very reason it is *intrinsically unity of itself and the opposite*, and consequently *universality*; at the same time, it is properly only a *particular*, since it is determinate, and in its determinateness is not purely self-related. But it is not the *simple* abstract particularity that is posited. On the contrary, through the *immediacy* which *each determinateness possesses*, the factors of the particularity appear as opposed; at the same time, through their unity, which constitutes their relation, the particularity also appears as their totality.—What is really posited, then, in this judgement is universality, as the

concrete identity of the concept, whose terms have no independent subsistence, but are only particularities posited in it. Thus it has become the *disjunctive judgement*.

(c) *The Disjunctive Judgement.*

In the categorical judgement the concept appears as objective universality and an external singularity. In the hypothetical judgement the concept in its negative identity emerges in this externality; through this identity the particulars obtain the same determinateness now posited in the disjunctive judgement, as they possess immediately in the hypothetical. The disjunctive judgement, therefore, is objective universality posited at the same time in union with the form. Accordingly, it contains *first* the concrete universality or the genus in a *simple* form, as the subject; *secondly*, the same universality, but now as the totality of its opposed particulars. A is either B or C. This is the *necessity of the concept*, in which *first* the identity of the two extremes is one and the same extent, content, and universality; and *secondly* these extremes are opposed according to the formal distinction of the concept-modes, yet in such wise that by reason of the aforesaid identity this distinction appears as a *mere form*. Thirdly, the objective universality appears for that reason as the self-reflected reality in contrast to the unessential form, as the *content*. This content, however, possesses in itself the determinateness of the form, and appears, now as the simple determinateness of the *genus*, now as the same determinateness evolved into its opposition;—thus it is the particularity of the *species*, and their *totality*, the universality of the genus.—The particularity in its evolution constitutes the *predicate*; for it is the *universal* to the extent that it contains the whole universal sphere

of the subject, and also contains it as distributed by particularization.

If we examine this particularization, we see *in the first place* that the genus constitutes the substantial universality of the species; the subject, therefore, is *both B and C*; this *both—and* denotes the *affirmative* identity of the particular with the universal; this objective universal maintains itself completely in its particularity. *In the second place* the species are *mutually exclusive*—A is *either B or C*; for they constitute the *determinate opposition* of the universal sphere. This *either—or* is their *negative* relation. Yet in this they are no less identical than in their affirmative relation; the genus is their *unity* as *determinate* particulars.—Were the genus an abstract universality, as in the judgements of existence. the species also would have to be taken merely as *distinct* and mutually indifferent; but the genus is not such external universality, the mere product of *comparison* and *omission*, but the immanent and concrete universality of the species.—An empirical disjunctive judgement lacks necessity; A is either B or C or D &c., because the species B, C, D, &c., have been *found to exist*. But, properly speaking, no *either—or* can be affirmed on these grounds; for species of this kind merely constitute, as it were, a subjective completeness; one *species* no doubt excludes the *other*; but *either—or* excludes *every further one*, and shuts off a whole sphere to itself. This totality has its *necessity* in the negative unity of the objective universal, which contains within itself singularity in solution, as a simple *principle* of opposition immanent in it, by which the species are *determined* and *related*. Empirical species, on the contrary, have the basis of their opposition in some contingency or other, which is an external principle, and therefore not *their* principle, and consequently, also

not the immanent determinateness of the genus. Hence in regard of their determinateness they are also not related to one another.—But it is through the *relation* of their determinateness, that the species constitute the universality of the predicate.—It is here, properly, that the so-called *contrary* and *contradictory* concepts should first find their place, for in the disjunctive judgement is posited the essential conceptual distinction between them. But in it they have at the same time found their truth also, namely, that the contrary and contradictory themselves stand both in contrary and contradictory opposition to each other. Species are contrary in so far as they are merely *distinct*, that is to say, in so far as they possess through the genus as their objective nature an intrinsic and self-existent subsistence; they are *contradictory* in so far as they exclude one another. But each of these characters taken by itself is one-sided and without truth; in the *either—or* of the disjunctive judgement their unity is posited as their truth, according to which the species' self-dependent subsistence, as *concrete universality*, is itself also the *principle* of the negative unity whereby they mutually exclude one another.

By the identity, just demonstrated, of subject and predicate in respect of the negative unity, the genus in the disjunctive judgement is determined as the *proximate*. This expression suggests, in the first place, a mere quantitative distinction of *more* or *less* properties possessed by a universal in relation to a particularity coming under it. From this point of view it remains contingent what is properly the proximate genus. In so far, however, as the genus is taken for a universal constructed merely by the omission of properties, so far it cannot properly construct a disjunctive judgement at all; for it is contingent whether it has retained the

determinateness that constitutes the principle of the *either—or*; in general, the genus would not be exhibited in the species according to its *determinateness*, and the species could only have a contingent completeness. In the categorical judgement the genus appears at first merely in this abstract form as against the subject; it is therefore not expressly the proximate genus to it, and is so far external. But when the genus has become concrete and essentially *determinate* universality, then in its simple determinateness it is the unity of the *concept-factors*, which are only merged in that simplicity, and have their real opposition in the species. A genus, accordingly, is the *proximate* genus of a species, when the specific difference of the species lies in the essential determinateness of the genus, and the species, as a whole, are defined by a principle of opposition that lies in the nature of the genus.

The point just considered constitutes the identity of subject and predicate from the aspect of *determinateness* in general; an aspect which has been posited by the hypothetical judgement, whose necessity is an identity of things immediate and distinct, and therefore essentially a negative unity. It is this negative unity in general that separates subject and predicate, but now it is itself posited as taking opposite forms; in the subject it appears as *simple* determinateness, in the predicate as *totality*. The separation of subject and predicate is the *opposition of the concept*; but the *totality* of the *species* in the predicate must likewise be the same opposition and *no other*.—The reciprocal *determination* of the *disjunctive* members is reached therefore in this way. It reduces itself to the opposition of the concept, for it is only the concept that disjoins itself, and reveals its negative unity in its modification. We should add that species is being here considered only in respect of its simple

conceptual determinateness, not in respect of the *embodiment* in which it has passed out of the idea into a further self-dependent *reality*; this latter is certainly *dropped* in the simple principle of the genus; but the *essential* differentiation must be a factor of the concept. The proper fact is that in the judgement here considered the concept's *own* development has now *posited* its disjunction; the very thing that we found, when considering the concept, to be its intrinsic and self-existent determination, its differentiation into determinate concepts.—Now, as the concept is the universal, the totality, alike affirmative and negative, of the particulars, it is *itself* for that very reason immediately *one of its disjunctive members*; while the *other* is this universality resolved into *its particularity*, or the determinateness of the concept *as determinateness*; the determinateness in which the universality exhibits itself as totality.—If the disjunction of a genus into species has not yet attained this form, this is a proof that it has not risen to the determinateness of the concept, and has not proceeded from the concept.—*Colour* is either violet, indigo blue, light blue, green, yellow, orange, or red;—the confusion and impurity, even from an empirical point of view, of such a disjunction as this, is immediately evident; from this aspect, to go no further, it must be termed barbarous. When colour has been conceived as the *concrete unity* of bright and dark, this *genus* possesses in it the *determinateness* which constitutes the *principle* of its particularization into species. But of these species one must be the absolutely simple colour which contains the opposition in equipoise, and confined within its intensity and negated; in contrast to which there must present itself the direct opposition of the relationship between bright and dark, to which must be added, as it is the case of a natural phenomenon, the indifferent neutrality of the

opposition.—To take for species mere mixtures, such as violet and orange, and mere differences of degree, such as indigo blue and light blue, can only have its foundation in a wholly unthinking procedure that shows too little reflection even for empiricism.—The further diverse and more definite forms which may belong to disjunction, as it occurs in the sphere of nature or of mind, this is not the place to discuss.

In the first instance, the disjunctive judgement possesses the members of the disjunction in its predicate ; but it is no less disjunct itself ; its subject and predicate are the members of the disjunction ; they are factors of the concept, posited in their determinateness, but at the same time as identical ; *identical* (a) in the objective universality, which appears in the subject as the simple *genus*, and in the predicate as the universal sphere, and as the totality of the concept-factors, and (b) in the *negative* unity, the evolved nexus of necessity, by which the *simple determinateness* in the subject has branched into the *opposition of the species*, and appears in this very opposition as their essential relation and self-identity.

This unity, the copula of this judgement, into which the extremes have collapsed through their identity, is consequently the concept itself, and, moreover, the concept *as posited* ; the mere judgement of necessity has thereby risen into the *judgement of the concept*.

D. THE JUDGEMENT OF THE CONCEPT.

The wit to pass *judgements of existence*, such as *the rose is red*, snow is white, &c., can hardly pass for a proof of great judging powers. The *judgements of reflection* are rather *propositions* ; in the judgement of necessity the object no doubt appears in its objective universality, but it is only in the judgement now to be considered that *its relation to the concept is given*. In this judgement the

concept is laid down as the basis, and, as it stands in relation to the object, it appears as an *ideal* to which reality may or may not be adequate. It is only a judgement of this kind that involves a true act of appreciation; the predicates *good, bad, true, beautiful, right, &c.*, express that the thing is *measured* by the standard of its universal *concept*, as the absolutely presupposed *ideal*, and is, or is not, in *harmony* with it.

The judgement of the concept has been called the judgement of *modality*, and it is commonly supposed to contain the form of relationship that the relation of subject and predicate bears in an *external understanding*, and to be concerned with the value of the copula only *in relation to thinking*. According to this view, the *problematical* judgement is where the affirmation or denial is regarded as *optional* or *possible*; the *assertorical*, where it is regarded as *true*, that is, *actual*; and the *apodeictical*, where it is regarded as *necessary*.—It is easily seen why it is so natural in the case of this judgement to pass out of the judgement itself, and to regard its significance as something merely *subjective*. For it is here that the concept or subjectivity reappears in the judgement, and stands in relationship to an immediate actuality. But this subjectivity must not be confused with *external reflection*, which of course is also something subjective, but in a different sense from the concept; on the contrary, the concept, which re-emerges from the disjunctive judgement, is the direct opposite of a mere *peculiarity*. The earlier judgements are in this sense merely subjective, for they rest on an abstraction and one-sidedness, in which the concept is lost. The judgement of the concept, on the contrary, is objectivity and truth as against those earlier judgements, just because it has for its foundation the concept, —not the concept in external reflection, or in *relation*

to a subjective or contingent *thinking*, but the concept in its quality as concept.

In the disjunctive judgement the concept was posited as the identity of the universal nature with its particularization ; thereby the relationship of the judgement was merged. The *concretion* of universality and particularization is, to begin with, a simple result ; it has now further to develop itself to totality, since the factors which it contains are at first lost in it, and do not as yet oppose one another in determinate self-dependence.—The defect of the result may be more precisely expressed by saying that in the disjunctive judgement, although the objective *universality* has become complete *in its particularization*, yet the negative unity of the latter only returns *into the former*, and has not yet determined itself to the third factor, namely, to *singularity*.—Yet inasmuch as the result itself is *negative unity*, it is indeed already this *singularity* ; but, as such, it is only this *one* determinateness, which has now to *posit* its negativity, sunder itself into the *extremes*, and in this manner finally evolve itself *into the syllogism*.

The proximate diremption of this unity is the judgement in which it is posited first as subject, as an *immediate singular*, and then as predicate, as the determinate relation of its factors.

(a) *The Assertorical Judgement.*

The judgement of the concept is at first *immediate* ; as such, it is the *assertorical* judgement. The subject is a concrete singular in general, while the predicate expresses the same thing as the *relation* of its *actuality*, determinateness, or *constitution* to its *concept*. (This house is *bad*, this action is *good*.) More precisely, therefore, it involves (a) that the subject *ought* to be something ; its *universal nature* has posited itself as the self-dependent

concept. And (b) it involves *particularity*, which, not only on account of its immediacy, but also on account of its express differentiation from its self-dependent universal nature, appears as a *constitution* and *external existence*; and owing to the self-dependence of the concept, this external existence is indifferent on its side to the universal, and may or may not be conformable to it.—This constitution is the *singularity* which lies beyond the necessary *determination* of the universal in the disjunctive judgement, a determination which only shows as the particularization of the *species*, and as the negative *principle* of the genus. Thus the concrete universality which has issued from the disjunctive judgement is sundered in the assertorical judgement into the form of *extremes*, to which the concept itself as the *posited* unity that relates them is still lacking.

The judgement is therefore as yet only *assertorical*; its *verification* is a subjective *assurance*. That something is good or bad, right or wrong, proper or improper, &c., finds its connecting link in an external *tertium*. But to say that this connexion is *externally posited* is the same as to say that as yet it is only *intrinsic* or *internal*.—When a thing is good or bad, &c., no one, of course, is going to suppose that it is only good, say, in the *subjective consciousness* while in itself perhaps bad; or that good and bad, right, proper, &c., are not predicates of the objects themselves. Accordingly, the mere subjectivity of the assertion of this judgement consists in this, that the *intrinsic* connexion of the subject and predicate is not yet *posited*; or, what is the same, that it is merely *external*; the copula is still an immediate, *abstract being*.

Consequently, the assurance of the assertorical judgement finds itself confronted with equal right by its contradictory. When one is assured that *this action is*

good, the opposite assurance, that *this action is bad*, has equal justification.—Or, looking at it *intrinsically*, since the subject of the judgement is the *immediate singular*, in this abstraction it does not yet possess posited in it the *determinateness* that should contain its relation to the universal concept. Thus it is still a contingency, which may, or again may not, conform to the concept. The judgement is therefore essentially *problematical*.

(b) *The Problematical Judgement.*

The *problematical* judgement is the assertorical in so far as this latter must be taken both affirmatively and negatively.—From this qualitative aspect the *undistributed* judgement is likewise a *problematical* one, for it holds good both affirmatively and negatively; similarly, in the *hypothetical* judgement the being of the subject and predicate is *problematical*. Also it is posited by the undistributed and hypothetical judgements that the singular and categorical are as yet merely subjective. But in the *problematical* judgement, as such, this positing is more immanent than in the judgements just mentioned, because in it *the content of the predicate is the relation of the subject to the concept*, and consequently in this case *the determination of the immediate as a contingent is itself given*.

In the first instance, it merely appears as *problematical* whether the predicate is to be coupled with a certain subject or not, and so far the indeterminateness falls on the copula. This cannot yield any determination for the *predicate*, for this is already the objective concrete universality. The *problematical* element therefore affects the immediacy of the *subject*, which is hereby determined as a *contingency*.—But, further, we must not for that reason abstract from the singularity of the subject; if it were purged of its singularity in general, it

would be merely a universal; the predicate involves precisely that the concept of the subject is to be posited in relation to its singularity.—We cannot say: *the house or a house is good, but: according to its constitution.*—The problematical nature of the subject in itself constitutes the *factor* of its *contingency*; the *subjectivity* of the *fact*, as opposed to its objective nature or to its concept, the mere peculiarity or *constitution*.

Hence the *subject* itself is differentiated into its universality or objective nature, its *ideal*, and the particular constitution of its existence. Thus it contains the *ground* of its *being, or not being, adequate to its ideal*. In this way it has become equated with the predicate.—The *negativity* of the problematical element, as directed against the immediacy of the *subject*, signifies accordingly only this original sundering of the subject, which is already *intrinsically* the unity of the universal and particular, *into these its factors*—a sundering which is the judgement itself.

It may further be remarked that each of the *two* sides of the subject, its concept and its constitution, may be called its *subjectivity*. The *concept* is the self-retired universal essence of a fact, its negative unity with itself; this constitutes its subjectivity. But a fact is also essentially *contingent*, and possesses an *external constitution*; this may no less be termed its mere subjectivity in contrast to its former objectivity. The very meaning of a fact is just this, that its concept, as the negative unity of itself, negates its universality, and projects itself into the externality of singularity.—The *subject* of the judgement is here posited in this twofold aspect. The above contradictory significations of subjectivity are in their truth united in one thing.—The signification of the subject has itself become problematical in consequence of its *having lost* the immediate *determinateness* which

it possessed in the immediate judgement, and its determinate and direct *opposition* to the *predicate*.—This contradictory signification of subjective, which occurs even in the ratiocination of ordinary reflection, might of itself at least admonish us that the truth of the subjective does not lie in *one* of these significations. The twofold signification is the manifestation of the truth that each when taken separately is one-sided.

When the problematical element is thus posited as a problematical element in the *fact*, as the fact with its *constitution*, then the judgement itself is no longer problematical, but *apodeictical*.

(c) *The Apodeictical Judgement.*

The subject of the apodeictical judgement (the house constituted so and so is *good*, the action *constituted* so and so is *right*) contains *first* the universal or what it *should be*, and *secondly* its *constitution*. This latter contains the *ground*, why a predicate of the concept-judgement applies, or does not apply, to *the whole subject*, that is, whether the subject corresponds to its concept or not.—This judgement, then, is *truly* objective; or it is *the truth of the judgement* in general. Subject and predicate correspond and have the same content, and this *content* is itself the posited *concrete universality*; that is to say, it contains the two factors, the objective universal or the *genus*, and the *singularized* universal. Here, therefore, we have the universal which is *itself*, and continues itself through *its counterpart*, and is only universal through its *unity* with this counterpart.—A universal such as the predicate good, proper, right, &c., has an *ideal* at its basis, and contains at the same time the *correspondence of existence* with that ideal. Not that ideal or the genus by itself, but *this correspondence* is the

universality that constitutes the predicate of the apodeictical judgement.

The *subject* likewise contains these two factors in *immediate* unity as the *fact*. But it is the truth of the fact, that it is internally *rent* into its *ideal* and its *being*; this is the *absolute judgement on all actuality*.—Because this original sundering, which is the omnipotence of the concept, is at the same time a return into its unity, and an absolute relation of ideal and being to one another, the actual becomes a *fact*; its inner relation, this concrete identity, constitutes the *soul* of the fact.

The transition from the immediate simplicity of the fact to the *correspondence* which is the *determinate* relation of its ideal and its being—or, in other words, the *copula*—is now seen on closer scrutiny to lie in the particular *determinateness* of the fact. The genus is the *intrinsic and self-existent* universal, which, as such, appears as the unrelated; whereas determinateness is the element in that universality which, while it reflects *into itself*, at the same time reflects *into an opposite*. The judgement therefore has its *ground* in the constitution of the subject, and is consequently *apodeictical*. Hence we have now before us the *determinate* and *pregnant copula*, which consisted formerly in the abstract *is*, but has now developed into the *ground* in general. It appears in the first instance as an *immediate* determinateness in the subject, but is no less the *relation* to the predicate, which has no other *content* than this very *correspondence*, or the relation of the subject to the universality.

Accordingly the form of the judgement has passed away; first, because subject and predicate are *intrinsically* the same content; secondly, because the subject through its determinateness points out beyond itself and relates to the predicate; and yet again thirdly, *this relation* has crossed over into the predicate, alone con-

stitutes its content, and so is the *posited* relation or the judgement itself.—Thus the concrete identity of the concept, which was the *result* of the disjunctive judgement, and which constitutes the *inner* foundation of the judgement of the concept—which identity was posited in the first instance only in the predicate—has now been restored *in the whole*.

If we scrutinize the positive element of this result, which effects the transition of the judgement into another form, we find, as we have seen, that the subject and predicate in the apodeictical judgement appear each as the whole concept.—The *unity* of the concept, as the *determinateness* constituting the copula that relates them, is at the same time *distinct* from them. In the first instance it stands only on the side of the subject, as its *immediate constitution*. But, inasmuch as it is essentially the *relating element*, it is not merely such an immediate constitution, but the *universal* that *permeates* subject and predicate.—While subject and predicate have the same *content*, the *formal relation*, on the other hand, is posited by this determinateness; *determinateness as a universal*, or *particularity*.—Thus it contains within itself the two formal terms of the extremes, and is the *determinate* relation of subject and predicate. It is the *pregnant or significant copula* of the judgement, the unity of the concept that has once again emerged from the *judgement*, where it had been lost in the extremes.—*By this impregnation of the copula* the judgement has become the *syllogism*.

THIRD CHAPTER

THE SYLLOGISM.

WE have found the *syllogism* to be the restoration of the *concept* in the *judgement*, and consequently the unity and truth of both. The concept as such holds its factors merged in *unity*; in the judgement this unity is internal or, what is the same thing, external, and the factors, though doubtless related, are posited as *self-dependent extremes*. In the *syllogism* the modes of the concept appear as the extremes of the judgement, and at the same time their determinate *unity* is posited.

Thus the syllogism is the completely posited concept; it is therefore the *rational*.—The understanding is regarded as the faculty of the *determinate* concept, confined to its *isolation* by abstraction and the form of universality. But in reason the *determinate* concepts are posited in their *totality* and *unity*. Therefore not only is the syllogism rational, but *everything rational is a syllogism*. The syllogistic process has been from ancient times ascribed to the reason; yet on the other hand we speak of reason in the absolute and of rational principles and laws in such a way, that it is not clear what is the connexion between the former reason which syllogizes and the latter reason which is the source of laws and other eternal verities and absolute thoughts. If the former be taken to be the formal reason, and the latter to be creative of content, then according to this distinction the *form* of reason, the syllogism, is precisely what must not be lacking in the latter. Nevertheless, to such an extent are the two commonly held apart, and

each ignored in the presence of the other, that it looks as though the reason of absolute thoughts was ashamed of the reason of the syllogism, and as though it was only in deference to tradition that the syllogism was also adduced as an operation of reason. Yet it is manifest, as has just been remarked, that the logical reason, if it is regarded as the *formal* reason, must essentially be recognizable also in the reason which is concerned with the content; nay, rather, no content can be rational save through the rational form. Although reason is a commonplace of everyday discourse, we cannot expect any help from that quarter; for everyday discourse refrains from stating what the term *reason* really signifies. This sort of cognition, which is by way of being rational, is mostly so busy with its objects that it forgets to cognize reason itself, and only distinguishes and characterizes it by the objects that it possesses. If we are told that reason is the cognition that knows about God, freedom, right, and duty, the infinite, unconditioned, supersensuous, or, as it may be, merely gives representations and feelings of these objects, then, for one thing, these latter are merely negative objects, and, for another thing, the first question still remains quite open, what it is in all those objects in virtue of which they are rational.—It is this, that the infinitude of these objects is not the empty abstraction from the finite, not the void and indeterminate universality, but the pregnant universality, the concept which is *determinate* and possesses its determinateness in this true way, that it differentiates itself within itself, and appears as the unity of these self-dependent and determinate factors of its opposition. It is only thus that reason *rises* above the finite, conditioned, sensuous—term it what you will—and is in this negativity essentially *pregnant with content*, for it is the unity of determinate extremes; as such, however, *the rational* is nothing but *the syllogism*.

Now the syllogism, like the judgement, is, to begin with, *immediate*; thus each of its terms (*termini*) is a *simple abstract* determinateness; in this form it is the *syllogism of the understanding*. If we stop at this phase of the syllogism, the rationality in it, though no doubt present and posited, is still inapparent. The essential feature of the syllogism is the *unity* of the extremes, the *middle* and supporting *ground* that unites them. Abstraction, in maintaining the *self-dependence* of the extremes, opposes this *unity* to them as a determinateness no less fixed and *self-existent*, and in this way apprehends it rather as *non-unity* than as unity. The expression *middle* (*medius terminus*) is borrowed from spatial representation, and contributes its share to the fact that one stops short at the *mutual externality* of the terms. Now if the essence of the syllogism is that the *unity of the extremes* is *posited* in it, and if, nevertheless, this unity is simply regarded on the one hand as an independent particular, and on the other hand as mere external relation, and non-unity is made the essential relationship of the syllogism, then the reason which constitutes this syllogism leaves us a long way from rationality.

First, the *syllogism of existence*, in which the terms are thus immediately and abstractly determined, demonstrates in itself (since, like the judgement, it is their *relation*) that they are *not* such abstract terms, but that each is the *relation to the other*, and that the middle is not merely particularity in opposition to the extreme terms, but contains these *posited* in it.

By this dialectic of its own it converts itself into the *second* syllogism, the *syllogism of reflection*, with terms of a kind in which essentially the *opposite shows*, or which are posited as *mediated*—which they purport to be from the nature of the syllogism in general.

Thirdly, in that this *manifestation* or mediacy reflects

into itself, the syllogism is determined as the *syllogism of necessity*, wherein the mediating element is the objective nature of the fact. As this syllogism determines the extremes of the concept no less as totalities, the *syllogism* has attained to the correspondence of its concept or the middle and its existence or the opposed extremes; that is, it has attained to its truth, and in so doing has passed out of subjectivity into *objectivity*.

A. THE SYLLOGISM OF EXISTENCE.

I. The syllogism in its *immediacy* has for its factors the modes of the concept as *immediate*. Hence they are the abstract particulars of the form, which are not yet developed by mediation into *concretion*, but stand *single* and distinct. The *first* syllogism, therefore, is the *formal* one in the proper sense of the term. The *formalism* of the syllogizing process consists in halting at the phase of this first syllogism. The concept, sundered into its *abstract* factors, has *singularity* and *universality* for its extremes, and appears itself as the *particularity* standing between them. On account of their immediacy they appear each as a merely self-related determinateness, and every one of them a *single content*. Particularity constitutes the middle in the first instance, since it unites in itself *immediately* the two factors of singularity and universality. On account of its determinateness it is, on the one hand, subsumed under the universal, while, on the other hand, the singular, as against which it possesses universality, is subsumed under it. But this *concretion* is in the first instance merely a *duality of aspect*; on account of the immediacy in which the middle term presents itself in the immediate syllogism, it appears as *simple* determinateness, and the *mediation* which it constitutes is *not yet posited*. The dialectical movement, then, of the syllogism of existence

consists in the positing in its factors of the mediation that alone constitutes the syllogism.

(a) *First Figure of the Syllogism.*

S—P—U is the general schema of the determinate syllogism. Singularity closes with universality by means of particularity; the singular is not universal immediately, but through the medium of particularity; and conversely, the universal is not immediately singular, but descends to singularity through particularity.—These terms are opposed to one another as *extremes*, and are united in a third that is *distinct* from each of them. They are both determinateness; in that they are *identical*; this their common determinateness is *particularity*. But they are no less *extremes* against this particularity than they are against one another, since each appears in its *immediate* determinateness.

The general signification of this syllogism is that the singular, which as such is infinite relation to self and consequently would be merely *internal*, emerges by means of particularization into *existence*, as into universality, in which it no longer belongs to itself alone, but stands in *external connexion*; conversely, the ~~singular~~ ^{universal} in separating itself into its determinateness as particularity, has become in this sundering a concrete, and, as the relation of the determinateness to itself, a self-related *universal*, and consequently also a true singular; in the extreme of universality it has retreated out of externality *into itself*.—The objective significance of the syllogism is only *superficially* given in the first syllogism, since the terms are not yet posited as the unity which constitutes the essence of the syllogism. It is still subjective to the extent that the abstract signification possessed by its terms is not thus isolated in the absolute nature of

things, but only in the subjective consciousness.—We may add that the relationship of singularity, particularity, and universality is, as we have seen, the *necessary and essential form-relationship* of the terms of the syllogism ; the defect consists not in this determinateness of the form, but in the fact that *under this form* each single term is not at the same time *richer*.—Aristotle has confined himself rather to the mere relationship of *inherence*, in stating the nature of the syllogism as follows : *When three terms so stand to one another, that one extreme is in the whole of the middle term and the middle term is in the whole of the other extreme, then these two extremes are necessarily united in a conclusion.* What is here expressed is rather the mere repetition of the *like* relationship of inherence between one extreme and the middle, and again between the middle and the other extreme, than the relative determinateness of the three terms.—Now, as the syllogism rests on the above stated determinateness of the terms as against one another, it is immediately evident that other relationships of the terms, which are given by other figures, can only possess validity as syllogisms of the understanding, in so far as they can be *reduced* to that original relationship ; they are not *distinct species* of figures standing *alongside the first* ; on the one hand, in so far as they purport to be correct syllogisms, they rest solely on the essential form of the syllogism in general, which is the first figure ; on the other hand, in so far as they deviate from it, they are transformations into which that first abstract form necessarily passes, thereby developing itself and advancing to totality. We shall see presently the details of this process.

S—P—U is accordingly the general schema of the syllogism in its determinateness. The singular is subsumed under the particular, and the particular under the universal ; therefore the singular is also subsumed

under the universal. Or, the particular inheres in the singular, and the universal in the particular; *ergo* the universal also inheres in the singular. In one aspect, namely in relation to the universal, the particular is subject; in relation to the singular it is predicate; in other words, in relation to the former it is a singular, in relation to the latter a universal. Since both characters are united in it, the extremes are brought together by this their unity. The *ergo* appears as the inference that has taken place in the *subject*, an inference deduced from *subjective* insight into the connexion of the two *immediate* premisses. As subjective reflection enunciates the two relations of the middle to the extremes as particular and indeed immediate *judgements* or *propositions*, the conclusion, as the *mediated* relation, is also of course a particular *proposition*, and the *therefore* or *ergo* is the expression of the fact that it is the mediated one. This *ergo*, however, is not to be regarded as a qualification attaching externally to this proposition, and only having its ground and place in subjective reflection; but, on the contrary, as grounded in the nature of the extremes themselves, whose *relation*, again, is expressed as a *mere judgement* or *proposition* only for the behoof of, and by means of, abstracting reflection, but whose *true relation* is posited in the middle term.—That *therefore* *S is U* is a *judgement*, is a mere subjective circumstance; the very meaning of the syllogism is that this is not merely a *judgement*, i. e. not a relation effected by the *bare copula* or the empty *is*, but one effected by the determinate pregnant middle.

Consequently, to regard the syllogism merely as consisting of *three judgements* is a formal view that ignores the relationship of the terms, with which alone the syllogism is concerned. It is altogether a mere subjective reflection that sunders the relations of the

terms into separate premisses and a conclusion distinct from them :—

All men are mortal
Caius is a man
Therefore Caius is mortal.

The moment we hear the step of a syllogism of this kind, we are seized with a feeling of boredom—the result of this unprofitable form, which by means of the separate propositions presents a semblance of diversity that immediately dissolves in the reality. It is mainly in consequence of this subjective form that the syllogistic process has the appearance of a subjective *makeshift* to which the reason or understanding resorts in cases where it cannot cognize *immediately*.—The nature of things, the rational, most certainly does not go to work by first framing for itself a major premiss, the relation of a particular to a subsisting universal, and then secondly providing itself with a separate relation of a singular to the particular, out of which, thirdly and lastly, a new proposition comes to light.—This syllogizing, that proceeds through separate propositions, is nothing but a subjective form ; the nature of the fact is that the different concept-modes are united in their essential unity. This rationality is not a makeshift ; on the contrary, in contrast to the *immediacy* of relation which still obtains in the *judgement* it is *objectivity* ; and the former immediacy of cognition is rather the mere subjective, whereas the syllogism is the truth of the judgement.—All things are *syllogism*, a universal conjoined with singularity by means of particularity ; but, to be sure, they are not a whole consisting of *three propositions*.

2. In the *immediate* syllogism of the understanding the terms have the form of *immediate determinations* ; and we have now to consider it from this point of view,

in which they are a *content*. In this respect it may be regarded as the *qualitative* syllogism, just as the judgement of existence possesses the same aspect of qualitative determination. Hence each term of this syllogism, like the terms of that judgement, is a *single* determinateness; the determinateness being posited through its relation to self as indifferent to the *form*, and consequently as content. The *singular* is any immediate concrete object; the *particular* a single one of its attributes, properties, or aspects: the *universal*, again, a still more abstract, more singular, determinateness in the particular.—Since the subject is *immediately* determined, and is therefore not yet posited in its concept, its concretion is not yet reduced to the essential modes of the concept; its self-related determinateness is therefore indeterminate, infinite *multiplicity*. In this immediacy the singular possesses an infinite number of attributes that belong to its particularity, each one of which therefore can constitute a middle term for it in a syllogism. But by *every different* middle term it is united *with a different universal*; by each of its properties it stands in a different context and nexus of existence.—Further, the middle term is also a concrete in comparison with the universal; it contains several predicates itself, and the singular can again be united through the same middle term with several universals. In general, therefore, it is *altogether contingent* and *arbitrary*, which of the many properties of a thing is taken as a starting-point to connect it with a predicate; different middle terms constitute transitions to different predicates, and even the same one middle term may be a transition to divers predicates, since, as a particular in contrast to the universal, it contains several attributes.

But not only is an indefinite number of syllogisms equally possible for one subject, and not only is a single

syllogism *contingent* in respect of its content, but these syllogisms that concern the same subject must also pass into *contradiction*. For opposition in general, which in the first instance is indifferent *diversity*, is no less essentially *direct opposition*. The concrete is no longer a mere phenomenon, but is concrete through the unity in the concept of direct opposites that have determined themselves to factors of the concept. Now, when, in accordance with the qualitative nature of the terms in the formal syllogism, the concrete is apprehended in respect of a single one of the attributes which belong to it, the syllogism assigns to it the predicate corresponding to this middle term; as however from another point of view a syllogism leads to the opposite determinateness, the former conclusion is shown to be false, although, taken by themselves, its premisses and also its inference are perfectly correct.—If from the middle term, that a wall has been painted blue, one infers that therefore the wall is blue, this is a correct syllogism; yet, in spite of this syllogism, the wall may be green, if it has also been coated with yellow, from which latter circumstance, taken by itself, it would follow that it was yellow.—If from the middle term, sensibility, we infer that man is neither good nor evil, because neither one nor the other can be predicated of the sensible, the syllogism is correct, but the conclusion is false; because of man, as the concrete, the middle term of spirituality is equally valid.—From the middle term of the gravitation of planets, satellites, and comets towards the sun it follows correctly that these bodies fall into the sun; yet they do not fall into it, because they are no less independent centres of gravity for themselves, or are, as the phrase is, impelled by centrifugal force. Similarly, from the middle term of sociality we may deduce the community of goods among citizens; whereas the middle

term of individuality, if pursued with like abstractness, leads to the dissolution of the state, as has resulted, for example, in the German Empire from keeping to the latter middle term.—A formal syllogism of this kind is reasonably held to be unsatisfactory to the last degree, since it depends on chance or whim which middle term is employed. However elegantly a deduction of this kind has run the course of its syllogisms, however fully its correctness is conceded, nevertheless it leads absolutely to nothing, since the fact always remains that there are still other middle terms, from which the exact opposite can be deduced with equal correctness.—All that the Kantian *antinomies* of reason amount to is that from a concept first one attribute is laid down as principle, and afterwards with equal necessity the opposite one.—In these cases the blame of the insufficiency and contingency of a syllogism must not be shifted merely on the content, as though this fault were independent of the form, and the form alone were the concern of logic. On the contrary, it lies in the form of the formal syllogism that the content is a one-sided quality of this kind; it is determined to this one-sidedness by the *abstract* form just given. That is to say, the content is a single quality of the many qualities or attributes of a concrete subject or conception, because *the form requires* that it should be nothing more than such an immediate single determinateness. The extreme of singularity, as *abstract singularity*, is the *immediate* concrete, and therefore the infinitely or indefinitely manifold; the middle is the no less *abstract particularity*, and consequently a *single one* of these manifold qualities; and, similarly, the other extreme is the *abstract universal*. Therefore it is essentially on account of its form that the formal syllogism is wholly contingent in point of content; and contingent not merely in the sense that it is

contingent for the syllogism whether *this* or *another* object be submitted to it—from this content logic abstracts—but, when a subject is laid down, it is contingent what attributes of content the syllogism shall infer from it.

3. In their aspect as immediate, abstract, and self-reflected, the terms of the syllogism are terms of content. But their essential nature, on the contrary, is that they are not such self-reflected, mutually indifferent terms, but *formal terms*; as such they are essentially *relations*. These relations are, *first*, those of the extremes to the middle—relations that are *immediate*; the *propositiones praemissae*, and, more exactly, the *propositio major*, or the relation of the particular to the universal, and the *propositio minor*, or the relation of the singular to the particular. *Secondly*, we have the relation of the extremes to one another, which is the *mediated* relation or *conclusion*. The former *immediate* relations or premisses are propositions or judgements in general, and *contradict the nature of the syllogism*, according to which the different modes of the concept are not immediately related, but their unity should likewise be posited; the truth of the judgement is the syllogism. All the less can the premisses remain immediate relations since their content consists of immediately *opposed* terms, and they are therefore not immediately identical by their own very nature—except they be purely identical propositions, i. e. empty tautologies that lead to nothing.

Hence we hear it commonly demanded of the premisses that they shall be *proved*, i. e. that *they likewise shall be presented as conclusions*. In this way the two premisses yield two further syllogisms. But these *two* new syllogisms again yield between them *four* premisses which demand *four* new syllogisms; these have *eight* premisses, whose *eight* syllogisms again yield *sixteen*

sylogisms for their *sixteen* premisses, and *so on* in a geometrical progression *to infinity*.

Thus there emerges here again the *progress to infinity* which appeared before in the humble *sphere of being*, and which in the province of the concept, of the absolute self-reflection out of the finite, in the domain of free infinity and truth, we had no longer any reason to expect. It has been shown in the sphere of being that, whenever we come upon the spurious infinity that runs into a progress, there is present the contradiction of a *qualitative being* and an *ineffectual demand* that goes beyond it; the progress itself is the repetition of the requirement for unity, that has stepped in to oppose the qualitative, and of the persistent lapse into the limit inadequate to that requirement. Now in the formal syllogism the *immediate* relation or the qualitative judgement is the foundation, and the *mediation* of the syllogism is what is posited as the higher truth in contrast thereto. The progress to infinity in proving the premisses does not solve this contradiction, but only renews it perpetually, and is the repetition of one and the same original defect.—On the contrary, the truth of the infinite progress consists in the merging of that progress itself, and of the form which it has already determined to be defective.—This form is that of the mediation S—P—U. The two relations S—P and P—U are to be mediated; if this is effected in the same way, the defective form S—P—U is merely duplicated, and so on to infinity. P has to S also the formal character of a *universal* and to U the formal character of a *singular*, because these relations are in general judgements. Hence they require mediation: but mediation of the kind before us only re-introduces the relationship that has to be merged.

The mediation then must be effected in another way.

For the mediation of P—U we have S available; the mediation, therefore, must take the form P—S—U. To mediate S—P, U is available; this mediation, therefore, becomes the syllogism S—U—P.

Let us scrutinize this transition in the light of its concept. In the *first* place, the mediation of the formal syllogism is, as has been shown, *contingent* in respect of its *content*. The immediate *singular* possesses in its attributes an indefinable multitude of middle terms, and these in their turn possess a like multitude of qualities in general; so that it lies entirely in an external *choice*, or generally in an *external circumstance* and contingent decision, with what universal the subject of the syllogism shall be united. Consequently the mediation is in point of content neither necessary nor universal; it is not grounded in the *concept* of the *fact*; on the contrary, the *ground* of the syllogism is the external element in the fact, i. e. the *immediate*; but among the concept-modes the immediate is the *singular*.

In regard to the *form*, likewise, the *mediation* has for its *presupposition immediacy of relation*; therefore the mediation is itself mediated, and mediated by the *immediate*, i. e. the *singular*.—More precisely, the *conclusion* of the first syllogism has made the singular the mediating element. The conclusion is S—U; thereby the *singular* is posited as *universal*. In one premiss, the minor S—P, it already appears as *particular*; consequently, it appears as that in which these two characters are united.—To put it otherwise, the conclusion by its own very nature expresses the singular as a universal; and that, too, not in an immediate fashion, but through mediation; consequently as a necessary relation. *Simple* particularity was the middle term; in the conclusion this particularity is *posited* in its *evolved* nature, as the *relation of the singular and universality*.

But the universal is still a qualitative determinateness, or predicate of the *singular*; in being determined as universal, the singular is *posited* as the universality of the extremes or as middle; taken by itself it is the extreme of singularity, but, since it is now determined as universal, it is at the same time the unity of the two extremes.

(b) *The Second Figure. P—S—U.*

1. The truth of the first qualitative syllogism is that something is united with a qualitative determinateness as a universal, not in its own absolute nature, but through a contingency, or in a singularity. In such a quality the *subject* of the syllogism has not returned into its concept, but is conceived merely in its *externality*; immediacy constitutes the ground of the relation, and consequently the mediation; thus the singular is in truth the middle.

But, further, the syllogistic relation is the *merging* of immediacy; the conclusion is not an immediate relation, but relation through a *tertium*; it involves, therefore, a *negative* unity; accordingly the mediation is now determined as involving a *negative* factor.

In this second syllogism the premisses are P—S and S—U. Only the former of these premisses is still immediate; the second S—U is already mediated, namely, by the first syllogism. The second syllogism, therefore, presupposes the first; just as, conversely, the first presupposes the second.—The two extremes are here distinguished as particular and universal; thus the latter still holds its *place*; it is predicate; but the particular has changed its place, it is subject, or *posited in the character of the extreme of singularity*, just as the *singular is posited in the character of middle*, or of particularity. Both are, therefore, no longer the abstract

immediacies that they were in the first syllogism. Nevertheless they are not yet posited as concretes; in standing in the *place* of the other, each is posited in its own proper character, and at the same time, though only *externally*, in the character of its *opposite*.

The *definite* and *objective meaning* of this syllogism is that the universal is not *in its own absolute nature* a determinate particular—for, on the contrary, it is the totality of its particulars—but is such and such a *one* of its species *through the medium of singularity*; the rest of its species are excluded from it through immediate externality. On the other hand, the particular likewise is not immediately and by its own very nature the universal, but the negative unity strips off its determinateness, and thereby raises it to universality.—The singularity stands in a *negative* relationship to the particular, so far as being its predicate is concerned; it is *not* predicate of the particular.

2. But in the first instance the terms are still immediate qualities; they have not yet developed of themselves to any objective significance; the altered *position* which two of them hold is the form, which as yet is merely externally attached to them; in general, they are, therefore, still as in the first syllogism a mutually indifferent content; two qualities that are coupled, not in their own absolute nature, but by means of a contingent singularity.

The syllogism of the first figure was the *immediate* syllogism or, as we may say equally well, the syllogism in its concept as *abstract form* that has not yet realized itself in its terms. The transition of this pure form into another figure means, on the one hand, the first step in the realization of the concept, inasmuch as the *negative* factor of mediation, and thereby a further determinateness of form, is posited in the previously immediate,

qualitative determinateness of the terms.—But, at the same time, it means an alteration of the pure form of the syllogism; the syllogism no longer corresponds perfectly to this pure form, and the determinateness posited in its terms is different from its original formal character.—Regarded merely as a subjective syllogism proceeding in an external reflection, it passes for a *species* of syllogism, which ought to correspond to the genus, namely, to the general schema $S-P-U$. But, to begin with, it does not correspond to this schema; its two premisses are $P-S$ or $S-P$ and $S-U$; hence the *medius terminus* is both times subsumed, or both times the subject, in which accordingly the two other terms inhere. Consequently it is not a middle; for a middle should once subsume or be predicate, and once be subsumed or subject, or one of the terms should inhere in it, while it itself inheres in the other.—To say that this syllogism does not correspond to the general form of the syllogism is true in this sense, that the general form has passed into this syllogism, inasmuch as the truth of that form consists in its being a subjective contingent act of conclusion. If the conclusion in the second figure (that is, without taking advantage of the limitation to be mentioned presently, which renders it indeterminate) is correct, it is so because it is so in itself, not because it is the conclusion of this syllogism. But the same is the case with the conclusion of the first figure; it is this, its truth, that is posited by the second figure.—In the view of the second figure as merely a *species* the necessary transition of the first form into the second is overlooked, and the first form is adhered to as the true one. Consequently, if we are to have in the second figure (which from ancient custom is quoted without further reason as *the third*) a syllogism *correct* in this subjective sense, it must be

conformable to the first; hence, as one premiss S—U has the relationship of the subsumption of the middle term under one extreme, it must be possible to invert the relationship of the other premiss P—S, and to subsume P under S. But a relation such as this would be the merging of the determinate judgement S is P, and could only occur in an indeterminate, that is, in an undistributed judgement; therefore the conclusion in this figure can only be undistributed. But the undistributed judgement, as remarked above, is as much negative as affirmative—a conclusion to which consequently no great value can be assigned.—Inasmuch, too, as the particular and universal are the extremes, and are immediate, mutually indifferent attributes, their relationship is itself indifferent; either can be taken at choice as major or minor term, and hence, too, either premiss as major or minor premiss.

3. The conclusion, being equally affirmative and negative, is a relation indifferent to these attributes, consequently a *universal* relation. More precisely, the mediation of the first syllogism was *intrinsically* a contingent one; in the second, this contingency is *posited*. Thus it is a mediation that merges itself; the mediation has the character of singularity and immediacy; what is united by this syllogism must, on the contrary, be *intrinsically* and *immediately* identical; for the middle before us, *immediate singularity*, is infinitely manifold and external determinateness. In it, therefore, is rather posited the mediation that is *external* to itself. But the externality of singularity is universality; the above mediation through the immediate singular points out beyond itself to the mediation that is *its opposite*, which therefore is effected by the *universal*.—In other words, what is to be united by the second syllogism must be conjoined *immediately*; the *immediacy* on which this

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syllogism is based cannot bring about a determinate conclusion. The immediacy to which it points is the opposite of its own—the merged primary immediacy of being—accordingly, the self-reflected or *intrinsically existent* immediacy, the *abstract universal*.

From the point of view that we have considered, the transition of this syllogism was an *alteration* like the transition of being, since the qualitative element, and, indeed, immediate singularity, lies at its basis. But from the standpoint of the concept, singularity unites the particular and universal by *merging* the *determinateness* of the particular. Here we are presented with the contingency of this syllogism; the extremes are not brought together by the determinate relation which they bear to the *medius terminus*; this term is, therefore, *not* their *determinate unity*, and the positive unity which does belong to it is only *abstract universality*. But the positing of the middle in this character, which is its truth, means a new form of the syllogism.

(c) *The Third Figure. S—U—P.*

1. This third syllogism does not contain a single immediate premiss; the relation S—U has been mediated by the first syllogism, the relation P—U by the second. Hence it presupposes the first two syllogisms; but, conversely, they both presuppose it, as in general each of the three presupposes the other two. In this figure, therefore, the whole determination of the syllogism is completed.—This reciprocal mediation involves precisely that each syllogism, though independently mediation, is, nevertheless, not in itself the totality of mediation, but contains an immediacy whose mediation lies outside it.

The syllogism S—U—P regarded in itself is the truth

of the formal syllogism. It expresses that the mediation of the formal syllogism is abstractly universal mediation, and that the extremes are not contained in the middle in respect of their essential determinateness, but only in respect of their universality; and that, therefore, the syllogism precisely fails to unite what was to be mediated. Here then is posited what constitutes the formalism of the syllogism whose terms have an immediate content indifferent to the form, or, what is the same thing, are formal terms such as have not yet reflected themselves into terms of content.

2. The middle of this syllogism is indeed the unity of the extremes, but a unity in which abstraction is made of their determinateness; it is the *indeterminate* universal. But since this universal is at the same time distinguished as the abstract from the extremes as the *determinate*, it is itself a *determinate* in contrast to them, and the whole is a syllogism that we have to consider in its standing to its concept. The middle, as the universal, is the subsuming term or predicate to *both* its extremes, and does not occur once as subsumed or subject. If, therefore, it is required, as a *species* of the general syllogism, to correspond to this latter, the necessary condition of such correspondence is that, whereas one relation S—U already possesses the proper relationship, the other relation U—P should admit it also. This happens in a judgement in which the order of subject and predicate is indifferent, that is, in a *negative* judgement. In this way the syllogism becomes legitimate, but the conclusion necessarily negative.

Thus it is here again indifferent which of the two terms of the conclusion is taken as predicate or subject, and which of them is taken in the syllogism as extreme of singularity or extreme of particularity, therefore, as major or minor term. Since hereon depends, on the common

assumption, which of the premisses is to be major and which minor, this too has become a matter of indifference here.—This is the ground of the ordinary *fourth figure* of the syllogism, which Aristotle did not recognize, and which in any case is concerned with a wholly empty and trifling distinction. In it the immediate position of the terms is the *reverse* of their position in the first figure. Since the subject and predicate of the negative conclusion, in the formal view of the judgement, have not the definite relationship of subject and predicate, but either can take the place of the other, it is indifferent which term be taken as subject and which as predicate; and, therefore, equally indifferent which premiss be taken as major and which as minor.—This indifference, assisted as it is by the quality of undistributedness (especially when it is observed that this can be taken in the comprehensive sense) renders the so-called fourth figure a pure futility.

3. The objective significance of the syllogism in which the universal is the middle is that the mediating element, as unity of the extremes, is *essentially a universal*. As, however, the universality is in the first instance merely qualitative or abstract universality, the determinateness of the extremes is not contained in it; their conjunction, if it is to be effected, must again have its ground in a mediation lying outside this syllogism, and is in respect of this latter just as contingent as in the case of the preceding figures. But, now, since the universal is determined as the middle, and the determinateness of the extremes is not contained in it, this middle is posited as a completely indifferent and external one.—Following first the line of this naked abstraction, we have as a result what we may certainly call a *fourth figure* of the syllogism, namely, the syllogism of *indifference*, U—U—U, which abstracts from the qualitative opposition of the terms, and consequently has for its distinctive

character their merely external unity or, in other words, their *equality*.

(d) *The Fourth Figure: U—U—U, or
The Mathematical Syllogism.*

1. The statement of the mathematical syllogism is :—
If two things or terms are equal to a third, they are equal to each other.—Here the relationship of inherence or subsumption of the terms is effaced.

The mediating factor is a *tertium* in general ; but it has absolutely no distinctive character as against its extremes. Each of the three can therefore equally well be the mediating *tertium*. Which is to be used for this purpose, and which of the three relations, therefore, are to be taken as the immediate, and which as the mediated, depends on external circumstances and alien conditions, namely, on which two of them are the immediate *data*. But this denomination does not affect the syllogism itself, and is completely external.

2. The mathematical syllogism passes in mathematics for an *axiom*—for a *self-evident, primitive proposition*, that neither admits nor requires any proof, i.e. any mediation, that presupposes nothing else, and can be deduced from nothing else.—If its prerogative of being immediately *evident* be scanned more closely, it will be seen that it lies in the formalism of this syllogism, which abstracts from all qualitative distinction of the terms, and only adopts their equality or inequality. For this very reason, however, it is not without presupposition, or unmediated; the quantitative character, which is the only thing regarded in it, has its being only *through abstraction* from qualitative difference and from the modes of the concept.—Lines or figures affirmed to be equal to one another are thought only in respect of their magnitude ; a triangle is

affirmed to be equal to a square, but not as triangle to square, but only in regard to magnitude. Similarly, the concept and its modes do not enter into this syllogizing, which is not an act of *conception* at all. Nay, the understanding has not before it even the formal abstract modes of the concept; and the self-evidence of this syllogism rests merely on the fact of its poverty of definite thought, and its abstractness.

3. But the *result of the syllogism of existence* is not merely this abstraction from all definite conception; the *negativity* of the immediate abstract terms, which was a consequence of that syllogism, has yet another *affirmative* side, namely, that the abstract determinateness has had *its opposite posited* in it, and has thereby become *concrete*.

In the first place, the syllogisms of existence one and all mutually *presuppose* one another, and the extremes united in the conclusion are only really and truly united in so far as they are *otherwise* united by an identity that has its ground elsewhere. The middle term, as it is constituted in the syllogisms that we have considered, *purports* to be their conceptual unity, but is only a formal determinateness that is not yet posited as their concrete unity. But this presupposition of each one of those mediations is not merely a *given immediacy* in general, as in the mathematical syllogism, but is itself a mediation, that is, for each of the two other syllogisms. Therefore, what we have really got is not mediation founded on a given immediacy, but mediation founded on mediation. Consequently, this is not quantitative mediation that abstracts from the form of mediation, but rather *the mediation that relates to mediation*, or the *mediation of reflection*. The circle of reciprocal presupposition that these syllogisms form between them is the return into itself of this act of presupposition, which

forms a totality therein, so that the *opposite* to which each single syllogism points is no longer placed by abstraction *without*, but is embraced *within*, the circle.

Further, in regard to the *single formal terms*, it has been seen that in this entirety of the formal syllogisms each single term has taken in turn the *place of middle*. Immediately the middle was determined as *particularity*; subsequently it determined itself through dialectical movement as *singularity* and *universality*. Similarly each of these terms passed through the *places of the two extremes*. *The merely negative result* is the extinction of the qualitative formal terms in the merely quantitative mathematical syllogism. But what we have really got is the *affirmative result* that mediation is not effected by a *single* qualitative determinateness of form, but by their *concrete identity*. The defect and formalism of the three syllogistic figures above examined consists just in this, that a single determinateness of this kind purported to constitute their middle.—Thus mediation has determined itself as the indifference of the immediate or abstract formal terms, and as their affirmative *reflection* into one another. The immediate syllogism of existence has thereby passed into the *syllogism of reflection*.

NOTE.

In the account here given of the nature of the syllogism and its different forms, incidental reference has been made to what in the common treatment and examination of the syllogism constitutes the main interest, namely, how a correct conclusion may be obtained in each figure; in those references, however, only the main points have been given, and the various cases and complexities which arise, when we drag in the distinction of affirmative and negative judgements, besides their quantitative determination, especially un-

distributedness—have been left unnoticed.—A few remarks on the ordinary view and treatment of the syllogism in logic will be in place here.—It is a matter of common knowledge that this doctrine was elaborated into such *minutiae*, that in the end its so-called subtilities have become the object of universal dislike and disgust. The *natural understanding*, in asserting itself in all directions of mental culture against the insubstantial forms of reflection, directed itself also against this artificial knowledge of the forms of reason, and supposed itself capable of dispensing with such a science on the ground that the several operations of thought were already performed by itself naturally in virtue of its own powers, and without any special instruction. In truth, if the necessary condition of rational thinking was the laborious study of the syllogistic formulae, mankind would be as badly off in that respect as they would be (as already remarked in the preface) in another respect, if they could not walk and digest without having studied anatomy and physiology. Granting that the study of those sciences may not be without benefit for the regulation of one's diet, the study of the forms of reason must certainly be credited with a still more weighty influence on the correctness of one's thinking. But without entering here on this aspect of the matter, which concerns the education of the subjective thinking and, therefore, properly speaking, paedagogic science, every one must admit that the study which has for its object the laws of reason and the methods of her operation must be of the greatest interest in its own very nature—of an interest at least not inferior to that which attends an acquaintance with the laws of nature and her particular formations. If it is not thought a slight thing to have discovered sixty odd species of parrots, one hundred and thirty-seven species of veronica, &c., much less must it be

thought a slight thing to discover the forms of reason. Is not a figure of the syllogism an infinitely higher thing than a species of parrot or veronica ?

A general contempt, therefore, for the knowledge of the forms of reason is to be regarded as mere barbarism. Nevertheless we are equally bound to grant that the ordinary account of the syllogism and its particular formations is not a *rational* cognition, not an exposition of them as *forms of reason*, and that syllogistic wisdom has brought upon itself by its own unworthiness the contempt that has been its lot. Its defect consists in its confining itself absolutely to the *understanding's form* of the syllogism, in which the modes of the concept are taken as *abstract* formal terms. It is all the more inconsequent to maintain them as abstract qualities, since in the syllogism it is their *relations* that constitute the essential feature, and inherence and subsumption already involve that the singular, since the universal inheres in it, is itself a universal, and that the universal, since it subsumes the singular, is itself a singular ; and, more precisely, the syllogism explicitly posits this very *unity* as the *middle*, and the character of the syllogism is expressly *mediation*, which means that the modes of the concept no longer have for their foundation, as in the judgement, their relative externality, but rather their unity.—Thus the concept of the syllogism declares the imperfection of the formal syllogism, in which the middle is not the unity of the extremes, but is kept as a formal abstract term qualitatively distinct from them.—The treatment of the subject is rendered still more futile by the fact that even relations or judgements of a kind in which the very formal terms become indifferent—as in the negative and undistributed judgement—and which, therefore, approximate to mere propositions, are yet taken as perfect relationships.—Then, as

the qualitative form S—P—U is generally accepted as ultimate and absolute, the dialectical treatment of the syllogism entirely drops out, and as a result the remaining syllogisms are regarded not as *necessary alterations* of that first form, but as *species*.—In this case it is indifferent whether the first formal syllogism itself is regarded merely as a species *alongside* the others, or as *genus* and species at the same time; the latter is the case in so far as the other syllogisms are reduced to the first. If this reduction is not expressly effected, yet there is always an implication of the same formal relationship of external subsumption which is expressed by the first figure.

This formal syllogism involves the self-contradiction that the middle, which purports to be the determinate unity of the extremes, does not appear as this unity, but as a term qualitatively distinct from those extremes whose unity it purports to be. Because the syllogism involves this self-contradiction, it is inherently dialectical. Its dialectical movement presents it in the entire factors of the concept, and shows that, not only the above relationship of subsumption or particularity, but *no less essentially* negative unity and universality are factors in the act of conclusion. In so far as each of these again, taken by itself, is merely a one-sided factor of particularity, they are likewise imperfect middles, but at the same time they constitute the evolved determinations of the middle; the complete course through the three figures presents the middle successively in each of these characters, and the true result that arises from it is that the middle is not a single concept-mode, but the totality of them all.

The defect, therefore, of the formal syllogism lies not in the *form of the syllogism*—which, on the contrary, is the form of rationality—but in the fact that the form appears

as merely *abstract* and therefore irrational form. It has been shown that the abstract term, on account of its abstract relation to self, may equally be regarded as content; in this respect the formal syllogism only serves to show that a relation of a subject to a predicate follows or does not follow *solely from this middle term*. Nothing is gained in having proved a proposition by a syllogism of this kind; on account of the abstract determinateness of the middle term, which is an irrational quality, there may be just as well other middle terms from which the direct opposite follows; nay, from the same middle term contradictory predicates may in turn be deduced by further syllogisms.—Besides being of little service, the formal syllogism is also a very simple thing; the numerous rules that have been invented are vexatious, if it were only that they contrast so strongly with the simple nature of the fact, but also for the further reason, that they relate to the cases where the formal significance of the syllogism is furthermore diminished by the external form-determination, notably undistributedness (especially as it must for this purpose be taken in a comprehensive sense), and where even in respect of form nothing but empty results can be deduced.—However, the most merited and most important side of the disfavour into which syllogistic doctrine has fallen is that this doctrine is such an *unreasoning* labouring of an object whose sole content is *reason* or the *concept* itself.—The multifarious syllogistic rules remind us of the procedure of the arithmeticians, who similarly give a crowd of rules concerning arithmetical operations, all of which rules presuppose that one has not the *concept* of the operation.—But numbers are an irrational material and the operations of arithmetic consist in an external colligation or separation, a mechanical procedure—as indeed calcu-

lating machines have been invented which perform these operations ; whereas it is the unkindest cut of all when the formal terms of the syllogism, which are concepts, are treated as a material destitute of conception.

It is surely the last extremity of this irrational treatment of the concept-modes of the syllogism, that Leibniz (Opp. Tom. ii. p. 1) has subjected the syllogism to the calculus of combinations and permutations, and has reckoned thereby how many positions of the syllogism are possible—that is to say, with reference to the distinction of affirmative and negative, also of universal, undistributed, indeterminate, and singular judgements. There are found to be 2048 such combinations that are possible ; of which, after the exclusion of the invalid figures, there remain twenty-four that are legitimate.—Leibniz makes a great deal of the usefulness of the analysis of combinations in ascertaining not only the forms of the syllogism, but also the combinations of other concepts. The operation by which this is ascertained is the same by which it is calculated how many combinations of letters an alphabet allows of, how many throws are possible in a game of dice, how many kinds of play with an ombre card, &c. Thus we find the terms of the syllogism put in the same class with the points of the die and the ombre card, the rational regarded as an inanimate and unintelligent thing, and the peculiar characteristic of reason and its modes *to relate themselves* as spiritual essences, and by this relation to *merge* their *immediate* character, ignored.—This application by Leibniz of the calculus of combinations and permutations to the syllogism and to the combination of other concepts differed from the decried *Art of Lully* solely in being more methodical than the latter from the *arithmetical* point of view, while equalling it in its general absurdity.—Connected herewith was a favourite idea of Leibniz, which he embraced in his youth, and which in

spite of its immaturity and shallowness he did not relinquish even in later life, the idea of a *characteristica universalis* of concepts—a notation in which each concept would be represented as a relation proceeding from others, or in its relation to others—as though in rational combination, which is essentially dialectical, a content still preserved the same characters which it possesses when rigidly isolated.

The *calculus of Ploucquet* has beyond doubt seized the most consistent method by which the relationship of the syllogism is capable of being subjected to a calculus. It rests upon the abstraction from differences of relationship, from the opposition of singularity, particularity, and universality in the judgement, and upon the strict maintenance of the *abstract identity* of subject and predicate, whereby they stand in a *mathematical equation*—a relation which reduces the syllogizing process to a meaningless and tautological formulation of propositions.—In the proposition *the rose is red* the predicate on this view does not denote the universal red, but only the determinate *red of the rose*; in the proposition *all Christians are men* the predicate on the same view denotes only those men who are Christians; from this latter proposition and the proposition *the Jews are not Christians* we infer the conclusion (which did not particularly commend this syllogistic calculus to Mendelssohn) *therefore the Jews are not men* (that is to say, not the men that the Christians are).—Ploucquet states as a consequence of his discovery—‘*posse etiam rudes mechanicè totam logicam doceri, uti pueri arithmeticam docentur, ita quidem, ut nulla formidine in ratiociniis suis errandi torqueri, vel fallaciis circumveniri possint, si in calculo non errant.*’—This recommendation, that by means of the calculus the whole of logic can be mechanically brought within reach of the uneducated, is surely the worst thing that can be

said of an invention bearing on the exposition of logical science.

B. THE SYLLOGISM OF REFLECTION.

The course of the qualitative syllogism has merged the *abstract* nature of its terms ; the term has thereby posited itself as a determinateness in which the opposite determinateness also *shows* itself. The syllogism contains, besides the abstract terms, also their *relation*, and this relation is posited in the conclusion as a mediated and necessary one ; therefore each determinateness is in truth posited not as a single and separate one, but as a relation to its opposite, that is, as a *concrete* determinateness.

In the previous syllogism the middle was abstract particularity, a simple and separate determinateness, and only a middle externally and relatively to the self-dependent extremes. Now it is posited as the *totality* of the terms ; as such, it is the *posited* unity of the extremes, but, in the first instance, it is the unity of reflection, which embraces them within itself—an embrace which, as the *first* merging of immediacy and the first relating of the terms, has not yet become the absolute identity of the concept.

The extremes are the terms of the judgement of reflection ; *singularity* proper and *universality* as a connective determination or a reflection embracing a manifold within itself. But the singular subject, as we have seen in the case of the judgement of reflection, contains, besides the bare singularity which belongs to the form, determinateness as absolutely self-reflected universality, as presupposed, i. e. still immediately assumed, *genus*.

From this determinateness of the extremes, which depends on the progressive determination of the judge-

ment, may be seen the precise content of the *middle*, which is the term of essential import in the syllogism, since it distinguishes syllogism from judgement. It contains (1) *singularity*, but (2) singularity extended to universality as *all*, (3) the basal universality that absolutely unites within itself singularity and abstract universality—in other words, the *genus*.—Thus the syllogism of reflection is the first that possesses the *proper determinateness* of form, in that the middle is *posited* as the totality of the terms; the immediate syllogism, on the contrary, is *indeterminate*, because the middle is still abstract particularity, in which the factors of its concept are not yet posited.—This first syllogism of reflection may be called the *syllogism of complete extension*.

(a) *The Syllogism of Complete Extension.*

1. The syllogism of complete extension is the syllogism of understanding in its perfection, but is as yet nothing more. That the middle in it is not *abstract* particularity, but has evolved into its factors, and is therefore concrete, is no doubt an essential requisite for the concept; but the form of *complete extension* as yet gathers the singular only externally into universality, and, conversely, it retains the singular as something possessing immediate and independent subsistence in the universal. The negation of the immediacy of the terms, which was the result of the syllogism of existence, is only the *first* negation, and not yet the negation of negation or absolute reflection into self. Therefore the single terms still underlie the universality of reflection that embraces them within itself;—or, complete extension is not yet the universality of the concept, but the external universality of reflection.

The syllogism of existence was contingent because its middle term, as a single determinateness of the concrete

subject, admits of an indefinite multitude of other such middle terms and, therefore, the subject might be syllogistically united with indefinitely opposed and even contradictory predicates. But as the middle now contains the *singularity*, and is thereby itself concrete, it can only connect the subject with a predicate which belongs to it as concrete.—If, for example, we were to infer from the middle term *green* that a picture was pleasing because green is pleasing to the eye, or that a poem or building was beautiful, because it possessed *regularity*, the picture, &c., might all the same be ugly on account of other properties from which this latter predicate might be inferred. When, however, the middle term has the character of *complete extension*, it contains the greenness or regularity as *a concrete*, which is, therefore, not the abstraction of a mere green or regular entity; with this *concrete*, then, only those predicates can be connected which are conformable with *the totality of the concrete*.—In the judgement *the green or regular is pleasing*, the subject is merely the abstraction of green, or regularity; in the proposition *all green or regular things are pleasing*, the subject, on the contrary, consists of all actual concrete objects that are green or regular; which objects, therefore, are taken as *concretes* with *all their properties* that they possess besides the greenness or the regularity.

2. Yet this reflective perfection of the syllogism renders it *ipso facto* a mere illusion. The middle term has the determinateness *all*; to the all is *immediately* attached in the major premiss the predicate that is to be united to the subject in the conclusion. But *all* are *all singulars*; in the major premiss, therefore, the singular subject already possesses immediately the predicate in question, and *does not obtain it first through the syllogism*.—To put it otherwise, the subject obtains through the

conclusion a predicate as a consequence; but the major premiss already contains this conclusion within itself; *the major premiss, therefore, is not correct on its own account*, or, in other words, is not an immediate presupposed judgement, but *itself presupposes the conclusion* whose ground it purported to be.—In the favourite perfect syllogism—

All men are mortal
But Caius is a man
Ergo Caius is mortal

the major premiss is only correct because and in so far as the *conclusion is correct*; were Caius possibly not mortal, the major premiss would not be correct. The proposition which purported to be conclusion must already be immediately correct on its own account, since otherwise the major premiss could not contain all singulars; before the major premiss can be accepted as correct, there is the *previous* question whether the conclusion itself may not be an *instance* against it.

3. In the case of the syllogism of existence we found from the concept of the syllogism that the premisses as *immediate* contradicted the conclusion, that is to say, the *mediation* demanded by the conception of the syllogism; and that, consequently, the first syllogism presupposed others, and these others conversely presupposed the first. In the syllogism of reflection we find posited in the syllogism itself that the major premiss presupposes its conclusion, in that the former involves that connexion of the singular with a predicate which purports to appear only as conclusion.

What we have really got, then, may in the first instance be expressed by saying that the syllogism of reflection is only an empty external *semblance of the syllogistic process*—that, consequently, the essence of this syllogizing rests on subjective *singularity*, and that,

therefore, this latter constitutes the middle and is to be posited as such—the singularity that is singularity as such, and only possesses universality externally.—To put it otherwise, we saw from the precise content of the reflective syllogism that the singular stands to its predicate in a relation that is *immediate*, and not inferred, and that the major premiss, the connexion of a particular with a universal, or, more precisely, of a formal universal with an intrinsic universal, is mediated by the relation of singularity which is present in the former—singularity as complete extension. But this is the *syllogism of induction*.

(b) *The Syllogism of Induction.*

1. The syllogism of complete extension comes under the schema of the first figure S—P—U ; the syllogism of induction under that of the second figure U—S—P, as it has again singularity for its middle, not *abstract* singularity but singularity as *complete*, that is to say, posited along with its opposite term, universality.—*One extreme* is some predicate or other that is common to all these singulars ; its relation to them constitutes immediate premisses, like what purported to be the conclusion in the preceding syllogism.—The *other extreme* may be the immediate *genus*, as it is found in the middle of the preceding syllogism, or in the subject of the distributed judgement ; which immediate genus is exhausted in all the individuals or species of the middle taken together. Accordingly the syllogism takes the shape :—

s
U—s—P
s
s
ad
infinitum.

2. The second figure of the formal syllogism U—S—P failed to correspond to the schema, because S which constitutes the middle was not the subsuming term or predicate in either of the premisses. In induction this defect is removed; the middle is here *all singulars*; the proposition U—S, which contains as subject the objective universal or genus separated off so as to form an extreme, possesses a predicate that is at least of equal extent with the subject, and hence for external reflection is identical with it. The lion, elephant, &c., constitute the *genus* of the quadruped; the difference, that *the same* content is posited now in singularity, now in universality, is accordingly a mere *indifferent distinction of form*—an indifference which is the result of the formal syllogism posited in the reflective syllogism, and is here posited through the equality of extension.

Induction, therefore, is not the syllogism of mere *perception*, or of contingent existence, like the corresponding second figure, but the syllogism of *experience*—of the subjective gathering together of singulars into the genus, and of the syllogistic conjunction of the genus with a universal determinateness, because this determinateness is found in all the singulars. This syllogism has also the objective significance that the immediate genus determines itself through the totality of singularity to a universal property, and has its existence in a universal connexion or mark.—However, the objective significance of this, as of the other syllogisms, is so far only its inner conception, and is not yet posited here.

3. On the contrary, induction is still essentially a subjective syllogism. The middle consists of the singulars in their immediacy, and the gathering of them into the genus by means of the complete extension is an *external* reflection. On account of the subsisting *imme-*

diacy of the singulars, and their consequent *externality*, the universality is merely completeness or remains rather a *problem*.—Consequently the *progress* to the spurious infinity comes to light again here; the *singularity* ought to be posited as *identical* with the *universality*, but, inasmuch as the singulars are no less posited as *immediate*, the unity in question remains a perennial *obligation*; it is a unity of *equality*; the terms that are to be identical, are at the same time *not* to be so. It is only when carried on to *infinity* that the a, b, c, d, e constitute the genus, and give the completed experience. Thus the *conclusion* of induction remains *problematical*.

In so far, however, as induction expresses the demand that perception, in order to become experience, must be pursued *to infinity*, it presupposes that the genus is *in its own intrinsic nature* united with its determinateness. Hence, properly speaking, it rather assumes its conclusion as an immediacy, just as the syllogism of complete extension presupposes its conclusion for one of its premisses.—An experience that rests on induction is regarded as valid, *although* the perception is confessedly *incomplete*; but the assumption that no *instance* can arise *to contradict* that experience is only possible on the supposition that the experience is true *in its own intrinsic nature*. The syllogism by induction, therefore, though indeed founded on immediacy, is not founded on that immediacy on which it purported to be, on the *existing* immediacy of *singularity*, but on the *intrinsic and self-existent immediacy of the universal*.—The fundamental character of induction is that it is a syllogism; if the singularity is taken as essential, while the universality is taken merely as an external qualification of the middle, the middle would fall asunder into two unconnected parts, and we should have no syllogism at all; this externality belongs rather

to the extremes. It is only as *immediately identical* with *universality* that *singularity* can be the middle ; such a universality is properly *objective* universality or *genus*.— This may also be looked at in this way : in the term of singularity that forms the basis of the middle of induction, universality is *external but essential* ; but an *external* of this kind is just as immediately its direct opposite, the *internal*.—The truth, therefore, of the syllogism of induction is a syllogism that has for its middle a singularity that is immediately and *intrinsically* universality ; this is the *syllogism of analogy*.

(c) *The Syllogism of Analogy.*

1. This syllogism has for its abstract schema the third figure of the immediate syllogism : S—U—P. But its middle is no longer any random single quality, but a universality that is the *self-reflection* and hence the *nature of a concrete* ; and, conversely, since it is thus the universality *of a concrete*, it is at the same time in itself this *concrete*.—Thus the middle is here a singular, but a singular taken in its universal nature ; further, there is another singular as extreme, possessing the same universal nature with the former. For example :—

The Earth is inhabited

The Moon is *an Earth*

Therefore the Moon is inhabited.

2. Analogy is the more superficial, the more the universal, in which the two singulars are one, and according to which one becomes the predicate of the other, is a mere *quality*, or (to take the subjective view of quality) some *mark* or other, the identity of the two therein being regarded as a mere *resemblance*. Superficiality of this kind, however, to which a form of the understanding or reason is brought by being degraded into the sphere of mere *representation*, should not be

recognized in logic at all.—Also it is improper to represent the major premiss of this syllogism as though it should run: *that which resembles an object in certain marks resembles it in others also*. By so doing the *form of the syllogism* is expressed in the shape of a content, while the empirical content, the content properly so called, is relegated to the minor premiss. In the same way the whole form, e. g. of the first figure, might be expressed as its major premiss: *that which is subsumed under some other thing in which a third inheres has also that third inherent in it; now and so forth*. But the syllogism itself is not concerned with the empirical content, and it is a matter of perfect indifference whether we convert its proper form into the content of the major premiss, or adopt any other empirical content for the purpose. But if we should insist that the syllogism of analogy is not concerned with the former content, which contains nothing but the peculiar form of the syllogism, then the first syllogism would not be concerned with it either, that is to say, would not be concerned with what makes the syllogism a syllogism.—The real concern is always the form of the syllogism, whether it have the form itself, or something else, for its empirical content. Thus the syllogism of analogy is a peculiar form, and it is an inane reason for refusing to regard it as such, that its form can be made into the content or matter of a major premiss, whereas logic is not concerned with the matter.—What may lead to this misunderstanding in the case of the syllogism of analogy, and perhaps also in the case of the syllogism of induction, is that in them the middle and the extremes also are further determined than in the merely formal syllogism, and, therefore, the formal determination, since it is no longer simple and abstract, must appear also as a *determination of content*. But this self-determination of the form to

content is, in the first place, a necessary advance of the formal syllogism, and therefore essentially concerns the nature of the syllogism itself: and therefore, *secondly*, a concept-determination of this kind cannot be put in the same class with an empirical content, nor can abstraction be made from it.

When we consider the form of the syllogism of analogy in the above statement of its major premiss, namely, that *if two objects agree in one or more properties, then a further property which one possesses belongs to the other also*, it may seem that this syllogism possesses *four terms*, the *quaternio terminorum*,—a circumstance which would entail the difficulty of bringing analogy into the form of a formal syllogism.—There are *two* singulars, *thirdly* a property immediately assumed as common, and *fourthly* the other property which one singular immediately possesses, and the other obtains first through the syllogism.—This arises from the fact that, as already seen, *the middle* is posited in the analogical syllogism as singularity, but immediately *also* as the singular's true universality.—In *induction*, besides the two extremes, the middle is an indefinable crowd of singulars; in this syllogism, therefore, we should have to reckon an infinite multitude of terms.—In the syllogism of complete extension universality appears in the middle merely as the external form-qualification of complete extension; in the syllogism of analogy, on the contrary, as essential universality. In the above example, the middle term *the earth* is taken as a concrete that, in its truth, is as much a universal nature or genus as a singular.

From this point of view the *quaternio terminorum* does not, as was supposed, render analogy an imperfect syllogism. Yet it does so from another aspect. For although one subject has the same universal nature as the other,

yet it is undetermined whether the determinateness which is inferred for the second subject belongs to the first by virtue of its *nature*, or by virtue of its *particularity*; whether, for instance, it is as a cosmic body *in general*, or only as this *particular* cosmic body, that the earth is inhabited.—Analogy is still a syllogism of reflection to the extent that singularity and universality are united *immediately* in its middle. On account of this immediacy we have still got the *externality* of reflective unity. The singular is only *intrinsically* the genus, it is not posited in that negativity by which its determinateness would appear as the determinateness proper to the genus. Therefore the predicate which belongs to the singular of the middle is not already predicate of the other singular, although both belong to the one genus.

3. S—P (the Moon is inhabited) is the conclusion; but one premiss (the Earth is inhabited) is a similar S—P; the fact that S—P is to be a conclusion involves the demand that the said premiss be one also. Hence this syllogism is inherently the demand for the syllogism itself against the immediacy which it contains; in other words, it presupposes its conclusion. A syllogism of existence has its presupposition in the *other* syllogisms of existence; in the case of the syllogisms just examined the presupposition has migrated within them, since they are syllogisms of reflection. As, then, the syllogism of analogy is the demand for its own mediation against the immediacy with which its mediation is burdened, it is the factor of *singularity* whose merging it demands. Thus there remains for middle the objective universal, the *genus* purged of its immediacy.—In the syllogism of analogy the genus was a factor of the middle only as *immediate presupposition*; inasmuch as the syllogism itself demands the merging of the presupposed immediacy, the negation of the singularity, and consequently

the universal, is no longer immediate but *posited*.—The syllogism of reflection involved only the *first* negation of immediacy; the second has now appeared on the scene, and with it the external universality of reflection has developed into intrinsic and self-existent universality. —Regarded from the affirmative side, the conclusion turns out identical with the premiss, the mediation fused with its presupposition, and thus we have an identity of the reflective universality by which it has passed into a higher universality.

Glancing over the course of the syllogisms of reflection, we see that the mediation is in general the *posited* or *concrete* unity of the formal determinations of the extremes; the reflection consists in this positing of one determination in the other; thus the mediating element is the *complete extension*. But *singularity* appears as the essential ground of this complete extension, and universality merely adds an external qualification to it as its *completeness*. Universality, however, is *essential* to the singular, if the singular is to be a uniting middle; therefore the singular must be taken as *intrinsically* universal. But the singularity is not united with universality in this mere affirmative manner, but is merged in it, and a negative factor; thus the universal is the intrinsic and self-existent, the posited genus, and the singular as immediate is in fact the externality of the genus, or in other words, it is an *extreme*.—The syllogism of reflection taken in general comes under the schema P—S—U, in which the singular as such is the essential character of the middle; in so far, however, as its immediacy has merged itself, and the middle has determined itself as intrinsic and self-existent universality, the syllogism has entered under the formal schema S—U—P, and the syllogism of reflection has passed into the *syllogism of necessity*.

C. THE SYLLOGISM OF NECESSITY.

The mediating factor has now determined itself (1) as *simple* determinate universality, like the particularity in the syllogism of existence; but (2) as *objective* universality, that is to say, universality that contains the complete determinateness of the opposed extremes, like the complete extension of the reflective syllogism; a *pregnant* yet *simple* universality—the *universal nature* of the thing, the *genus*.

This syllogism *possesses content*, since the *abstract* middle of the syllogism of existence has posited itself into the *determinate opposition* in which it appears as middle of the reflective syllogism, while this opposition has again reflected itself into simple identity.—This syllogism is, therefore, the *syllogism of necessity*, since its middle is not some alien immediate content, but the self-reflection of the determinateness of the extremes. These possess in the middle their inner identity, the determinations of whose content are the formal determinations of the extremes.—Hence the opposition between the terms appears as an *external* and *inessential* form, and the terms themselves as factors of *one necessary* existence.

In the first instance this syllogism is immediate, and so far formal that the *connexion* of the terms is the *essential nature as content*, and this content appears in the opposed terms, only in a *diverse form*, and the extremes in themselves appear merely as an *inessential* subsistence.—The realization of this syllogism has so to determine it, that the *extremes* shall also be *posited* as this *totality* which initially the middle is, and that the *necessity* of the relation, which, to start with, is only the substantial *content*, shall be a relation of the *posited form*.

(a) *The Categorical Syllogism.*

1. The categorical syllogism has the categorical judgement for one, or both, of its premisses.—With this syllogism, as with the corresponding judgement, is here associated the special significance that its middle is *objective universality*. Superficially, the categorical syllogism is also taken for a mere syllogism of inherence.

The categorical syllogism in its full significance is the *first syllogism of necessity*, in which a subject is united with a predicate through *its substance*. But substance, when raised into the sphere of the concept, is the universal, whose absolute existence is posited as having for its form or manner of existence, not accidentality, as in the sphere of substance proper, but the mode of the concept. Its opposed factors, therefore, are the extremes of the syllogism, and, to be precise, universality and singularity. The former, in contrast to the *genus*, which is the precise determination of the *middle*, is abstract universality or universal determinateness;—the accidentality of the substance gathered into simple determinateness, which, however, is its essential distinction or *specific difference*.—The singularity, again, is the actual, intrinsically the concrete unity of genus and determinateness, here, however, as in the immediate syllogism, only immediate singularity; accidentality gathered into the form of *self-existent* subsistence.—The relation of this extreme to the middle constitutes a categorical judgement; again, in so far as the other extreme, according to the above stated determination, expresses the specific difference or determinate principle of the genus, this other premiss is also categorical.

2. This syllogism, as the first and consequently immediate syllogism of necessity, comes in the first instance under the schema of the first formal syllogism

S—P—U.—But as the middle is the essential *nature* of the singular, and not *any random one* of its qualities or properties, and as likewise the extreme of universality is not any abstract universal, which again would be merely a single quality, but universal determinateness, the *specific principle of difference of the genus*, we are rid of the contingency of the subject being syllogistically united with *any random quality* through *any random* middle term.—Consequently, as the *relations*, too, of the extreme to the middle have not the same external immediacy as in the syllogism of existence, there is no place here for the demand of a proof in the sense that occurred there, and led to the infinite regress.

Further, this syllogism does not, as does a syllogism of reflection, presuppose its conclusion for its premisses. The terms from their substantial content stand to one another in an absolute relation of identity; we have here *one* essence permeating the three terms, in which essence the terms of singularity, particularity, and universality are merely *formal* factors.

To this extent, therefore, the categorical syllogism is no longer subjective; in the above identity is the beginning of objectivity; the middle is the pregnant identity of its extremes, which are contained in that middle in their self-dependence, for their self-dependence is the above substantial universality, or genus. The subjectivity of the syllogism consists in the indifferent subsistence of the extremes as against the concept or the middle.

3. Yet the syllogism before us retains this subjective feature, that the above identity still appears as substantial identity or as *content*; and does not yet exhibit itself at the same time as *identity of form*. Consequently, the identity of the concept is still an *inner* bond of union, and therefore, as relation, is still *necessity*; the universality of the middle is solid, *affirmative* identity, and

does not appear at the same time as the *negativity of its extremes*.

More precisely, the immediacy of this syllogism, which is not yet *posited* in accordance with *its intrinsic nature*, exhibits itself in the following manner. The proper immediate of the syllogism is the *singular*. This is subsumed under its genus as middle; but under the same middle come also an *indefinite multitude* of other singulars; it is therefore *contingent* that only *this* singular is posited as subsumed under it.—But, further, this contingency does not belong merely to *the external reflection* that discovers the contingency of the singular posited in the syllogism by *comparison* with other singulars; on the contrary, in that the singular itself is related to the middle as to its objective universality, it is posited as *contingent*, as a subjective actuality. On the other hand, as the subject is an *immediate* singular, it contains determinations that are not contained in the middle as the universal nature; consequently it has also an independently determined existence indifferent to the middle, and possessing a content peculiar to itself. Hence, conversely, this latter term also has an indifferent immediacy, and an existence distinct from the former.—The same relationship holds also between the middle and the other extreme; for the latter has likewise the character of immediacy, and consequently of a contingent existence as against its middle.

Accordingly, what is posited in the categorical syllogism is, *on the one hand*, extremes standing in such a relationship to the middle, that they possess *intrinsically* objective universality, or a self-dependent nature, and at the same time appear as immediate and consequently mutually *indifferent actualities*. But, *on the other hand*, they are no less determined as *contingent*; in other words, their immediacy is *merged* in their identity. But by reason

of the aforesaid self-dependence and totality of the actuality, this identity is merely formal and internal; thus the syllogism of necessity has determined itself to the *hypothetical syllogism*.

(b) *The Hypothetical Syllogism.*

1. The hypothetical judgement contains only the necessary *relation* without the immediacy of the related. *If A is, then B is*; or, the being of A is equally the being of *another*, of B; it is not thereby stated either that *A is*, or that *B is*. The hypothetical syllogism adds this *immediacy* of being:—

If A is, then B is,
But A is,
Therefore B is.

The minor premiss taken by itself enunciates the immediate being of A.

But this is not the only addition to the judgement. The syllogism contains the relation of subject and predicate, not as the abstract copula, but as the pregnant *mediating* unity. The *being* of A, therefore, is to be taken *not as mere immediacy*, but essentially as the *middle of the syllogism*. This point must be examined more closely.

2. To begin with, the relation of the hypothetical judgement is *necessity*, or inner *substantial identity* in external diversity of real existence or reciprocal indifference of phenomenal being; an internal basis of identical *content*. The two sides of the judgement therefore appear not as an immediate being, but as a being held within the necessity, and therefore *merged* or merely phenomenal. Further, as sides of the judgement they stand to one another as *universality* and *singularity*; one of them therefore is the above content as *totality of the conditions*, the other as *actuality*. It is, however,

indifferent which side be taken as universality, and which as singularity. That is to say, in so far as the conditions are still the *internal abstract* side of an actuality, they are the *universal*, and it is by the *gathering of them together* into a *singularity* that they emerge *into actuality*. Conversely, the conditions are an *isolated, dispersed* phenomenon, which only *in actuality* gains *unity* and significance, and a *universally valid existence*.

The precise relationship between the two sides, that has here been regarded as the relationship of condition and conditioned, may also be taken as cause and effect, ground and consequence—this is here indifferent; but the relationship of condition corresponds more closely to the relation present in the hypothetical judgement and syllogism, in that the condition appears essentially as an indifferent real existence, while ground and cause are transitive through their very nature; besides, condition is a more universal term, in that it embraces both sides of the above relations, since the effect, consequence, &c., are just as much conditions of the cause, ground, &c., as the latter are of the former.—

Now, A is the *mediating* being, inasmuch as it is, *first*, an immediate being, an indifferent actuality, and, secondly, is no less a being *intrinsically contingent*, and self-merging. What carries the conditions over into the actuality of the new formation whose conditions they are is the fact that they are not being as the abstract immediate, but *being in its concept*, that is, in the first instance, *becoming*; but as the concept is no longer transition, they are more exactly *singularity*, as self-related *negative* unity.—The conditions are a dispersed material that awaits and demands its application; this *negativity* is the mediating element, the free unity of the concept. It determines itself as *activity*, since this middle is the contradiction of *objective universality* or the

totality of the identical content, and *indifferent immediacy*.—This middle, therefore, is no longer merely internal necessity, but *existent necessity*; the objective universality contains relation to self as *simple immediacy*, as being; in the categorical syllogism this factor is in the first instance a determination of the extreme; but as against the objective universality of the middle it determines itself as *contingency*, consequently, as something only *posited* and merged, that is, withdrawn into the concept or into the middle as unity, which middle itself in its objectivity is now also a being.

The conclusion, *therefore B is*, expresses the same contradiction, that B is an *immediate* existence, but at the same time owes its existence to another, or is *mediated*. In point of form, therefore, it is the same concept that the middle is; only differing from it as the *necessary* from *necessity*—in the wholly superficial form of singularity as against universality. The absolute *content* of A and B is the same. They are only two different names for the same fundamental fact, and different only for *representation*, which clings to the phenomenal diversity of existence, and distinguishes between the necessary and its necessity; but in so far as the necessity were to be separated from B, B would not be the necessary. Thus we have got here the identity of the *mediating* and the *mediated*.

3. The hypothetical syllogism, in the first instance, exhibits *necessary relation* as connexion through *the form* or *negative unity*, whereas the categorical exhibits it as connexion through affirmative unity, solid *content*, objective universality. But *necessity* collapses into the *necessary*; the *formal activity* of the translation of the conditioning into the conditioned actuality is *intrinsically* the unity in which the members of the opposition, that previously were emancipated into indifferent existence,

are merged, and the opposition of A and B has become an empty name. Thus it is self-reflected unity, and consequently an *identical* content; and not only is it so *intrinsically*, but it is also *posited* as so by the syllogism, in that the being of A is also not its own, but B's, and vice versa, and in general the being of one is the being of the other, and in the conclusion the immediate being or indifferent determinateness appears definitely as mediated; so that their externality has merged itself, and *the unity of their deeper self is posited*.

The mediation of the syllogism has hereby determined itself as *singularity* or *immediacy*, and as *self-related negativity*, or as an identity that differentiates and gathers itself into itself out of that difference—as absolute form, and for that very reason as objective *universality*, or self-identical *content*. The syllogism in this character is the *disjunctive syllogism*.

(c) *The Disjunctive Syllogism.*

As the hypothetical syllogism comes in general under the schema of the second figure of the formal syllogism U—S—P, so the disjunctive comes under the schema of the third figure S—U—P. But the middle is *universality replete with form*; it has determined itself as *totality*, as *evolved* objective universality. The middle term, therefore, is not only universality but also particularity and singularity. As universality it is, first, the substantial identity of the genus, but, secondly, it is an identity that has *taken into itself the particularity as its equal in extent*; as such, it is the universal sphere that contains its total particularization—the genus dissected into its species; A that is B and C and D. But particularization is differentiation, and, as such, is no less the *either—or* of the B, C, and D, the *negative* unity, the *reciprocal* exclusion of the terms.—Further, this exclusion

is not merely a reciprocity, or the determination merely a relative one, but it is just as essentially a *self-related* determination; the particular as *singularity* to the exclusion of the *others*—

A is either B or C or D,
But A is B,
Therefore A is neither C nor D ;

or again—

A is either B or C or D,
But A is neither C nor D,
Therefore A is B.

A is subject, not only in the two premisses, but also in the conclusion. In the first premiss it is a universal, and, in its predicate, the *universal* sphere particularized into the totality of its species ; in the second, it appears as a *determinate*, or as a species ; in the conclusion, it is posited as the exclusive, *singular* determinateness.—Or, again, it appears in the minor premiss as exclusive singularity, and is affirmatively posited in the conclusion as the determinate which it is.

Hence we find that what is *mediated* here is in general the *universality* of A with its *singularity*. But the *mediating* factor is this A, which is the *universal* sphere of its particularization, and a determinate *singular*. Consequently, what is the truth of the hypothetical syllogism, the unity of the mediating and mediated, is *posited* in the disjunctive syllogism, which at the same time is for that reason *no longer a syllogism* at all. For the middle, which is posited in it as the totality of the concept, contains itself the two extremes in their complete determinateness. The extremes, in distinction from this middle, appear as a mere positivity to which attaches no determinateness peculiar to itself as against the middle.

Considering this point in special reference to the hypothetical syllogism, we see that the latter involved

a *substantial identity* as the *inner* bond of necessity, and a *negative unity* distinct therefrom—namely, the activity or form which translated one existence into another. The general character of the disjunctive syllogism is *universality*; its middle is the A as *genus* and as perfectly *determinate*; owing to this unity the above content that was before internal has come to be *posited*, and, conversely, the positivity or form is not external negative unity as against an indifferent existence, but identical with the aforesaid solid content. The complete formal determination of the concept is posited "in its determinate opposition, and at the same time in the simple identity of the concept.

In this way, then, the *formalism of the syllogistic process*, and with it the subjectivity of the syllogism and of the concept in general have become merged. This formal or subjective character lay in the fact that the mediating factor of the extremes, being the concept as an *abstract* term, is *distinct* from them whose unity it is. In the consummation of the syllogism, on the contrary, where objective universality is at the same time posited as totality of the formal terms, the opposition of mediating and mediated has dropped away. That which is mediated is itself an essential factor of what mediates it, and each factor appears as the totality of the mediated.

The figures of the syllogism exhibit each determinateness of the concept *singly* as the middle, which at the same time is the concept as *an ideal*, as a demand that the mediating factor shall be the concept's totality. But the different genera of the syllogism exhibit the steps of the *impregnation* or concretion of the middle. In the formal syllogism the middle is only posited as totality by the fact that all the modes, though each *singly*, take in turn the function of mediation. In the syllogism of reflection, the middle appears as the unity which gathers together

externally the terms of the extremes. In the syllogism of necessity it has determined itself to the unity that is no less evolved and total than simple, and the form of the syllogism, which consisted in the opposition of the middle to its extremes, has thereby become merged.

Thus in general the concept has become realized ; more exactly, it has gained the reality that is *objectivity*. The *first reality* was that the *concept*, as the inherently negative unity, sunders itself, and as *judgement* posits its modes in determinate and indifferent opposition, and in the syllogism directly opposes itself to them. In this way it is still the internality of this its externality, but the result of the course of the syllogisms is to equate this externality with the inner unity ; through the mediation in which at first they are merely united in a *tertium*, the opposed terms are brought back once more into this unity, and thus the externality exhibits in itself the concept, which consequently is no longer opposed to it as its internal unity.

Conversely, however, the above determination of the concept, which has been regarded as *reality*, is no less a *positivity*. For not only has this result exhibited the truth of the concept as consisting in the identity of its externality and internality, but even in the judgement the factors of the concept in their very mutual indifference still remain terms that possess their significance only in their relation. The syllogism is *mediation*, the perfect concept in its *positivity*. Its movement is the merging of this mediation in which nothing is absolute, but everything exists only by means of something else. The result is therefore an *immediacy* that has proceeded from the *merging of mediation*, a *being* which is no less identical with mediation, and which is the concept that has restored itself out of, and in, its differentiation. This *being* is accordingly an absolute *fact*—in other words, *objectivity*.

NOTE ON THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE
HEGELIAN AND POPULAR CONCEPTIONS
OF FORMAL LOGIC.

ALTHOUGH I have indicated in section J of the Introduction the main distinctions between the Hegelian conception of formal logic and the popular notion of that science, it may be well to add a few words of further detail on the point.

As far as we can extract any connectedness out of the jumble of psychical, grammatical, and mathematical reflections that passes nowadays for logical science, it would seem that the term *logic* is used in two senses. In the first place it is used to denote the science that discovers and presents the *a priori* concepts or categories, that is to say, the predicates that are universally and necessarily applicable to every existent object. In this sense it is a science that involves a particular content, which content, however, in virtue of its universal applicability, and in contrast to the matter of experience, may be called a formal content. In the second place the term *logic*, and in particular *formal logic*, is more strictly confined to denoting a science that investigates the operations by which thinking reflects on, or brings into relation, the various elements of its content, whether those elements possess an empirical or formal import. In this sense logic is said to be absolutely formal, since it does not merely restrict itself to the formal as against the material, but abstracts even from that distinction. It administers its formulas with absolute impartiality to truths so heterogeneous as that *this table has three legs*,

and that *space has three dimensions*. Thus within the formal science of logic we have an inner logic, a formal of formals, that is so free from favour that it gives no preference to the formal over its empirical rival, but is equally contemptuous of both.

Now, the popular notion of logic in the wider acceptance of the term is essentially determined by the metaphysical standpoint of common sense. To the eye of common sense the logical categories, in common with all other predicates or concepts, are pictorial representations or copies of an external reality, and only differ from other copies of it in being representative of qualities that are found to run through the whole compass of existence. If I picture to myself a rainbow, I am picturing something that I can only at rare intervals behold in actual being; whereas, when I picture substance, I can find the corresponding original at every hand's turn. It may be, as Kant says, that I myself put the categories into the external reality by my imaginative creativeness, but in any case they are in it; and their significance as concepts is merely that they reproduce for me the facts of the world.

As representations, then, the logical categories possess no right or wrong of their own, but are true so far as they correspond, and false so far as they do not correspond, to their originals. And since one reality is as real as another, that is to say, *is* as much *there* as another, these pictures of reality, in so far as they are faithful copies, are all equally true. To think of things in their quantitative aspect and to think of them in relations of interaction are simply two different ways of looking at them, as coequal in validity and privilege as different points of the compass. It follows that there is no order of dependence connecting category with category, since each depends immediately on the particular reality that

it represents. The fact that they are all categories of thought or logic implies no more connexion between them than is implied between pictures in their being hung in the same gallery.

Now, this conception of logic reduces it to a palpable imposture. In so far as the logical categories are restricted to the universally applicable predicates of things, they can only touch the poorest and most empty aspects of reality. They are the roughest and thinnest of sketches, in which all the varied hues and delicate forms of reality are omitted. Of Beethoven they can only show us what Beethoven shares with the clay. In so far as they are only representations, they involve no appreciation, and the value of things escapes them altogether. In so far as they are mere pictorial representations, the *quid nutum instar picturae in tabula* of Spinoza, they fail to render the dynamical character of existence, and are false perpetuations of a transient reality. We can picture a thing as it is now, and, again, as it is the next moment, but the absolute continuity of change, which is the truth of reality, can be overtaken by no succession of pictures, however rapid that succession may be. Altogether, then, the popular logic is a sorry failure because, first, it is the poorest possible picture of the existent reality, and, secondly, no picture can be an adequate representation of essential reality at all.

If logic is to have any claim to be a science of truth, we must entertain, with Hegel, a directly contrary conception of its essential nature. We must hold that, far from logic being a representation of the so-called reality, logic is the absolute truth, the absolute thing in itself, of which, if we like, we may call that reality the representation. We must hold that the concepts of logic are so far from being intrinsically indifferent to good and bad, that all absolute values are inherent in

them, and only appear in the world of reality as their embodiment. We must hold that logic is not restricted to the predicates that are common to all existence, but, as the great exemplar, contains in it all the positive predicates and significances that are to be found in the entire universe of finite being. Finally, we must hold that the logical category is as little pictorial as it is representative, that it is not an artificial pose or arrest of a moving reality, that, on the contrary, logic as a whole, and its categories as its factors, constitute an absolutely fluid continuity. No doubt, logic exhibits discreteness in such statical or partially statical categories as being and not-being, cause and effect, but it only exhibits these categories in order to annul them again, and assert its own continuity by the absorption of their discreteness. They are merely the low forms, the inanimate nature, of its cosmos.

If we pass on to consider logic in the narrower sense of the term, or formal logic, we find that the popular notion in this case is no less inadequate. Formal logic, as we have seen, is supposed to be the science of the universal and necessary element in our reflection on any object, be that object an empirical matter or a category of thought. But this universal element or schema—which is what we call the form of thinking—is again accepted as a historical *datum*. We find that all objects are presented to us as individuals grouped in classes marked by a common attribute, and again that these classes are presented to us as in turn grouped into larger classes marked by wider attributes. Therefore an absolutely universal form of thinking will consist in reflecting that such and such classes are contained in, or excluded from, certain other classes, or that any given individual is contained in, or excluded from, this or that class. At the same time, in saying that an individual belongs to

this or that class, we are asserting that it bears a certain mark, and, in saying that one class is contained in another class, we are asserting that one attribute is the mark of another attribute. As against the individual or singular, the smaller class and its mark are indifferently called the particular, and the larger class and its mark are called the universal.

In this way the absolute form of thinking turns out again to be a representation of the external reality. The judgement

The Subject is The Predicate

is merely the rough representation or silhouette of such a full truth, say, as that Socrates shares a common mark, called *humanity*, with a number of other individuals that with him constitute the class called *man*. And the syllogism

	Middle Term	is	Major Term
	Minor Term	is	Middle Term
Ergo	Minor Term	is	Major Term

is merely the outline of such a full truth or actuality as that Socrates in belonging to a class called *man*, which is included in a larger class called *mortal*, is himself included in that larger class. The fact that formal logic is confined to this mere outline of things, this outermost shell of reality, is the sole foundation for all the pretentious claims entered on behalf of this science, that it alone attains to infallible certainty, that it is a science not of things but of thinking, that it is a science not of thought but of the pure form of thought, that it is an ideal science, a science not of what we think but of what we should think. On the representative view of thought in general, how can there be any significance in thinking beyond its faithfulness to facts, or any significant form of thought that is not a form of things, or any ideal of

thinking beyond its correctness, that is to say, its agreement with its original?

Now in the first place we have to repeat here what we have said about logic in the wider acceptance of the term, that if formal logic professes to be a representation of the existent reality, it becomes a shallow impostor, scarce worthy of exposure. For one thing, it can at most claim to represent only the emptiest and most abstract relation that holds between things; for another thing, even in this paltry operation it falsifies its original. The free and teeming variety of natural formations refuses to submit itself to the hard and fast lines of logical definition and division. By what common mark shall we determine the class *man*? If we define him as the rational animal, what are we to say of the idiot? If we define him as the *animal ridens*, what shall we say of Henry I after the death of his only son? Or, again, what are we to do in general with hybrids and monsters? Further, this representation of formal logic must surrender all appreciation of values. When we say that Socrates is a man, or that man is free, we are stating a truth of much deeper significance than when we say that Socrates is snubnosed or that it is cold to-day. But all these propositions fall alike into the schema

Subject copula Predicate;

and, even if we have the disinterested curiosity to differentiate them as

Individual copula Genus

and

Individual copula Quality

these two forms remain equally true in themselves as co-equal representations of two existent realities.

The Hegelian conception of formal logic is again a complete subversion of the popular notion. For him, formal logic is a stage in the self-development of that

absolute truth, of which the existent reality is a maimed and inadequate embodiment. But, again, it is only a stage, and a subordinate stage; and therefore it is only the original for one subordinate aspect of reality. It would indeed be preposterous to imagine that the rich content of reality—nature and life, science and art, religion and philosophy—was a copy of such poor logical forms as the universal, particular, and singular, and their combinations and relations. It is only the mere specification of such content, its particularization and individualization as such, that is representative of the modes of formal logic.

Again, since formal logic is a stage in logic as a whole, its various terms and forms are steps in the great evolutionary series of values. Universal, particular, and singular, different forms of judgement e.g. the judgement of inherence, the judgement of subsumption, categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive judgements, different forms of the syllogism e.g. the syllogism of inherence, the syllogism of subsumption, categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms, are not indifferent co-ordinate forms, equally valid in themselves and only differing by what they represent, but are phases of a dialectic whose respective values are intrinsic to themselves.

Once more, since formal logic is only one stage in logic as a whole, and that a subordinate stage, all its categories in themselves and also their sum-total are to this extent false; just as the mere classification of things and the particularization and individualization of genera is a very poor aspect of reality. But the modes of formal logic are false, not because they misrepresent an external reality, but because they are untrue to themselves. The proposition that *Socrates is snubnosed* is false, not in the sense that it is a libel on the real appearance of Socrates, but in the sense that it wrongly postulates an

immediate or unrelated individual on the one side, and an immediate or unrelated quality on the other side, and then, as wrongly, asserts an equally immediate relation between them, as though the individual was a plain surface, the attribute a pot of paint, and the judgement or copula the paint-brush. Such a proposition is intrinsically false, because, if the attribute is thus isolated as something distinct and separate from the individual, then there is no relation between them. And if we should suppose that what the proposition really affirms is, not an immediate relation between the individual and a self-subsistent attribute, but merely the inseparability of the individual from its own particular attribute, not a connexion between Socrates and snubnosedness in general, but a connexion between Socrates and his peculiar type of snubnosedness, then the proposition comes to signify merely that Socrates has the shape of nose that Socrates has—a relation where there is nothing to relate.

To sum up Hegel's indictment of the popular formal logic, we may say that its fundamental fallacy is the notion of logic as representative of an external reality. In the working out of the science, this fallacy produces the effect that the various logical forms are co-ordinated as merely diverse ways of looking at things, different readings of propositions or syllogisms, some indeed of more value extrinsically, as representing higher realities, but all intrinsically of equal legitimacy, just as a penny is as good coin as a sovereign. But the misdeeds of this popular science do not end here. In a transport of formalism, it proceeds to swamp these forms, which before it misrepresented, in the blank indifference of mathematical relationship. The singular, particular, and universal become merely the small term, a bigger one, and one yet bigger; and having no intrinsic distinction of character they are naturally denoted by *A*, *B*, *C*, or

X, Y, Z . But some logicians—for example, Ploucquet and Sir William Hamilton—have gone one better still by pointing out that in such a proposition as A is B only some of the B 's are meant. In this way the judgement becomes an equation, and to reason is to count. The quantification of the predicate is the last absurdity of formal logic, not for the trivial reason that we do not in our ordinary thinking reflect on the quantity of the predicate, but because the fundamental truth that underlies the judgement is the identity-in-difference of the singular and the universal, and the quantification of the predicate is an attempt to resolve the difference into the empty identity of equality, in which the difference or opposition is not reconciled but only ignored.

I may conclude this note with a general indication of the nature of the self-development by which the different forms of the judgement and syllogism are successively evolved in the Hegelian logic. In the lowest form of the judgement, as we have just seen, the subject and predicate, or the singular and universal, are in themselves absolutely separate and self-subsistent, while at the same time their general relation is asserted in the copula. The subject, therefore, is what we might in general call a thing, and the predicate what we might in general call a quality. By a thing we mean in general an immediate or unrelated individual existence, and by quality we mean in general an immediate or unrelated mark, note, or sort. In a judgement of this kind, therefore, the subject in itself involves no relation to the predicate, and the predicate in itself involves no relation to the subject. Yet at the same time the copula asserts the relation—as yet undefined—of these wholly unrelated entities. This self-contradiction, then,—the relation of the unrelated—is the falsehood or dialectic of the judgement in its lowest form. The evolution of the judgement in general, therefore,

consists in the gradual enrichment of the logical import of its terms, so as to convert the relation of the unrelated into a relation of the related. And, concurrently, this enrichment of the terms will carry with it a determination of the significance of the relation, an impregnation of the copula. The higher form of judgement:—

This individual belongs to this genus
or Socrates is a man

is to some extent a relation of the related. For a genus is in itself—that is, apart from the assertion of the judgement—related to its members. Yet in so far as a genus is not the absolute determinant of its members, it is also *not* related to them, and to this extent the judgement in question remains that same self-contradiction—a relation of the unrelated. The true relation of the related, the identity of opposites, can only be attained in that form in which the singular and universal are presented both in their difference and in their identity. This form is the syllogism, which is the truth as against the judgement, or, to speak more correctly, the truth *of* the judgement, the successful enunciation of what the judgement was trying to say.

But even the syllogism fails, in its lowest form, to realize the full import of the identity of opposites. We have seen in the Introduction that this identity involves not only opposition and identity, but also that the identity and opposition shall be themselves identical. Now, the syllogism, to begin with, gives us the opposites in their opposition, and again in their identity, but at first these aspects are presented as separate. In the syllogism

Strong odours are objectionable
This plant has a strong odour
Therefore it is objectionable

we are given *the plant* and *objectionableness* in their

opposition as the extremes, and again in their identification in the middle term of *strong odour* ; but as yet we can only say that, *for one thing*, the plant and objectionableness are different entities, and, *for another thing*, they are in a particular aspect identified. Therefore we are left once more with the identity of the not-identical ; and this dialectic or self-contradiction starts the evolution of the syllogism. As in the case of the judgement, this evolution will consist in the gradual enrichment of the logical import of the extremes and the middle term so as to convert the identity of the not-identical into an identity of the identical.

An advance towards this goal is exhibited in such a syllogism as

Man is free
Socrates is a man
Therefore Socrates is free.

For here the two extremes are not black strangers that happen to meet in the grounds of a common acquaintance, the middle term ; rather, freedom is the essential character of Socrates as a man. Nevertheless, freedom does not of itself involve the necessity of there being this individual that we call Socrates, and to this extent the syllogism in question still remains an identity of not-identicals. The evolution of the syllogism in general, therefore, can only find its consummation in the complete abrogation of the separateness or non-identity of the extremes by their collapse into the middle term ; in other words, in the merging of all mediation or reasoning, of all determination of one term by another, and in the consequent positing of an absolute and self-existent reality. But this absolute and self-existent reality is the object.

NOTE ON HEGEL'S THEORY OF THE SYLLOGISTIC FIGURES

IN the judgement the concept analyses itself and posits its factors of singular, particular, and universal in independent self-subsistence. At the same time, since an analysis presupposes the unity of what is analysed, the judgement alleges the identity of these isolated factors. Thus we get in general three allegations: (*a*) that the singular is universal, (*b*) that the particular is universal, (*c*) that the singular is particular. To take a concrete example—although we must be careful in so doing to discount the empirical import—my concept of my virtuous and happy friend *A* evolves itself into the three allegations, that my friend *A* is happy, that virtue is a happy thing, and that my friend *A* is virtuous.

In the immediate or lowest form of judgement, as also in the immediate or lowest form of syllogism, these three factors of singular, particular, and universal are thought in complete intrinsic isolation, and the relation alleged by the judgement is merely a factitious and coercive unity imposed on the terms in the teeth of their natural independence. To resume our example, a judgement or syllogism of this immediate type must contain no reflection to the effect that a man's moral nature is the essential element in him, or that happiness is essentially a factor of right action. I must simply regard my friend *A*'s virtue as a circumstance of his existence, like his stoutness of build, or his passion for golf; and I must think of happiness as a state that may be incidental to many circumstances besides virtue, e. g. to youth and irresponsibility.

Now the transition of the judgement into the syllogism is in general the substitution of argument for allegation. That is to say, the syllogism unites any two of the factors of singular, particular, and universal by means of the third, or, what is the same thing, it bases any one of the above three allegations on the other two. Thus the three allegations are replaced by three arguments or syllogisms : (a) my friend *A* is happy, because virtue is a happy thing and he is virtuous, (b) virtue is a happy thing, because my friend *A* is happy and he is virtuous, (c) my friend *A* is virtuous because he is happy and virtue is a happy thing. These three arguments constitute respectively the first, second, and third figures of the immediate or formal syllogism in Hegel's exposition, and the first, third, and second figures of the traditional logic.

According to the traditional formula the first figure is expressed in the schema :—

Virtue is a happy thing
My friend *A* is virtuous
Therefore he is happy

According to the form that Hegel prefers (a form that had already been recommended by Locke in Bk. IV chap. 17 of his *Essay*) it may be stated thus :—

My friend *A*—virtue—happiness.

Here the particular constitutes the middle term, and since the particular is in itself the term that stands midway between the singular and universal, the positions that the terms occupy in this figure agree with their own intrinsic significance. Hence this is the primary figure.

The fallacy of this figure—and it is essentially the fallacy of the formal syllogism in general—is that, my friend *A*'s virtuous character being here regarded merely as one of the many sides of his complex nature, the happiness that generally accompanies virtue may be

annulled for him by the effects of some other circumstance or fact of his existence. For example, he is a sensible as well as a moral being; and, *pace* the Stoics, some virtuous persons at any rate would not be happy on the rack. In a word, this syllogism connects my friend *A* and happiness not through any rational unity or necessity, but only by something that happens to attach to him, in other words, by a mere contingency or fact. Hence the middle term of this syllogism is *in its import* a singular, for the singular is in general the fact or immediacy as against the particular and universal. Therefore the truth of this figure—the explicit statement of what this figure implies—will be a syllogism in which the singular is professedly the middle term. This is the traditional third figure, or what Hegel calls the second figure of the formal syllogism. It may be stated in the traditional form as:—

My friend *A* is happy

My friend *A* is virtuous

Therefore virtue is a happy thing

or in Hegel's form as:—

Virtue—my friend *A*—happiness.

This figure is invalidated by the same fallacy as its predecessor. Since the formal syllogism in general regards my friend *A* as an immediate and independent singular, and virtue and happiness as independent qualities only contingently attaching to him, it is impossible to establish any relation between these qualities, which might be intrinsically antagonistic in spite of their accidental juxtaposition in the same concrete individual. The most that we can infer is that virtue and happiness *may coexist*—a poor result indicated by the orthodox rule that the conclusion in the third figure must be particular. Virtue and happiness are not essentially united, because my friend *A* is not the

synthesis of these qualities, but is, in relation to them, merely an abstract universal under which they are externally subsumed. We have just seen that the middle term of the first figure is in its import a singular. Now we find that the middle term of the second figure (the traditional third figure) is in its import an abstract universal. Consequently the truth of this figure will be a syllogism that expressly posits the abstract universal as its middle term. This is Hegel's third figure, or the second figure of the Aristotelian logic ; and its formula will be :—

My friend *A*—happiness—virtue

or

Virtue is a happy thing

My friend *A* is happy

Therefore he is virtuous.

Here we have the fallacy of the formal syllogism and the invalidity of its conclusion expressly posited. My friend *A* may be happy, but he is in himself something independent of happiness ; virtue may be a happy thing, but it is something distinct and separate from happiness. Therefore happiness does not intrinsically appertain either to my friend *A* or to virtue, and they, since they essentially fall outside the middle term, fall away from one another. A syllogism in this figure could only have what we call a formally valid conclusion if the virtue and happiness could be identified, that is, if we could say that virtue *alone* is accompanied by happiness. But this would require the interchangeability of subject and predicate, which is only to be got in a negative proposition. Hence the syllogistic rule that one premiss and the conclusion must be negative in the second figure.

The truth of the formal syllogism, then, is that, whatever middle term it may profess to have, its middle term *in its import* is always an abstract universal to which

the extremes are only externally alleged to attach, and which therefore is *not* their unity. I may say that the singular and universal meet in the particular, but so long as I mean by the particular a mere particular as such, a mere isolated quality or character, my statement remains only an allegation, or, what is the same thing, I am using the particular as a mere bond of external connexion, as an abstract universal. But what this really means is that the formal syllogism in confining the singular to the pure singular, the particular to the pure particular, and the universal to the pure universal is doing the very opposite of what it thinks to do, and is robbing these three factors of all their significance. When this is seen, the result, or, rather, one result, is what Hegel calls a fourth figure, the mathematical syllogism of indifference in which we simply argue that if two terms are identified with a third they are thereby identified with each other.

The advance, then, that is effected by the transition of the syllogistic figures is such an advance, for example, as that which leads from the philosophy of Locke to the philosophy of Hume. The value of Hume's philosophy is that it is an exposure of Locke. All the poverty and impotence of empiricism, that was glossed over by Locke's inconsistency, is laid bare in the unflinching criticism of Hume. So each figure in the formal syllogism is the exposure of its predecessor, and is a step towards truth because it removes one more layer of the disguise that cloaks the inward rottenness of the formal syllogism in general. We might summarize the whole transition by saying that the formal syllogism sets out by connecting the extremes in a particular of a sort, that this particular of a sort turns out really to be a singular of a sort, that, again, this singular of a sort turns out to be a universal of a sort, and that, finally, this universal

of a sort turns out to be a mere third term in general. The growing evidence of the inadequacy of the formal syllogism is attested by the rules of the traditional logic that the conclusion in the third figure can only be particular, and in the second figure only negative.

But the mathematical syllogism of indifference is not the only result of the discomfiture of the formal syllogism. The collapse of a syllogism founded on an isolated singular, an isolated particular, and an isolated universal, has its positive result in a syllogism in which these three factors are posited with their isolation qualified by what Hegel calls the first negation. In such a syllogism, called by Hegel the syllogism of reflection, the particular will appear as a plurality of *singulars*, the universal as a totality of *singulars*. This new syllogistic sphere having opened, it is clear that the three figures must reappear; for here, again, we may mediate through the particular, or through the singular, or through the universal. If we mediate through the particular according to the scheme of the first figure, we get the syllogism of complete extension:—

All virtuous persons are happy
My friend *A* is virtuous
Therefore he is happy.

Mediation through the singular, according to the scheme of Hegel's second figure, gives us the syllogism of induction:—

My friend *A* and *B C D . . .* are virtuous
My friend *A* and *B C D . . .* are happy
Therefore virtuous persons are happy.

And finally mediation through the universal gives us the syllogism of analogy:—

This or that virtuous person is happy
My friend *A* is happy
Therefore he is virtuous.

Now, the qualification of the isolation of its factors, while it saves the reflective syllogism from the fallacy of the formal syllogism, lands it in another fallacy peculiar to itself, the fallacy of *petitio principii*. In the syllogism of complete extension I am only justified in saying that all virtuous persons are happy if I already know that my friend *A* is happy—which is the conclusion. In the syllogism of induction I can only draw my conclusion by substituting *all* for the mere plurality of *A, B, C, D, . . .*; but this substituted *all* is itself the conclusion. In the syllogism of analogy I can only infer the virtue of my friend *A* on the understanding that the happiness of this or that other person is the necessary consequence of his being virtuous, which is exactly the same thing that I am seeking to prove in the case of my friend *A*.

Finally, in the highest form of syllogism, the syllogism of necessity, the first, second, and third figures reappear once more as the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms. In the categorical syllogism:—

The rational is free

~~Man is rational~~ Man is rational

Therefore man is free

we have mediation through the particular of rationality.

In the hypothetical syllogism:—

If a being is rational, it is free

But man is rational ?

Therefore he is free

we mediate through the singular, for the middle term is the *fact* that man is rational. Lastly, the disjunctive syllogism has for its middle term a universal sphere distributed into its individual species.

As the first, second, and third figures in general exhibit the inference through the particular, singular, and universal, they exhaust all the possibilities of logical

mediation, and accordingly the traditional fourth or Galenian figure depends on distinctions that are of no logical importance, on mere differences in the *positions* of terms in premiss and conclusion apart from their logical significance as singular, particular, and universal.

This whole question of the syllogistic figures supplies a good illustration of Hegel's general attitude towards the forms of the traditional logic. That attitude cannot be expressed by any bald statement to the effect that he accepted them, or that he broke with them. For him the formal syllogism, as compared with the judgement, or, still more, as compared with the categories of being and reflection, is a regenerate form. It is by way of being the truth, for it professes to be an identity of opposites, and the identity of opposites is the truth. But it retains the old Adam of falsehood in the isolation of its factors ; and therefore its practice belies and stultifies its profession. To this extent it is a hypocrite, and the transition of its figures is the unmasking of its hypocrisy. But this work of exposure is its own work, and the discarded figures are the stepping-stones of its dead self by which it rises to the higher things of the reflective syllogism.

NOTES

P. 114, ll. 6, 7. 'With the courtier's mien that purblind yet smiling condemns the cause of the earnest soul.'

P. 115, l. 13. In the evolution of logic, and in the Hegelian evolution generally, the truth issues from the falsehood, the higher from the lower, in such a way that its presentation is at the same time the refutation of the falsehood, and the demonstration of the truth. On the contrary, the substance of Spinoza, for example, is the alleged foundation of things, but it does not justify itself; it is simply accepted as a beginning.

l. 18. *Seyn* or being—which within the sphere of logic corresponds to the *fact* or thing—is the primary *datum*; but by virtue of its falsehood or abstraction it necessitates a dialectical movement towards its *own correction*, or its *own truth*, and in so doing cancels its own primacy. It presents itself as a first, but logical reflection shows that after all it is not a first, but that something deeper lies behind and so before it.

l. 20. On the one hand the absolute truth, the philosophical principle of things, must clearly be an immediacy, that is, it cannot be mediated by, or dependent on, some other thing, in which case it would not be absolute. On the other hand, since it is the truth or the principle, it must clearly stand in relation or contrast to, that is, be mediated by, the false or the inessential. This seems at first an insoluble contradiction; but it is not really so. The truth or principle does stand in relation to an *other* or *opposite*; but that opposite is not external to the truth, but it, and therefore the relation of the truth to it, are merged or absorbed into the truth. Such an absorption may be seen *mutatis mutandis* in Kant's transcendental ego. This ego is related to an object; but the object and its relation to, or mediation of,

the subject are themselves elements of, or merged in, the subject; so that from this point of view the subject is not related or mediated at all, or, in other words, is an immediacy.

P. 116, l. 2. 'retreated', because the logical *advance* is a *going back* to the foundation. This is implied in the common notion of evolution. The lower exists for the sake of the higher, therefore the highest is that for which everything else exists, and which itself exists for the sake of nothing else. Therefore it depends upon nothing else, or is a beginning or foundation. Therefore in going onwards towards the highest, one is going backwards towards the beginning.

l. 14. By reflection is meant the bending or turning back of a false conception towards its correction or truth. See preceding note.

P. 117, l. 3. The common notion of any particular substance, say, of this lump of ice before me, contains two factors. In the first place the ice is a reality, not a nonentity or a mere relation to something else. I cannot annihilate it, and if I could annihilate everything else, it would still subsist. But, secondly, it is more than this. It is a force, it *does* something. It cools the things round it, it supports the air above it, it compresses the sawdust on which it lies, &c. This activity is its spontaneity, its individuality; but the individual is the self-related negative or the particular that respects nothing outside itself, the *particular particular*; therefore the activity of substance is its self-related negativity.

l. 4. The general notion of substance contains, as we have seen, two factors: (1) its mere reality or subsistence, its inertia by which it is an impediment to external action, in fact, its passivity, and (2) its spontaneity or activity. Now, as we may expect, the true relation between these two factors will be their identity in opposition, i. e. that activity and passivity are distinct, yet identical, and, what is more, identical not *along with*, but *in*, being distinct. But this true relation between activity and passivity has to establish itself out of the untruth of lower conceptions of the relation. These lower stages are in general immediacy, and mere mediation. Therefore the first and lowest conception of

the relation between these two factors or substance is the conception of them as immediate, as existing in indifference to each other, as merely *presupposed* opposites. This is the conception of agent *and* patient, a passive *and* an active substance. But presupposition in general, the acceptance that a thing is there already, as opposed to position or the laying down of a thing, is passivity. Therefore the conception of agent and patient is a *passive* representation of the relation between *passivity* and *activity*.

∴ We may put the matter in a more general way. We saw in the Introduction that rising from lower to higher, true to false, there are three general forms of conception: immediacy, where *A* and *B* have an indifferent subsistence; mediation, where *A* and *B* have an indifferent subsistence and *at the same time* are united in a relation; and identity in opposition, where *A* and *B* are identical *in* their opposition. Now in the second form, mediation, *A* and *B* have, each of them, two factors; *A* contains its own intrinsic being and also its reference to *B*, and *B* contains its own intrinsic being and also its reference to *A*. How then are we to conceive these two factors? How are we to conceive the relation between *A*'s intrinsic being and its reference to *B*? Here the triadic process must be repeated. There are three ascending forms in which the relation may be conceived. The intrinsicity of *A* and its outward reference may be conceived as indifferently subsisting each on its own account, that is, in the form of immediacy; or more truly, they may be conceived mediately, as *at the same time* independent and related; or finally, in their full truth, as absolutely identical. In the conception of two separate *presupposed* substances, one active and the other passive, the *intrinsic* and *relative* factors of substance are contemplated in immediate indifference. In the second step of the evolution of substance—which is the stage of the first negation—the indifferent immediacy of its two factors is qualified, and they are conceived as related. The third stage is their absolute identity in their opposition.

∴ P. 121, l. 2. Spinoza's system recognizes the phenomena of human individuality and human freedom (see Spinoza's *Ethica*, Bks. IV and V, *passim*), though it reduces them to

modes (*Bestimmungen*) of the fundamental substance. So far its position is unassailable. All that one can do in the way of *external* attack is to insist, as did Leibniz, on the essential and infinite self-dependence of the individual as against Spinoza's essential and infinite reality of the universal substance; that is, to pit one half-truth against the other.

I. 19. 'Inner' in the sense of latent, not expressed. According to Spinoza the solar system, for example, follows as a mode necessarily from the nature of God or substance; it stands in necessary connexion with the idea of substance. But where is the necessity? It is not visible; given the idea of God as eternal self-existence and nothing else, could one deduce the solar system? The sun melts wax, i. e. the melting of wax is necessarily connected with the heat of the sun. But where is the necessity? It is there, but not visible. The heat of the sun and the melting of the wax though connected by an invisible bond of necessity remain in themselves naturally indifferent independent heterogeneous facts. Their identity is concealed or internal. But two steps in a train of reasoning are absolutely identical in the sense that their unity is expressed or stated; the thinking of one is necessarily the thinking of the other; in fact, the truth is the indissoluble totality of which the different steps are mere factors. Therefore one is not an opposite to the other, but only its other self; and the relation of anything to another that is not really an *other* at all, but only itself (as, for example, the relation of the transcendental ego to the object) is freedom.

P. 122, l. 11. The general character of the concept, or what Hegel calls the concept of the concept, is determined by its genesis. The essential character of substance, as against the concept which is its outcome or truth, is the *imperfect identification* of its two factors, its absolute existence or self-identity and its positivity or external manifestation. In the vulgar notion of substance the identification is only rudimentary. The plain man represents to himself the absolute existence or self-identity of a substance as a *substratum* in which the positivity or accidents inhere or are

stuck; the only identification being local contiguity. With Kant's conception of substance we are on a different plane. Here the self-identity or absolute existence has become a necessary concept connecting the positivity or successive manifold; the self-identity has become the *synthesis* of the positivity. But the identification is only half-completed. For the identity *falls outside* the manifold. We conceive, say, a certain colour *a* and a certain taste *b* identified as qualities synthesised by the necessary concept *x*. But we cannot argue from *a* to *b*, or from *b* to *a*; or, to put it more correctly, *a* does not lead to *b*, nor *b* to *a*. It is simply that we posit, *besides a* and *b*, an identity that unites them. The complete identification of the two factors is only found in pure thought or the concept, where each particular leads of itself to the other; that is, where the identity is given in the manifold, or the absolute existence in the positivity. This concept therefore is substance seen in its truth, or substance in which the imperfect identification of its factors has been made complete; and its essential character, to begin with, is the absolute identity of absolute existence and positivity, or to put it in a general way, the identity of identity and opposition. Therefore even before we proceed to develop the concept, its general character, or its sphere in general, contains the following factors: (1) identity, (2) opposition, (3) the identity of (1) and (2). (1) is the universal, (2) the particular, and (3) the singular. But although we distinguish these factors it is clear that each factor is itself the totality. Identity here, as we have seen from the genesis of the concept, is identity *in and through*, that is, identical with, opposition; and so forth.

P. 123, ll. 27-31. I have translated Hegel's *Daseyn* by 'existence', and his *Existenz* by 'real existence', having in mind Locke's use of these terms. By *Daseyn* Hegel means the universal sphere or predicate of finite being, simply a thing's *being there*; in the language of Locke, an idea 'suggested to the understanding by every object without and by every idea within'. *Existenz*, on the other hand, is a category of the sphere of essence or reflection, a sphere that has sundered itself into contrasts of reality and appearance,

potentiality and actuality, and the like. Hence it is a term of much narrower extent and much richer content than *Daseyn*; and in this way it corresponds generally to the *real existence* of Locke. In the passage before us the two terms are used indifferently; but this is because they can both be predicated of the ego, and because they both involve that aspect of the ego by which it stands in contrast to the concept, and therefore the difference between them is irrelevant to the point in question.

P. 125, l. 9. p. 142 in Kirchmann's 1884 edition.

P. 127, l. 18. *Vorstellung*, which I have translated by *representation*, signifies the universal of sense that stands between the image, which is sensuous and individual, and the concept, which is universal and non-sensuous. It is the 'general idea' of the English empiricists, which Locke found so embarrassing, and of which Berkeley and Hume attempted to give psychological explanations. It is the state of consciousness that naturally arises in us when, for example, we use the term *round*, thereby signifying something that is to be seen in the sun, the moon, in oranges, in pancakes, in plates, in saucepan-lids, and neither confining ourselves on the one hand to the contemplation of the image of any one of these objects, nor on the other hand advancing to the concept—in so far as we can apply the term *concept* to such a sensuous content—of the equidistance of a whole circumscribing line from one point. With the psychological nature of this representation we are not here concerned, but it is important to note its absolute distinction from the concept. Although it attains to a sort of universality—the universality of *average*—it still retains the essential character of sense. Its function, as its name implies, is to place an object before us. Thus the object is presupposed as real, and the *Vorstellung* only brings it close to us for our inspection. As the object remains without us, the *Vorstellung* by no means pierces to the heart of it, but is merely the presentation of its outside or appearance. Hence it is no better than a lifeless picture, in the words of Spinoza *quid nutum instar picturae in tabula*, a statical presentation of the external frame of reality. On the other hand the concept, as Hegel views it, far from being the presentation

of a reality, is itself the reality, in which the so-called object is merged ; and it contains in its inner dialectic the archetype of all the movement and life of the world.

See Spinoza's *Ethica*, Bk. II, Prop. XL, Schol. I ; Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, p. 171 ; and Hegel's *Religionsphilosophie*, pp. 137-140 (ed. 1840).

l. 19. Psychology is the science of the soul regarded in itself, the phaenomenology of spirit is the science of the soul as cognitive, and in relation to an object.

l. 28. The spheres of being and concept, as respectively the spheres of immediacy and of identity of opposites, correspond *in general* to Kant's intuition as *the given*, and Kant's concept as *the a priori synthesis*.

P. 130, l. 8. The contrast between the attitude of religion and philosophy towards the presumptive reality may be illustrated by their attitudes towards popular science as presented, for example, in the common theory of evolution. This so-called theory is not, properly speaking, a theory at all, but a naked narrative of the history of the universe ; and accordingly the religious spirit has a perfectly right *feeling* of the inadequacy, and therefore of the essential falsehood, of such science. But when the religious spirit attempts to find expression for this feeling, it commonly gives itself away. For it endeavours to question the narrative, to alter certain details in it, or to introduce fresh ones so as to disturb the balance of the whole. But it has no evidence to support its strictures and corrections, and popular science can so far afford to laugh at it. Philosophy, on the other hand, lays its finger on the real falsehood of the theory, which is not that the narrative is a false narrative, but that every narrative as such is an inadequate and therefore false presentation of reality. If a child had witnessed the interview between Goethe and Napoleon, and, being questioned as to who were conversing on the occasion, had replied 'two persons', we should rightly consider his answer a worthless and absurd one. But this would not mean that he should have said three persons or four persons instead of two. His numbers would have been quite correct ; but the whole numerical aspect as such is a sorry failure to present

the reality. Two persons, by all means; but who were they? So of the scientific 'theory' of evolution we may say: a perfectly correct *précis* of the facts, no doubt; but what is their significance?

P. 137, l. 6. p. 105 in Kirchmann's 1884 edition.

P. 142, l. 5. Hegel is fond of insisting on this identity of internality and externality. See below, p. 226, ll. 21-22, and p. 232, ll. 4-5. His general meaning may be illustrated as follows. If *A* and *B* merely stand in a necessary connexion, it *does not appear from A*, or it *is not stated in A* that *B* must follow; therefore the identity of *A* and *B* is non-apparent, latent, or *internal*. But it is clear that this same nature of the necessary connexion might be expressed by calling it a merely *external* unity, in the sense that the connexion with *B* is *not contained in the essence of A*.

P. 152, l. 5. The infinite and absolute spirit is the philosophic mind: or, in a less perfect form, the artistic and religious mind. For the philosophic mind is the reason that sees the reason of everything, or, in other words, sees everything as reason, sees everything as its own. It is the absolute totality. See above, p. 91.

P. 177, l. 20. See below, p. 284.

P. 187, l. 13. *In general* the judgement of existence corresponds to the reading of the judgement in connotation; the judgement of reflection to the reading of the judgement in denotation. The higher forms of judgement, the judgement of necessity and the judgement of the concept, introduce logical considerations that the ordinary formal logic ignores.

P. 193, l. 12. The proposition that *the sun is round* involves in it two judgements: (*a*) a judgement that gives to this solitary individual, the sun, the entry into the great, wide-reaching, all-pervading association of circularity; (*b*) a judgement that from the infinite, dazzling, life-giving, myriad-sided wealth of this concrete whole, the sun, picks out the solitary quality of roundness; (*a*) is the assertion that the singular is universal, (*b*) is the assertion that the universal is singular. But though these two judgements are involved in the proposition in question, they are by no means co-ordinate:

or, the proposition *states* only the first of them. To get the second, we have to give a value—a logical value, of course—to each of the terms besides, or as against, their significance as mere judgement terms; we have to say *The singular— which as containing predicates is a concrete whole or universal— is a universal— which as attached to a subject is an isolated quality or singular.* Thus the subject and predicate obtain a logical content.

P. 194, l. 12. The student must not make the mistake of supposing that Hegel, following Antisthenes, is rejecting the affirmative judgement on the ground that the subject and predicate are not synonymous and that nevertheless the copula asserts their absolute or tautological identity. His criticism is rather that a judgement of this type asserts a relation or agreement *in general* between terms that are only determined as unrelated or directly opposed in character. But may not this defect be remedied by the recognition of the definite relation implied in a judgement? May not the judgement *the dog is an animal* be brought into a truer form by reading it as *the dog is a species of animal*? Certainly; and the whole business of Hegel's chapter on the Judgement is to recognize such truer forms. But since this recognition is a logical one, it must mean the successive necessary evolution of the higher forms from the lowest, whereas in the ordinary logic the only recognition they get is that a paragraph on them is to be found in the same volume with the formulation of judgements under the general scheme *S is P.*

When we recognize that the judgement *the dog is an animal* really means *the dog is a species of animal*, the addition thus made to the judgement cannot be regarded as an addition to its content, a mere amplification of our predicate, as when we say *the dog is a four-legged animal.* In that case the judgement:

Subject	Copula	Predicate
The dog	is	a species of animal

with its indefinitely relating copula and its generally opposed terms would leave us with the same difficulty as the proposition with which we started. Therefore the addition is to be regarded as a determination of the copula, and there-

fore of the form. It follows that the reduction of all judgements to the scheme *S is P* is a logically false formulation.

But do we not, as a matter of fact, often think such an undetermined relation between two terms? Certainly; and such is the significance of the affirmative judgement that lies before us. Such a judgement, however, is dialectical, because it is an unfulfilled pretence. It professes to exhibit to us a relation between two terms, but when it produces the terms for us to see, they are not related. Therefore logic demands that it shall make good its claim; in Hegel's phrase, that it shall *posit* what is *intrinsically* in it. It must produce the relation that it alleges.

But when the affirmative judgement has thus defined itself, may we not say that it is reinstated? Not if we would speak with propriety; for when we recognize the closer significance of the copula, when we read, for example, *the dog is an animal* to mean *the dog is a species of animal*, what has really happened, if we look below the mere wording of the proposition, is that the affirmative judgement has disappeared as such, and has become merged in a higher form.

P. 198, l. 23. The world of time and space is phenomenal both for Kant and for Hegel, but for very different reasons. For Kant it is phenomenal because it is relative to our thinking and this relativity suggests a thing-*per-se*, an unknown and unknowable reality standing outside the relation. For Hegel it is phenomenal because it is the manifestation in an imperfect form of the absolute truth or pure thought, which is the thing-*per-se*-or ultimate ground to which every other form of being and thinking is reduced by its own dialectic.

P. 207, l. 30. If the logical categories are regarded as representative of an external reality, there may well be imperfect representations among them, imperfect in the same way as my mental picture of the objects in sight of my window is imperfect on a foggy day. In fact, there will be forms to express my ignorance as well as my knowledge. In this way the common logic treats the proposition *Some A is B* as the expression of our ignorance whether only a plurality of

A's or the totality of them comes under the attribute *B*. In this case of course there is no inference to *Some A is not B*. The fact that the term *some* is used frequently to connote *some at least* is not to the point. On Hegel's view of logic the appeal to the common use of language and to the ordinary notions of mankind becomes irrelevant.

P. 212, l. 34. The German text has *wesentliche*. Remembering that at p. 206, l. 23, Hegel has spoken of the subject as *an accidental*, one is tempted to read *unwesentliche* here. But the subject as reflected into its essence in the predicate becomes a manifestation of essence. See p. 134, l. 19.

P. 223, l. 5. For Hegel's defence of Goethe's theory of colour against Newton's see his *Naturphilosophie*, pp. 302-335 (ed. 1842). *Yellow* and *blue* constitute the 'direct opposition of the relationship between light and dark', *red* 'contains the opposition in equipoise', and *green* is the 'indifferent neutrality of the opposition'.

P. 224, l. 29. 'peculiarity', *eine Art und Weise*. See above, pp. 44-45.

P. 236, l. 3. S—P—U, that is, Singular—Particular—Universal.

P. 243, l. 5. This defect of the syllogistic process has done not a little to discredit logic in the popular mind. The vulgar belief that anything can be proved by logic, that a thing may be quite right logically, and yet be practically absurd, the vulgar denunciation of logic as 'cruel' and 'relentless', have been occasioned, not so much by wilful perversions and abuses of logical forms, as by the exclusive application of perfectly *legitimate* logical methods to one out of the many sides of a concrete reality. But, whereas the popular mind conceives that the only antidote for this self-stultifying logic is what it calls practical good sense, in reality it is the prerogative of logic to diagnose, expose, and remedy its own defects.

P. 256, l. 7. This attitude of the natural understanding towards formal logic is clearly and forcibly expressed in Locke's chapter on the syllogism (*Essay*, Bk. IV, chap. 17).

P. 265, l. 19. It follows that the popular condemnation of the syllogism as a *petitio principii* is only just in the case of

this particular form of syllogism, the syllogism of complete extension. In such a syllogism of existence as:—

Green is agreeable
This snake is green
Therefore it is agreeable

the truth of the conclusion is not assumed in the major premiss; on the contrary, though the conclusion is a formally correct inference, it may be in itself false. Nor does its falsity invalidate the major premiss. It would only do so if we were at liberty to substitute *everything that is green* for *green*. But this would imply that the presence of green in any individual concrete object was sufficient to overcome the disagreeableness of any of its other qualities and render it agreeable as a whole. Such a syllogism of existence is itself no doubt a faulty form; but its fault is not *petitio principii*. See above, p. 242.

P. 284, l. 7. For the further realization of the concept in its consummation as idea, see above, pp. 79-85.

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